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Carl Schmitt’s Historicity between Theology and Technology
Joshua Reinhold Smeltzer
This thesis interprets the work of the German jurist and state theorist Carl Schmitt through
the lens of a ‘double-historicism’ by using unpublished archival materials – journal entries,
letters, manuscripts, and marginalia. Not only were Schmitt’s ideas and writings shaped by
his intellectual and political context, but he himself viewed legal and political concepts as
historically contingent. The first chapter reconstructs the ‘canonization’ of Carl Schmitt in
the field of political theory, focusing on the reception and sanitization of his work in English
language scholarship. The second chapter excavates Schmitt’s concept of ‘historicity’ and his
turn to the founder of the Historical School of Law, Friedrich Carl von Savigny, in lectures
given in 1943 and 1944. I then argue this historical turn is the key to understanding Schmitt’s
postwar work, connecting four major monographs published concurrently in 1950.
The following chapters show how Schmitt mobilizes historicity as a critique of natural law
theories and the right of resistance against tyrannical regimes (chapter 3), the appropriation of
Scholastic just war doctrines in the postwar period (chapter 4), Marxism’s weaponization of
legality (chapter 5) and utopianism as a form of annihilation of law and the ‘de-localization’
of both nature and man (chapter 6). Schmitt saw both legal positivism and natural law
theories as posing an existential crisis to the future of jurisprudence, one that could only be
overcome by recourse to a self-reflexive history of the discipline.
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Chapter 1
Carl Schmitt in the Anglosphere: The
Canonization of a Political Theorist
Shortly after the end of the Second World War, the German jurist and political theorist Carl
Schmitt found himself arrested by the American occupying authorities.1 Imprisoned first in
a camp in Berlin-Litcherfelde-Süd and then again in Berlin-Wannsee,2 the Prussian State
Councilor and Professor at the University of Berlin reached his nadir as an odious figure in
the history of German political and legal thought for his association with and support of the
National Socialist dictatorship. Even his closest former students, Ernst Rudolf Huber and
Ernst Forsthoff, did not write to their former mentor.3
During this period of imprisonment, Schmitt turned his gaze towards the history of
political thought, finding parallels in his historical situation to that of Thomas More, or as
Schmitt describes him, ‘the patron saint of intellectual freedom.’4 Like Schmitt, More was a
lawyer and councilor at the center of political power. In the end, however, the two suffered
different fates: More was also imprisoned, though unlike Schmitt, he was executed by the
very powers that he had served. And yet Schmitt complains that More had ‘made astounding
concessions to the tyrant before the time had come that he became a martyr and a saint.’5
1 Schmitt’s arrest was individually arranged by Karl Loewenstein and not part of the automatic arrests as
both Schmitt himself and his interrogator at Nuremberg, Robert Kempner, would later characterize it. See
Reinhard Mehring, Carl Schmitt: Aufstieg und Fall (Frankfurt: C.H. Beck, 2009), p. 442; Carl Schmitt, Ex
Captivitate Salus: Erfahrungen der Zeit 1945/47 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010 [1950]), p. 96; Carl
Schmitt, Antworten in Nürnberg (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2000), p. 21.
2 Schmitt, Antworten in Nürnberg, p. 11.
3 Mehring, Carl Schmitt, p. 444.
4 Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 21. ‘Der Schutzheilige der geistigen Freiheit.’
5 Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 21. ‘Dem Tyrannen erstaunliche Konzessionen gemacht, ehe es soweit war,
daß er zum Märtyrer und Heiligen wurde.’
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That Pope Pius XI could still canonize More in 1935 as a symbol of resistance to totalitarian
regimes despite these ‘astounding concessions’ demonstrated to Schmitt that even the saint
of intellectual freedom himself did not engage in resistance at all costs. For Schmitt, if such
a standard held for the exceptional case of a saint, then certainly Schmitt himself had been
under no obligation to resist the tyranny of the National Socialist regime, as the same rule
applies in all times of the concentration of political power: ‘non possum scribere in eum qui
potest proscribere.’6 It is not possible to write about that which has the power to proscribe.
Held within an American internment camp in 1945/6 and held once again as a potential
defendant at the Nuremberg Trials,7 a future rehabilitation of Schmitt’s academic reputation
would have appeared absurd; and yet, today, Carl Schmitt has been canonized in the Anglo-
sphere. Such proclamations are ubiquitous: whether it is the ‘canon of twentieth-century
political theory in America,’ the ‘canon of IR’s most influential critical figures,’ or the ‘late
modern canon’ of political theology, Carl Schmitt figures as a towering intellectual figure, the
newest political thinker to be elevated to the status of an academic saint.8 If not the person,
then we are told that Carl Schmitt’s work, fully autonomous from its author and its historical
context, belongs in the canon: ‘The great breadth and erudition of what is, in a self-evident
sense, Schmitt’s magnum opus appears destined to guarantee a place for Nomos of the Earth
in the canon of essential IR reading.’9 The extent of Schmitt’s veneration, particularly among
the self-identified political left, raises a simple question: how is it that an influential National
Socialist jurist became canonized in Anglophone literature?
This chapter argues that Schmitt’s reception underwent two constitutive processes: in
the first phase, Schmitt was introduced to an Anglophone audience as a historical figure,
one whose reputation could be salvaged by myopically rewriting his history. To make
Schmitt into a saint, this first process relied on what I describe as ‘the Myth of 1936,’
or the belief that Schmitt’s persecution by the Schutzstaffel in 1936 provides sufficient
evidence to establish that he was in fact an opponent of National Socialism, a position more
radical than even Carl Schmitt himself would attempt during his Nuremberg interrogations.
6 Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 21. Contained as well in ‘Stellungnahme I’ in Schmitt, Antworten in
Nürnberg, p. 73. On Schmitt’s repeated usage of this phrase in the context of the right of resistance, see
Chapter 3, Section 3.
7 Mehring, Carl Schmitt, pp. 448-450; Helmut Quaritsch, ‘Carl Schmitt im Nürnberger Justizgefängnis,’ in
Carl Schmitt, Antworten in Nürnberg, pp. 11-13, 15.
8 Andrew Norris, ‘A Mine that Explodes Silently. Carl Schmitt in Weimar and After,’ Political Theory 33(6)
(2005), 887-898, p. 887; Benno Gerhard Teschke, ‘Fatal Attraction: A Critique of Schmitt’s International
Political and Legal Theory,’ International Theory 3(2) (2011), 179-227, p. 182; Rocco Rubini, ‘Review: The
Future of Illusion: Political Theology and Early Modern Texts,’ Modern Philology 113(1) (2015), E53-E55,
p. E53.
9 William Hooker, Carl Schmitt’s International Thought: Order and Orientation (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), p. 3.
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Furthermore, this first phase, while superficially historical, depicts Schmitt as a passive
participant in German history, one whose writings did nothing more than describe a series
of contemporary political situations. I argue that this passive historicism in fact contradicts
Schmitt’s own understanding of his texts: Schmitt saw himself as engaged in a form of
intellectual warfare no less significant than physical war. The second phase, taking place
after Schmitt’s canonization, concerns the political left’s contemporary appropriation of his
writings. While Schmitt had Marxist students and admirers such as Otto Kirchheimer, Franz
Neumann and Walter Benjamin, the new generation of self-identified ‘left-Schmittians’ has
little in common with these previous thinkers. Instead, the ‘left-Schmittians’ – primarily
represented by Andreas Kalyvas and Chantal Mouffe – have further eroded the historical
elements of Schmitt’s thought in their attempt to formulate a critique of liberalism through
what they describe as Schmitt’s ‘radical democracy.’
1.1 The Myth of 1936: The Beginnings of the Schmitt Re-
naissance
This section focuses on two early texts that shaped the reception of Carl Schmitt for Anglo-
phone audiences: George Schwab’s The Challenge of the Exception (1970), the first major
monograph devoted to Schmitt’s work available in English, and Joseph Bendersky’s Carl
Schmitt: A Theorist for the Reich (1983), the first English language intellectual biography.
As both monographs were published at a time when few of Schmitt’s texts were available in
English translation and the secondary literature was correspondingly small, these monographs
were in a position to establish their own narrative for Schmitt’s rise and fall and thereby
shape the Schmittian renaissance in the Anglosphere.10 This section corrects a number of
their factual and interpretive inaccuracies while tracing the diffusion of these inaccuracies in
the broader wave of literature on Carl Schmitt.
10 By the time of Bendersky’s biography, only the 1932 edition of Der Begriff des Politischen (translated by
George Schwab in 1976) was available in English. The introduction and foreword both fail to mention
the revised third edition of the text published in 1933. Alain de Benoist, Carl Schmitt: Bibliographie
seiner Schriften (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2003), p. 14. Further, this narrative fits with Telos’ largely
self-congratulatory interpretation of the Schmitt Renaissance. Gary Ulmen, ‘Review of Joseph Bendersky,
Carl Schmitt: Theorist For the Reich,’ Telos 59 (1984), 201-212, p. 203; Joseph Bendersky, ‘Schmitt
and Hobbes,’ Telos 109 (1996), 122-129 p.122; Joseph Bendersky, ‘New Evidence, Old Contradictions:
Carl Schmitt and the Jewish Question,’ Telos 132 (2005), 64-82, p. 64. See as well Matthew Specter,
‘What’s “Left” in Schmitt? From Aversion to Appropriation in Contemporary Political Theory,’ in eds. Jens
Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons, The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014), 426-455, p. 448.
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As George Schwab wrote in the preface to his The Challenge of the Exception, his study
of Schmitt’s work would begin in 1921, with the publication of Die Dikatur, and end in
1936, just three years after Hitler’s Machtergreifung. The year 1936 is a carefully chosen
bookend to his study: Schwab justifies the abrupt break in his monograph due to ‘an attack on
[Schmitt] in 1936 by the Gestapo newspaper, Das Schwarze Korps,’ after which ‘[Schmitt]
ceased writing on problems pertaining to jurisprudence and politics (with few exceptions)
until the end of World War II.’11 Schwab’s statement constitutes the first articulation of a
foundational myth in Schmitt scholarship, one which will here be termed ‘the myth of 1936.’
That Schmitt was indeed attacked in the pages of Das Schwarze Korps in 1936 is a docu-
mented fact12; however, every other assertion contained in the above quotation is false. First,
Das Schwarze Korps was not a Gestapo newspaper but was rather run by the Schutzstaffel
(SS) and issues of the newspaper carried the subtitle ‘Zeitung der Schutzstaffeln der NSDAP –
Organ der Reichsführung SS.’ Second, in no way did Schmitt cease writing on ‘problems
pertaining to jurisprudence and politics’ in the nine years between 1936 and 1945. Even if
one were to forget that Schmitt was not a legal dualist13 and adopt a relatively narrow under-
standing of ‘jurisprudence and politics,’ Schmitt published extensively on both of these topics
during the time period Schwab identifies: for example, a monograph on Der Leviathan in der
Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes (1938); individual essays on ‘der Staat als Mechanismus
bei Hobbes und Descartes’ (1937), ‘Stellungnahme der Wissenschaftlichen Abteilung des
NS.-Rechtswahrerbundes zum Entwurf einer Strafverfahrensordnung’ (1937), ‘Neutralität
und Neutralisierungen’ (1939), ‘Über das Verhältnis von Völkerrecht und staatlichem Recht’
(1940), ‘Das “allgemeine deutsche Staatsrecht” als Beispiel rechtswissenschaftlicher Sys-
tembildung’ (1940), ‘Die Stellung Lorenz von Steins in der Geschichte des 19. Jahrhundert’
(1940), ‘Reich – Staat – Bund’ (1940), ‘Der Staat als ein konkreter, an eine geschichtliche
Epoche gebundener Begriff’ (1941), ‘Die Formung des französischen Geistes durch den
Legisten’ (1942), and ‘Behemoth, Leviathan und Greif – Vom Wandel der Herrschaftsformen’
(1943); further, the numerous essays on jurisprudence and politics edited, curated, and repub-
lished in Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar – Genf – Versailles (1940); and lastly,
a series of public lectures on Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft (1943/44).14
The sheer volume of publications in this period can hardly constitute ‘[ceasing] writing on
11 George Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt
between 1921 and 1936 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1970), pp. 7-8.
12 Mehring, Carl Schmitt, pp. 378-380; Andreas Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt: Sein Aufstieg zum ‘Kronjuris-
ten des Dritten Reiches’ (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchhandlung, 1995), pp. 671-677.
13 See, from the time period under consideration, Carl Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft
(1943/44)’ in Carl Schmitt, Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2003 [1958]),
386-429. This text is discussed further in the following chapter.
14 Benoist, Carl Schmitt: Bibliographie seiner Schriften und Korrespondenzen, pp. 26, 29, 32, 80-92.
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problems pertaining to jurisprudence and politics’ in any meaningful sense of the phrase.
However, the intern and function of Schwab’s claim is clear: after there years of trying to
gain influence with the National Socialist regime, Schmitt himself became a target of that
very regime.
In Joseph Bendersky’s subsequent intellectual biography, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the
Reich, the Myth of 1936 undergoes a slight mutation. Bendersky corrects the first error,
noting that Das Schwarze Korps was indeed an organ of the SS, and substantially expands on
the extent of the SS-Sicherheitsdienst (SD) campaign against Schmitt using contemporaneous
archival documents.15 At the same time, however, the Myth of 1936 becomes the cornerstone
of an exculpatory account of Schmitt’s involvement with National Socialism, one that has
spread throughout Schmitt literature.16 Bendersky uses the existence of an SS campaign
against Schmitt to justify his most vitriolic anti-Semitic attacks at the 1936 conference
on ‘Judaism in Jurisprudence,’ claiming that Schmitt was merely ‘trying to sound like a
devoted National Socialist’ in order to protect himself from persecution.17 That Schmitt
needed to try is itself a puzzling assertion given that he had more than enough practice in
his writings on National Socialist jurisprudence between 1933 and 1936 – he certainly did
not need to try then, nor did he in 1936. Moreover, Bendersky uses the severity of the SS
campaign against Schmitt to construct an even stronger version of Schwab’s second argument,
writing ‘to avoid further complications, [Schmitt] never again dealt with domestic or party
politics, but turned his attention to the study of international relations, and soon passed into
obscurity.’18 Just six pages later, and Bendersky repeats again, ‘with the exception of his
Hobbes studies, all of Schmitt’s publications between 1937 and 1945 dealt with international
law and politics.’19 Thus, while Schwab had at least relativized his claim by noting the
existence of some exceptions – admittedly an understatement – Bendersky transformed it
into an absolute statement and moved even further away from an accurate representation of
Schmitt’s intellectual output during this period.
15 Joseph Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p.
232.
16 From the pages of Telos alone, see Ulmen, ‘Review of Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich,’ p. 209; Paul
Hirst, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Decisionism,’ Telos 72 (1987), 16-26, p. 16; Joseph Bendersky, ‘Carl Schmitt at
Nuremberg,’ Telos 72 (1987), 91-96, p. 91; Joseph Bendersky, ‘Carl Schmitt as Occasio,’ Telos 78 (1988),
191-208; George Schwab, ‘Carl Schmitt Hysteria in the US: the Case of Bill Scheuerman,’ Telos 91 (1992),
99-107, p. 104; Gary Ulmen, ‘Schmitt as Scapegoat: A Reply to Palaver,’ Telos 106 (1996), 128-138, p.
135; Bendersky, ‘Schmitt and Hobbes,’ p. 128; Paul Gottfried, ‘Ostracizing Carl Schmitt,’ Telos 109 (1996),
95-97, p. 95; Joseph Bendersky, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Path to Nuremberg,’ Telos 139 (2007), 6-34, p. 18.
17 Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, p. 235.
18 Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, p. 242. Emphasis added. Bendersky repeats the same
argument in ‘Carl Schmitt at Nuremberg,’ p. 93.
19 Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, p. 248. Emphasis added.
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Bendersky’s characterization of the events of 1936 raise two further problems. The first
problem is that he treats National Socialism as monolithic and ideologically uniform. Such
a characterization, however, fails to note the academic and ideological debates between
members of the Bund Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Juristen (BNSDJ) over an appro-
priate legal theory for the newly formed Third Reich. Moreover, the rhetorical function of
Bendersky’s assertion is that Schmitt was not a true or convinced National Socialist if the SS
in particular did not consider him to be one. However, following Bendersky’s logic would
lead to the absurd conclusion that Ernst Röhm was not a National Socialist because the SS
publicly denounced him. Indeed, in a recent publication, Bendersky summarizes the 1936
events by noting that Schmitt was under ‘Nazi attack for his lack of racial theory,’ attributing
the specifically SS attack on Schmitt to the Nazis as a unified entity.20 This follows Bender-
sky’s previous characterization of ‘the Nazi rejection of [Schmitt],’ implicitly equating the
SS with ‘Nazi true believers.’21 This raises the first problem: should contemporary scholars
defer to the judgment of the SS?
This first problem can be articulated in Schmitt’s own vocabulary as quis judicabit – who
decides? In subsequent publications defending his thesis, Bendersky repeatedly attributes this
authority to the SS. For example, in a review of Scheuerman’s The End of Law, Bendersky
criticizes Scheuerman for asserting that Schmitt remained a National Socialist after 1936.
Bendersky writes, ‘contrary to an abundance of evidence that Schmitt was a mere figurehead
temporarily tolerated by the Nazis, Scheuerman insists that Schmitt really was an influential
Nazi theorist and remained so even after the SS attacked him in 1936.’ He continues to
chastise Scheuerman, noting that he ‘neglects, among others, the most crucial set of evidence:
the extensive SS file on Schmitt detailing the purge of him on the grounds that he was an
opportunist and former anti-Nazi with Weimar Jewish affiliations.’22 Schwab as well turned
to the Myth of 1936 to criticize Scheuerman’s interpretation.23 However, such an argument
only makes sense if one holds that only the SS could decide who was a National Socialist. In
that sense, Scheuerman was correct in responding, ‘if a Prussian Staatsrat (State Councilor),
editor of the crucial Die Deutsche Juristenzeitung, leader in the Nazi professors’ guild,
prominent Berlin professor, author of a flurry of anti-Semitic pamphlets, and organizer of the
infamous 1936 Conference on Judaism in Jurisprudence is not a “real” Nazi, who is?’24
20 Joseph Bendersky, ‘On the road to Damascus: The Telos Engagement with Carl Schmitt,’ Telos 183 (2018),
69-94, p. 85.
21 Bendersky, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Path to Nuremberg,’ p. 18.
22 Joseph Bendersky, Review of David Dyzenhaus, Law as Politics, and William Scheuerman, The End of Law,
in Central European History 34(1) (2001), 116-120, p. 119.
23 Schwab, ‘Carl Schmitt Hysteria,’ p. 102.
24 William Scheuerman, ‘The Fascism of Carl Schmitt: A Reply to George Schwab,’ German Politics and
Society 29 (1993), 104-111, p. 105.
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It is worth noting that the Bendersky and Schwab interpretation of 1936 is even more
exaggerated than the version Schmitt himself gave during his interrogation as a potential
defendant at Nuremberg. During the interrogation, Schmitt is much more specific than those
who would later interpret him. For example, he notes that ‘in the year 1936, I was openly
defamed by the SS.’ He notes further that ‘Frank’s position was not strong enough to protect
me from the SS.’25 These statements undermine Bendersky and Schwab in two ways: in the
first sense, they show that Schmitt himself knew that it was specifically the SS that publicly
attacked him in 1936, not ‘the Nazis’ as a whole; and second, they show that, far from being
a critic of the National Socialists, Schmitt was reliant on Hans Frank, founder and head of the
BNSDJ, Reichminister and later Governor General of Occupied Poland, for protection. Thus,
the claim that Schmitt himself makes is much narrower: ‘I was an opponent of the SS.’26
In subsequent publications, the Myth of 1936 is presented as a contextual fact, one that
is necessary for any historically accurate reading of Schmitt’s work. For example, Nevil
Johnson repeats that ‘after three years of unconvincing contortions to justify the new regime
he fell into disfavor and retreated into what he hoped would be the safety of silence.’27 It
appears in the 1996 translator’s foreword to The Concept of the Political with no supporting
citation.28 In Schwab’s introduction to his 1996 translation of Schmitt’s The Leviathan in the
State Theory of Thomas Hobbes, he notes ‘the thesis advanced here is one shared by Schmitt
scholars, namely that 1936 constitutes a watershed for Schmitt.’29 Upon closer inspection,
the ‘Schmitt scholars’ Schwab cites are himself and Bendersky, thereby passing off a highly
controversial claim as a widely accepted fact in scholarly literature; indeed, this is made all
the more dubious given that Bendersky, prior to publishing his Schmitt biography, praised
Schwab in a review of his works for drawing attention to precisely this point.30
Leaning on the Myth of 1936 has thus allowed George Schwab, Joseph Bendersky, and
those who follow their interpretation31 to perpetuate two claims in the Schmitt literature.
The first is that Carl Schmitt, although a member of the National Socialist party, was not a
25 Schmitt, Antworten in Nürnberg, pp. 75-76, 86. ‘Ich war im Jahre 1936 durch die SS öffentlich defamiert
worden’; ‘Die Stellung Franks war nicht stark genug, mich vor der SS zu schützen.’
26 Schmitt, Antworten in Nürnberg, p. 65. ‘Ich war Gegner der SS.’
27 Nevil Johnson, ‘Review of Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich,’ The English Historical Review 101(398)
(1986) 301-302, p. 302.
28 Tracy Strong, ‘Foreword: Dimensions of the New Debate around Carl Schmitt,’ in Carl Schmitt, The Concept
of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. x. Strong also limits Schmitt’s anti-semitism
to the years 1933-1936, a position that was neither then nor now tenable. p. xxv.
29 George Schwab, ‘Introduction,’ in Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes, trans.
George Schwab (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), p. ix.
30 Joseph Bendersky, ‘Carl Schmitt Confronts the English-Speaking World,’ Canadian Journal of Political and
Social Theory 2(3) (1978), p. 130.
31 See for example, Paul Piccone and Gary Ulmen, ‘Introduction to Schmitt,’ Telos 72 (1987), 1-14, p. 11.
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convinced National Socialist, and, in fact, only ‘when threatened by the ideological purists in
the party’ did Schmitt ‘[take] up the anti-Semitic cause as a means of proving his ideological
conversion.’32 This forms the opportunist or ‘lip-service’ thesis.33 Bendersky takes his
argument so far as to argue that, by 1935, ‘[Schmitt] found himself articulating ideas about
race and the Jews which he thought were truly absurd,’ a description of Schmitt’s cognitive
state that is supported with no evidence.34 Bendersky’s opportunism thesis directly echoes
George Schwab’s interpretation of the same events: ‘to avoid renewed failure, Schmitt
joined the National-Socialist bandwagon of anti-Semitism,’35 or as he phrases it in a later
text, ‘Schmitt turned to traditional antisemitism as a means of displaying his loyalty to the
regime.’36 Indeed, Schwab proposes an entirely exculpatory – and indeed incredulous –
interpretation of Schmitt’s practice of ‘marking’ Jewish authors after 1933. Schwab writes,
‘concerned with the widespread practice of plagiarizing Jewish authors, Schmitt insisted,
however, that if a Jewish author had to be cited at all, he must not be ignored but mentioned
as a “Jewish author.” By insisting on this Schmitt had hoped to raise the respectability
of German scholarship which had received mortal blows since 1933.’37 Thus, marking
Jewish authors – for example, referring to Friedrich Julius Stahl as ‘Stahl-Jolson,’ using his
pre-Christian name – was merely an attempt at curbing rampant academic plagiarism among
aspiring lawyers at German universities. Schwab’s only evidence for this interpretation? ‘On
32 Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, p. 281.
33 William Scheuerman, Review of Bernd Rüthers, Carl Schmitt im Dritten Reich, in German Politics and
Society 23 (1991), 71-79, p. 72; Bendersky, ‘Carl Schmitt at Nuremberg,’ p. 95; Ulmen makes the same
argument in Ulmen, Review of Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, p. 209.
34 Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, p. 228.
35 Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception, p. 107.
36 Schwab, ‘Schmitt Studies in the English-Speaking World,’ p. 453. The argument is repeated in Schwab,
‘Carl Schmitt Hysteria,’ p. 102.
37 On this practice, see Raphael Gross, Carl Schmitt und die Juden (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2005), p. 129.
Unfortunately, Schwab either did not realize the function of appending ‘-Jolson’ to Stahl’s name or he simply
did not care, as Schwab himself adopts Schmitt’s practice of referring to ‘Friedrich Stahl (Jolson)’ and
simply ‘Jolson.’ Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception, p. 119. Bendersky has likewise repeated the
marking in Bendersky, ‘Schmitt and Hobbes,’ p. 128. Referring to ‘Stahl-Jolson’ is surprisingly common
in literature on Schmitt. For a non-exhaustive list, see Hooker, Carl Schmitt’s International Thought, p.
48n51; David Boucher, ‘Schmitt, Oakshott and the Hobbesian Legacy in the Crisis of Our Times,’ in Law,
Liberty and State eds. David Dyzenhaus and Thomas Poole (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2015), p. 138; Christiano Grottanelli, ‘Mircea Eliade, Carl Schmitt, René Guénon, 1942,’ Revue de l’histoire
des religions, 219(3) (2002), 325-356, p. 335; Christoph Schmidt, ‘Der häretische Imperativ: Gershom
Scholems Kabbala als politische Theologie?’ Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 50(1) (1998),
61-83, p. 68n24; Johan Tralau, ‘Order, the Ocean, and Satan: Schmitt’s Hobbes, National Socialism, and the
Enigmatic Ambiguity of Friend and Foe,’ Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
13(2), 435-453, 438; Srinivas Aravamudan, “‘The Unity of the Representer’: Reading Leviathan against the
Grain,’ South Atlantic Quarterly 104(4) (2005), 631-653, p. 637; Carmelo Jiménez Segado, ‘Carl Schmitt
and the “Grossraum” of the “Reich”: A revival of the Idea of Empire,’ paper presented at the colloquium
‘The International Thought of Carl Schmitt,’ The Hague, 2004, p. 6.
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this information I rely on my conversations with Carl Schmitt.’38
Over thirty years later, Bendersky has been forced to retreat from his defense of Schmitt’s
anti-Semitism in the face of numerous examples both before and after the Third Reich,39 par-
ticularly illuminated in Raphael Gross’ Carl Schmitt und die Juden.40 With the publication of
additional archival resources, such as Carl Schmitt’s private notebooks and his Glossarium,41
the evidentiary basis for Schmitt’s anti-Semitism has only been strengthened.42 Thus, as
Bendersky now claims, ‘the diaries now categorically refute interpretations of Schmitt’s anti-
semitism as an opportunistic compromise limited to the Nazi years.’43 With the ‘lip-service’
thesis in ruins, Bendersky’s new alternative interpretation is that Schmitt was merely an
‘unusual’ anti-Semite, one whose ‘relationships with and attitudes towards Jews was nuanced,
complex (often vague) and certainly inconsistent as well as contradictory.’44
The second problem arising from the Myth of 1936 is the claim that Schmitt’s publications
after the SS attacks were not National Socialist or anti-Semitic – in other words, while it was
possible to criticize Schmitt for his ‘reprehensible compromises between 1933 and 1936,’
those three years were the extent of his intellectual corruption and opportunism.45 Such
an argument is meant to limit the contagion of what were blatantly propagandistic texts
published immediately after the Machtergreifung. In an early review article, Bendersky held
38 Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception, p. 136n7. In contrast, see the highly textual reading of the same
episode in Gross, Carl Schmitt und die Juden, p. 129. Schwab’s reliance on Schmitt’s ex post recollections
is characteristic of this period in Schmitt literature, particularly within the pages of Telos, during which
Schmitt gave interviews and granted access – though ostensibly selective access – to his personal records.
See Schwab, ‘Introduction,’ in Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan, p. xiv; Schwab, ‘Carl Schmitt Hysteria,’ pp.
104-105, 106; and Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, pp. xi, xiii, 289, 290; Bendersky,
‘Schmitt and Hobbes,’ pp. 125, 128; Gary Ulmen, ‘Continuity in Carl Schmitt’s Thought,’ Telos 119 (2001),
18-31, p. 29n39. For Stefan Breuer, reliance on Schmitt’s recollections means that even a nominally historical
work is doomed to repeat Schmitt’s self-interpretation. See Stefan Breuer, Review of Joseph Bendersky,
Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, in Kritische Justiz 17(1) (1984), 110-113, p. 111.
39 Curiously, despite making this point himself, Bendersky does not cite his own work, but rather the work
of the Telos editors, Paul Piccone and Gary Ulmen. See Bendersky, ‘On the road to Damascus,’ Telos 183
(2018), 69-94, pp. 85-88.
40 Gross, Carl Schmitt und die Juden.
41 Richard Faber, ‘Es gibt einen antijüdischen Affekt! Über Carl Schmitts “Glossarium,”’ Zeitschrift für
Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 46(1) (1994), 70-73. The initial Telos response to these notebooks was to
downplay the comments as ‘easily distorted’ and to note that they were never intended to be published. See
Ulmen, ‘Schmitt as Scapegoat,’ p. 132. Another attempt to downplay the contents was to characterize them
as ‘the bitterness of an aging former celebrity.’ See Gottfried, ‘Ostracizing Carl Schmitt,’ p. 95.
42 See Gross’ restatement in Raphael Gross, ‘The “True Enemy”: Antisemitism in Carl Schmitt’s Life and
Work,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt eds. Jens Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017), 96-116.
43 Joseph Bendersky, ‘Schmitt’s Diaries’ in Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt, p. 119.
44 Bendersky, ‘Schmitt’s Diaries,’ p. 135.
45 George Schwab, ‘Schmitt Studies in the English-Speaking World,’ in Complexio Oppositorum: Über Carl
Schmitt (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1988), p. 448.
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that Schmitt began a period of ‘inner-emigration’ after the SS attacks, entirely neglecting
Schmitt’s writings between 1936 and 1945.46 For George Schwab, the texts after 1936 do
not warrant discussion; instead, he skips from Das Schwarze Korps article in 1936 to the
July 20 plot to assassinate Hitler in 1944, curiously linking Schmitt’s fall from grace to a
famous example of internal resistance and arguing that Schmitt’s invocation of the Benito
Cereno myth was as ‘an individual’s desperate situation in a totalitarian system. It symbolizes
an utter helplessness to communicate this specific situation to the outside world.’47 The
underlying justification for Schwab’s argument is that the texts after this period all dealt
with international law and international politics, and thus could not be tainted by National
Socialism. Instead, as Bendersky presents Schmitt, after the events of 1936, he became a
critic of ‘Nazi totalitarianism,’ one who ‘cautiously [cloaks] his dissatisfaction in erudite
pieces of scholarship.’48
Bendersky has never retreated from the Myth of 1936. In a recent article commemorating
thirty years of Telos’ engagement with Schmitt, Bendersky cites Samuel Garrett Zeitlin’s
introduction to his translation Land and Sea as evidence of the journal’s reconsideration
of the persistence of Schmitt’s anti-Semitism; however, Bendersky noticeably ignores the
main thrust of Zeitlin’s argument: published in 1942, Land and Sea ‘was written as a work
of National Socialist propaganda.’49 Indeed, Bendersky chastises others for perpetuating
‘the erroneous notion, that [Schmitt] was a Nazi thinker’ and for attempting to ‘re-Nazify’
Schmitt.50 Instead, he characterizes opposition to the Myth of 1936 as indicative of academic
elitism: ‘Such hysterical inferences emanating from professors at major research universities
and the most prestigious presses (with accolades in eminent scholarly journals) offered yet
another validation of Telos’s broader scrutiny of New Class intellectuals.’51 That such an
attack on the academic position of scholars such as William Scheuerman, David Dyzenhaus,
and John McCormick – characterized by Bendersky’s fellow travelers as ‘self-appointed
46 Bendersky, ‘Carl Schmitt Confronts the English-Speaking World,’ p. 126. Bendersky has recently repeated
this claim in Bendersky, ‘Schmitt’s Diaries,’ p. 137. Ulmen repeats this uncritically in Ulmen, Review of
Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, p. 209; Ulmen, ‘Continuity in Carl Schmitt’s Thought,’ p. 30.
47 Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception, p. 143.
48 Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, pp. 244-245. See as well Ulmen, ‘Schmitt as Scapegoat,’ p.
135.
49 Samuel Garrett Zeitlin, ‘Propaganda and Critique: An Introduction to Land and Sea’ in Carl Schmitt, Land
and Sea trans. Samuel Garrett Zeitlin (Candor: Telos Press, 2015), xxxi-lxix, p. lxix.
50 One might respond that it is difficult to ‘re-Nazify’ someone who refused denazification. Joseph Bendersky,
‘The Definite and the Dubious: Carl Schmitt’s Influence on Conservative Political and Legal Theory in the
US,’ Telos 122 (2002), 33-47, pp. 34, 36.
51 Bendersky, ‘On the road to Damascus,’ p. 82; Paul Piccone and Gary Ulmen, ‘Uses and Abuses of Carl
Schmitt,’ Telos 122 (2002), 3-32, p. 6; for the broader Telos critique of ‘New Class intellectuals,’ see Paul
Piccone, ‘Ten Counter-theses on New Class Ideology: Yet Another Reply to Rich Jonstone,’ Telos 119
(2001), 145-155, p. 146; Paul Piccone, ‘Ostracizing Carl Schmitt,’ Telos 109 (1996), 87-91.
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ideological gate-keepers’52 – is the only counter-argument Bendersky can present is itself
a telling admission of the crumbling evidentiary support for the Myth of 1936 and, more
broadly, the thirty years of engagement with Schmitt within the pages of Telos.
The second chapter of this thesis on Schmitt’s turn to historicity refutes both aspects of
the Myth of 1936: first, the chapter is centered on a series of speeches Schmitt delivered in
1943/44, published after the war as Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft. This text,
written and delivered during Schmitt’s supposed period of ‘inner-emigration,’ shows that
Schmitt in fact continued to write and speak on issues of jurisprudence and domestic politics
well after 1936 – indeed, this was a text about the current state of European jurisprudence,
one which was delivered across the continent. In addition, chapter two also seeks to depict a
more complicated relationship between Schmitt and National Socialism at the end of the war.
Zeitlin was correct to note that Hitler’s violation of the Hitler-Stalin pact marked a turning
point for Schmitt’s view of the Third Reich53; speaking after the Pact was broken, Schmitt’s
text demonstrates a continued reliance on National Socialist texts and thinkers while at the
same time a critical approach to the National Socialist leadership.
1.2 Historicism or Apologetics?
In a parallel movement to constructing the Myth of 1936, both Schwab and Bendersky
advanced a particular methodological approach to Schmitt’s texts: historicism. While
this approach is never explicitly formulated, it nevertheless is consistently applied in their
interpretation of Schmitt’s ideas. For example, Schwab warns the reader at the start of his
monograph that ‘no answers to universal philosophical questions will be forthcoming,’ as
Schmitt was only ever a lawyer, bound to the political configurations of a specific historical
moment.54 Schwab continues, ‘[Schmitt’s] ideas should not be separated from specific
constitutional events that were fraught with political overtones and that occurred during
these sixteen years.’55 Understanding Schmitt thus means reading him historically as a
commentator of the political and legal events unfolding around him.
Bendersky’s subsequent monograph follows the same line, noting that ‘there is an impor-
tant interrelationship between [Schmitt’s] ideas and the changing political circumstances he
confronted.’56 Bendersky presents Schmitt’s texts within the shifting historical contexts and
52 Piccone and Ulmen, ‘Uses and Abuses of Carl Schmitt,’ p. 15.
53 Zeitlin, ‘Propaganda and Critique,’ pp. xxxviii-xli.
54 Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception, p. 7.
55 Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception, p. 8.
56 Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, p. x.
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state structures of the German Kaiserreich, the Weimar Republic, and the Third Reich. This
approach can be seen, for example, in Bendersky’s argument that Schmitt’s theory of the
Ausnahmezustand – the state of exception – developed while Schmitt served at the Prussian
general staff headquarters where ‘he had been assigned to the state-of-war section involved in
administering martial law. The practical and legal problems this entailed stirred within him
an abiding interest in dictatorship and in the Ausnahmezustand.’57 Thus, Schmitt’s personal
biography, in addition to the broader context of German political and constitutional history,
forms an essential component for interpreting Schmitt’s texts.
While this dissertation advances a historical approach, there are two problems with the
method applied by Schwab and Bendersky. The first problem is that while both authors
routinely invoke ‘historical context’ as a bludgeon against their critics, their own framing of
the historical context and selective use of sources is inadequate to that standard. Bendersky
accuses his critics of ‘distorting Schmitt’s ideas either by taking certain selections out of
context or by analyzing them in a historical vacuum,’ reducing them to ‘blatant example[s]
of such an ahistorical approach.’58 He disparages another of his critics as presenting ‘another
ahistorical, distorted picture painted by selectivity.’59 Moreover, in condemning the use
of Schmitt’s Glossarium as an interpretive device, Bendersky laments that ‘no one has
systematically examined these notes in situational or historical context.’60
At the same time, however, Bendersky’s use of Schmitt’s postwar recollections as ex-
culpatory evidence for his actions under National Socialism undermines any pretense of
an accurate historical construction. For example, while distancing Schmitt from the Nazi
leadership due to the latter’s anti-intellectualism, Bendersky quotes Schmitt as having later
recounted to him, ‘Besides, what would I say to [Hitler]? . . . I would have to sit him in a
chair and deliver a lecture.’61 While an amusing anecdote, such a story is at best evidence of
Schmitt’s postwar characterization of his previous attitudes, not evidence of those attitudes
themselves. Such a problem is, however, a problem of praxis, of Bendersky and Schwab
failing to adhere to their own methodological standards, not a problem of those standards
themselves.
There is a larger, theoretical problem looming in Schwab and Bendersky’s historical
57 Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, pp. 19, 22.
58 Joseph Bendersky, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Conservative Revolution,’ Telos 72 (1987), 27-42, pp. 29-30, 32;
Joseph Bendersky, Review of David Dyzenhaus, Law as Politics, and William Scheuerman, The End of Law,
p. 119.
59 Bendersky, Review of David Dyzenhaus, Law as Politics, and William Scheuerman, The End of Law, p. 119;
Bendersky, ‘Carl Schmitt as Occasio,’ p. 203.
60 Bendersky, ‘New Evidence, Old Contradictions,’ p. 71.
61 Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, p. 220.
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approach. For both authors, historicism means that Schmitt was a passive participant in
German history, one who was merely describing the political and legal contexts in which he
found himself. For example, Schwab euphemistically describes Schmitt’s National Socialist
constitutional theory, Staat, Bewegung, Volk as ‘a keen observation and approbation of the
emerging political situation in 1933 and, as it turned out, it was to an extent in accord
with the facts thereafter.’62 Such a description of the text renders Schmitt quite literally as
an observer, not a participant in history. Piccone and Ulmen claim that Schmitt’s ‘work
was always inextricably rooted in problematic historical contexts’ and that they are thus
‘primarily historical and . . . tied to immediate political problems.’63 In such an account,
Schmitt is reduced to being merely a diagnostician; his texts, precisely because they are
bound to a specific historical context, can only describe that context. Schwab’s interpretation
of historicism assumes that Schmitt has no agency, that his words exist apart from reality,
and that his writings were never intended to exert political influence.
Once again, Schwab’s arguments mirror those made by Schmitt during his Nuremberg
interrogations. As the transcripts reveal, Robert Kempner, his interrogator, was specifically
interested in Schmitt’s ‘participation [Mitwirkung], direct and indirect, in the planning of
wars of aggression, of war crimes and crimes against humanity.’64 That Kempner uses the
word ‘Mitwirkung’ is important as it implies that Schmitt had to have some sort of effect
[Wirkung] on the planning. However, this accusation is precisely what Schmitt denies in
his subsequent interactions with Kempner, remarking that he ‘did not strive’ for a policy,
‘but rather made a diagnosis.’65 Or, as he says later, ‘I went the way of steadfast scholarly
observation.’66 If Schmitt were in fact merely commenting on shifts occurring in the world
around him, Kempner’s accusations of ‘Mitwirkung’ would fall flat: a diagnostician cannot be
blamed for the disease he identified. As a result, Schmitt’s invocation of passive historicism
during his interrogation is designed to shield him from the specific accusations raised by the
prosecution; indeed, it is precisely this characterization of Schmitt’s work that is reintroduced
to Schmitt scholarship through George Schwab.
Bendersky’s writings fall victim to the same false equivalence of historicism and help-
lessness. Excusing Schmitt’s support of the National Socialists, Bendersky writes ‘Faced
with the realities of Nazi power, he attempted to make his ideas compatible with National
62 Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception, p. 112.
63 Piccone and Ulmen, ‘Uses and Abuses of Carl Schmitt,’ pp. 3, 13.
64 Schmitt, Antworten in Nürnberg, pp. 52, 59. ‘an Ihrer Mitwirkung direkt und indirekt an der Planung von
Angriffskriegen, von Kriegsverbrechen und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit.’
65 Schmitt, Antworten in Nürnberg, p. 53. ‘nicht erstrebt, sondern eine Diagnose gestellt.’ Emphasis added.
66 Schmitt, Antworten in Nürnberg, p. 68. ‘Ich bin den Weg unbeirrter wissenschaftlicher Beobachtung
gegangen.’ Emphasis added.
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Socialism.’67 Gary Ulmen adopts this line, claiming that ‘when it was all said and done,
Schmitt was forced to recognize that National Socialism had become the dominant force
in German politics.’68 Such an interpretation effectively gives Schmitt a carte blanche for
his texts published after 1933 – his writings merely described ‘the realities of Nazi power’
without themselves having any effect.
Adopting a passive historicism has allowed for a radical sanitization of Schmitt’s writings
on the Großraumtheorie published in 1941. If the Myth of 1936 holds, then the texts –
written after Schmitt’s supposed ‘inner-emigration’ – cannot be National Socialist texts,
as Schmitt was already a ‘subtle critic’ of the regime. Schwab, Bendersky, and Ulmen all
mobilize a form of passive historicism to interpret and ultimately rehabilitate this text. For
example, Ulmen follows Bendersky in arguing that ‘after the Nazis were in control of most
of Europe, Schmitt expanded his concept accordingly . . . he analyzed changes only after they
had taken place.’69 Schmitt’s theory of Großraum is accordingly described as ‘his diagnosis
and prognosis’70 of the changing configuration of international politics, merely describing the
formation of political blocks already underway. In a rather fantastical turn, George Schwab
claims that ‘Schmitt pointed out that the new political realities in Europe were outpacing
developments in international law,’ and as a result of this new political context, Schmitt
‘argued for the need to subject the German politics of Großraum to scholarly investigation
and to international law.’71 Thus, by neutralizing Schmitt’s texts as purely a descriptive
account of changing political realities, Bendersky, Schwab, and Ulmen can simultaneously
maintain the Myth of 1936, portray Schmitt as merely a passive observer to the National
Socialist dictatorship, and sanitize the origins of the Großraumtheorie.72
Such an interpretation of passive historicism violates Schmitt’s own understanding of the
polemical function of political and historical texts. Already in Schmitt’s Weimar writings,
he is clear that writing a passive description is itself impossible, as ‘all political concepts,
ideas and words have a polemical meaning. They have a concrete opposition in mind and are
bound to a concrete situation.’ 73 Indeed, political concepts are themselves part of Schmitt’s
67 Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, p. 207.
68 Ulmen, Review of Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, p. 209.
69 Ulmen, Review of Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, p. 210.
70 Gary Ulmen, ‘Toward a New World Order: Introduction to Carl Schmitt,’ Telos 109 (1996), 3-28, p. 27.
71 Schwab, ‘Carl Schmitt Hysteria,’ p. 106. For a counter-reading of the same text, see Smeltzer, ‘Reich,
Imperium, Empire.’
72 Sanitizing the Großraum concept is important for Schwab, as his foreign policy texts on the ‘open-society’
block is directly inspired by it as a Großraum formed by ‘shared values.’ Schwab makes this connection
explicit in Complexio Oppositorum, p. 417.
73 Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963 [1932]), p. 31. ‘Alle
politischen Begriffe, Vorstellungen und Worte [haben] einen polemischen Sinn; sie haben eine konkrete
Gegensätzlichkeit im Auge, sind an eine konkrete Situation gebunden.’ Emphasis in original.
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friend/enemy distinction: they are formed in concrete oppositions. To argue that Schmitt’s
own work could have been the only exception to an absolute claim and could have functioned
as a politically neutral description of historical events, is a categorical misreading of his
work.
Schmitt’s analysis of Hobbes’ Leviathan frontispiece delivers the clearest rejection of
Schwab and Bendersky’s passive historicism. Although the frontispiece is famous, Schmitt’s
commentary and its implications for his own work remains overlooked.74 There, Schmitt
reads the frontispiece through the conceptual lens of the friend/enemy distinction. Under
the famous depiction of the leviathan as constituted by a number of small individuals, the
frontispiece contains a series of five images on the bottom left and another five images on the
bottom right. The left side falls under the sword held in the Leviathan’s hand, a symbol of
‘worldly’ conflict; on the right side, a bishop’s crook, symbolizing the spiritual world. For
Schmitt, the five symbols on each side represent parallel ‘means of power and conflict.’ For
example, ‘the castle and the cannons correspond to institutions and intellectual methods on
the other side, the combat value of which is not any less.’75 Just as one might fight a war
with rifles, Schmitt sees political concepts as a means of fighting intellectual warfare; and,
as he makes clear in the previous quotation, this form of combat can be just as significant.
Thus,Schmitt credits Hobbes with ‘the great realization, that concepts and distinctions are
political weapons, that is specifically weapons of indirect authority.’76
Although this position is articulated most clearly in Schmitt’s interpretation of Leviathan,
it remains a consistent position within his broader work. Indeed, even those texts which
Schmitt himself describes as a history, such as Staatsgefüge und Zusammenbruch des zweiten
Reiches are themselves polemical, meant at making a particular intervention in contemporary
politics.77 Thus, Bendersky and Schwab’s historicism only generates half of the double-
historicity necessary to interpret Schmitt’s work: while emphasizing the role of historical
context is correct, it needs to be extended to give an account of what Schmitt was doing
with his publications. One need not reach to Meaning and Understanding to arrive at such a
conclusion; rather, the polemical function of texts arises organically within Schmitt’s work:
74 For example, Victoria Kahn discusses the frontispiece in an article on Schmitt, seemingly unaware that
Schmitt himself had commented on it. See Victoria Kahn, ‘Hamlet or Hercuba: Carl Schmitt’s Decision,’
Representations 83(1) (2003), 67-96, p. 87.
75 Carl Schmitt, Der Leviathan In der Staatslehre Thomas Hobbes (Cologne: Hohenheim Verlag, 1982 [1938]),
p. 26. ‘Den Festungen und Kanonen entsprechen auf der anderen Seite Einrichtungen und intellektuelle
Methoden, deren Kampfwert nicht geringer ist.’
76 Schmitt, der Leviathan, p. 26. ‘Die große Erkenntnis, daß Begriffe und Waffen “indirekter” Gewalten sind,
wird auf diese Weise gleich auf der ersten Seite des Buches anschaulich gemacht.’
77 See Joshua Smeltzer, “‘Germany’s Salvation”: Carl Schmitt’s Teleological History of the Second Reich,’
History of European Ideas (2018) and Zeitlin, ‘Propaganda and Critique.’
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if ‘all political concepts, ideas and words have a polemical meaning,’ then one only need ask
which ‘concrete opposition [they have] in mind’ and ‘to which concrete situation [they are
bound].’78 This dissertation thus adopts an approach of active historicism: rather than treating
Schmitt’s publications as academic exercises informed by – but nevertheless incapable of
influencing – shifting political contexts, it views these publications as themselves political
interventions. Furthermore, while the precise polemical target is not always identified in the
published text, unpublished sources can help to identify the intended object of his critique.
At a historiographical level, Bendersky and Schwab should be treated as one line in the
Schmitt literature, one that is echoed in the works of Paul Piccone and Gary Ulmen.79 The
question that has long dominated Schmitt literature is the question of a cordon sanitaire
between Schmitt’s works before and after 1933: could Schmitt’s texts after Hitler’s Machter-
greifung be read as a logical consequence of the positions he sketched during the Weimar
Republic?80 This sub-section has instead focused on a second posited ‘break’ in Schmitt’s
work occurring in 1936. It has argued that maintaining a clear distinction is impossible, itself
based on limited evidence and exaggerated claims related to Schmitt’s defamation at the
hands of the SS in 1936. It is not the blatant apologetics propagated by Günter Maschke;
rather, it is a subtle alteration of facts to limit Schmitt’s personal responsibility. As William
Scheuerman has quipped, Schmitt literature underwent something resembling a ‘societal “un-
learning”’ in the 1980s at the hands of the ‘Young Schmittians’ – the first-hand knowledge of
Schmitt’s defense of National Socialism became slowly distorted until the image of Schmitt
no longer matched historical reality.81 Although this process of ‘unlearning’ was popularized
within the pages of a relatively small academic journal, Telos, its impact continues to haunt
contemporary Schmitt scholarship.82 As such, the first stage of Schmitt’s canonization was
78 Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,’ History and Theory, 8(1) (1969),
3-53; Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, p. 31.
79 Contra Roger Chickering, Review of Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich by Joseph Bendersky, The History
Teacher 18(2) (1988), 311-312, p. 311. In agreement, see Martin Jay, Review of Carl Schmitt: Theorist for
the Reich by Joseph Bendersky, The Journal of Modern History 56(3) (1984), 558-561, p. 559. Bendersky
has argued that he remains committed to a different political ideology than Schwab; this may be true, but
their interpretation of 1936 is almost identical. See Bendersky, ‘Carl Schmitt as Occasio,’ p. 204.
80 Ingeborg Maus, Bürgerliche Rechtstheorie und Faschismus: Zur sozialen Funktion und aktuellen Wirkung
der Theorie Carl Schmitts (Munich: Fink Verlag, 1976); a condensed, English version of the argument in
Ingeborg Maus, ‘The 1933 “Break” in Carl Schmitt’s Theory,’ in Law as Politics ed. David Dyzenhaus
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 196-216. This line is advanced in William Scheuerman, The End of
Law (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999); the influence of Maus on Scheuerman, particularly on the
‘indeterminancy’ thesis, is documented in William Scheuerman, ‘Revolutions and Constitutions: Hannah
Arendt’s Challenge to Carl Schmitt’ in Law as Politics, 252-280, pp. 274-275; See as well Jay, Review of
Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, p. 560.
81 Scheuerman, Review of Carl Schmitt im Dritten Reich, p. 71.
82 See most recently Udi Greenberg,‘Revolution from the Right: Against Equality,’ in The Cambridge History
of Modern European Thought, eds. Peter Gordon and Warren Breckman (New York: Cambridge University
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complete: the newest saint of political theory appeared where a National Socialist had once
stood. Carl Schmitt had become, in the words of Gary Ulmen, ‘The modern equivalent of
Hobbes.’83
1.3 Left-Schmittiana: Radical Democracy or Radical Delu-
sion?
From its moment of inception, the Schmitt Renaissance led by George Schwab was aimed
at undercutting the image of Schmitt articulated by one German émigré in particular: Otto
Kirchheimer. Kirchheimer plays no prominent role in Schwab’s The Challenge of the Ex-
ception – he appears in a single footnote84 – and yet the book’s publication history reveals
the antagonism between Schwab and Kirchheimer. In 1962, George Schwab submitted his
dissertation on Schmitt, what would later become the book, while at Columbia University.85
Kirchheimer, as a member of Schwab’s doctoral committee, exercised his veto power over
the dissertation.86 To quote Schwab’s own recollection, Kirchheimer rejected Schwab’s
dissertation because Schmitt was a ‘trailblazer of National Socialism’: Kirchheimer found
Schwab’s thesis to be nothing less than ‘an apologia’ for Schmitt’s actions.87 In a retro-
spective account offered by Piccone and Ulmen, Schwab’s thesis was an early victim of the
“‘politically correct” climate of Columbia University in the 1960s.’88 Schwab was only be
able to pass his dissertation following Kirchheimer’s death by submitting a doctoral thesis
on a different subject.89 As the previous section has shown, both Schwab and subsequently
Bendersky have worked to neutralize Kirchheimer’s thesis by arguing that Schmitt was never
anything more than an opportunist – there could be no substantial linkages between his work
and his actions.
Press, 2019), 233-258, p. 225. On Telos’ impact on Schmitt’s popularity, see Matthew Specter, ‘What’s
“Left” in Schmitt?’ p. 426.
83 From the title of a paper given in 1980 at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.
Cited in Schwab, ‘Schmitt Studies in the English-Speaking World,’ p. 451.
84 Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception, p. 125n48.
85 Schwab, ‘Introduction to the Second Edition,’ The Challenge of the Exception (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot
1989 [1970]), p. v.
86 See Marcus Llanque and Herfried Münkler, “‘Vorwort” von 1963 (9-19),’ in Carl Schmitt: Der Begriff des
Politischen: Ein kooperativer Kommentar ed. Reinhard Mehring (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2003), p. 12.
87 See the transcribed discussion between Volker Neumann, George Schwab, and Günter Maschke in Complexio
Oppositorum, p. 462.
88 Piccone and Ulmen, ‘Uses and Abuses of Carl Schmitt,’ p. 10n12
89 Ulmen, Review of Bendersky, Carl Schmitt 203; Gary Ulmen, ‘Return of the Foe,’ Telos 72 (1987), 187-193,
p. 187n3.
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This dissolution between Schmitt as an individual in history and the texts that he has
produced allowed for the rise of a second wave of scholarly literature on Schmitt by those
who define themselves as ‘Left-Schmittians.’ While there had been previous Schmitt students
on the political left, particularly Kirchheimer and Neumann, and Schmitt had played the
role of an intellectual foil to figures such as Jürgen Habermas,90 this new generation of
‘Left-Schmittians’ had no aversion to drawing concepts from the ‘Crown Jurist of National
Socialism.’ This section considers two of its most esteemed exponents: Chantal Mouffe and
Andreas Kalyvas.91 I argue that while the first constituitive process allowed for a sanitization
of Schmitt’s involvement with National Socialism, the second meant a complete severance
between Schmitt the historical person and his work. In so doing, I am not criticizing normative
democratic theory as such; rather, my interest in this section is to show how left-Schmittians
have deployed the German jurist in the pursuit of their own agendas. Once Schmitt is taken
as a precursor to radical democratic theory, it is clear that the Schmitt reception has entered
the realm of the ‘extraordinary.’
Chantal Mouffe uses Schmitt primarily as an interlocutor for thinking through what
she identifies as ‘the democratic paradox.’ For Mouffe, ‘it is the incapacity of democratic
theorists and politicians to acknowledge the paradox of which liberal-democratic politics is
the expression which is at the origin of their mistaken emphasis on consensus and sustains
their belief that antagonism can be eradicated.’92 The primary target of her critique is a
particular form of deliberative democracy and consensus building articulated in the postwar
theories of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, with contemporary adherents to be found
in Seyla Benhabib and Joshua Cohen.93 Against these theories, Schmitt delivers a potent
weapon by locating a paradox in the component elements of liberal democracy, liberalism
and democracy. Democracy, for Mouffe, always requires some sort of aspect of belonging,
and equality of the demos in contrast to non-equal treatment of those on the outside; at the
same time, however, liberalism requires the equality of mankind as such, without reference
to categories of belonging. The first portion of Mouffe’s Schmitt appropriation uses his
diagnosis of this paradox without following Schmitt’s conclusion that democracy inherently
negates liberalism, while liberalism inherently negates democracy. Instead, Mouffe insists
that the site of the democratic paradox has a productive potential, namely in ‘the category
90 Specter, ‘What’s “Left” in Schmitt?’ p. 427.
91 Kalyvas has positioned his work as transending the ‘Right and Left Schmittian’ divide; however, Kalyvas is
generally considered a Left-Schmittian and maintains a similar position as Mouffe. See Andreas Kalyvas,
Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 85.
92 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), p. 8.
93 See for example the frequent discussions in Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, pp. 46-49, 85-90, 132-133,
137; Chantal Mouffe, ‘Politics and Passions: the Stakes of Democracy,’ in James Martin and Chantal Mouffe,
Hegemony, Radical Democracy, and the Political (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 182-183, 228.
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of the “adversary” as the key to [envisaging] the specificity of modern pluralist democratic
politics, and it is at the very centre of [her] understanding of democracy as ‘agonistic
pluralism.”’94 Thus, for Mouffe, ‘if we accept Schmitt’s insights about the relations of
inclusion–exclusion which are necessarily inscribed in the political constitution of the people
. . . we have to acknowledge that the obstacles to the realization of the ideal free speech
situation . . . are inscribed in the democratic logic itself.’95
Without judging the validity of her conclusion – it may or may not be true that democratic
logic precludes the ideal free speech situation envisaged by Habermas – it would seem that
Schmitt cannot deliver the theoretical foundation for Mouffe’s critique. The primary text
relied upon by Mouffe is titled Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus,
a commentary on the intellectual-historical situation of contemporary parliamentarism. In
other words, in the first instance, Schmitt delivered a thoroughly historical critique, not a
commentary on the eternal nature of liberal democracy as Mouffe reads him.96 For Mouffe,
one of the primary problems facing the political is its negation in the “‘post-political” vision’
of the post-Cold War period and the creation of a ‘world “beyond left and right.”’ Mouffe
argues that this ‘negation of antagonism . . . is not only conceptually mistaken, it is also fraught
with political dangers.’97 However, the historical context of Mouffe’s own writings and her
stated political impetus are irreducible to Schmitt’s time and his historical analysis: Mouffe
sees herself as delivering a critique of New Labour and the Democratic party under Bill
Clinton.98 However critical one may be in regards to Third Way politics, neither the United
States under Clinton, nor the United Kingdom under Blair can be conceivably compared
to the political situation of the Weimar Republic. Indeed, the fixation of using the Weimar
Republic as a catch-all depiction of democratic failure does more to obscure theoretical
analysis than it does to illuminate.99
At the same time that Mouffe radically ahistoricizes Schmitt’s work, she simultaneously
commits a misreading of his concept of enmity, or Feindschaft. A central aspect of Mouffe’s
theory is to insist on the possibility of a productive ‘agonistic pluralism,’ one which constructs
“‘them” in such a way, that it is no longer an enemy to be destroyed, but as an ‘adversary,’
that is, somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not
put into question.’100 As she explains further, ‘adversaries fight each other because they
94 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 14.
95 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 48.
96 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 57.
97 Mouffe, On the Political, p. 2
98 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 113; Mouffe, ‘Politics and Passions,’ p. 232.
99 See David Runciman, How Democracy Ends (London: Profile Books, 2018), pp. 2, 4, 9.
100Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 102.
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want their interpretation to become hegemonic; but they do not question their opponent’s
right to fight for the victory of their position.’101 This means that ‘an adversary is an
enemy, but a legitimate enemy, one with whom we have some common ground because we
have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy: liberty and
equality.’102 The problem with this interpretation, however, is that it contradicts Schmitt’s
stated understanding of enmity. In Der Begriff des Politischen, Schmitt criticizes pacifist
theorists for ‘transcending the limits of the political framework’ and ‘[degrading] the enemy
into moral and other categories . . . [making] of him a monster not only be defeated but also
utterly destroyed.’103 Later in the same text, he says those who claim to fight for humanity
are those who ‘deny the enemy the quality of being human’ which allows for ‘war to be
driven to he most extreme inhumanity.’104 Instead, the drive to annihilation comes with the
dissolution of the jus publicum europaeum and the criminalization of war – the enemy is
no longer an equal but rather becomes a criminal, one who has committed a crime against
humanity, and must therefore be punished. It would seem that Schmitt criticizes the very
view of enmity Mouffe ascribes to him. As a result, the self-description of Left-Schmittians
as delivering a ‘form of “tamed” or “sublimated” antagonism,’ her translation of the German
Feindschaft, is instead more of a simple repetition of the original Schmittian idea in disguise
than a ‘tamed’ version.105
Lastly, Mouffe champions the idea of engaging with Carl Schmitt’s ideas, rather than Carl
Schmitt himself as the author of those ideas. In a particularly direct passage defending her
use of Schmitt, she argues that ‘I believe that it is the intellectual force of theorists, not their
moral qualities, that should be the decisive criteria in deciding whether we need to establish
a dialogue with their work.’106 However, as I have already hinted at above, and will continue
to elaborate over the course of this dissertation, at the core of Schmitt’s intellectual thought
lies a commitment to historicity, without which his writings remain unintelligible. Instead,
by reading Schmitt how he himself read other authors, by following his own commentary
on the significance of the history of political and legal thought, and by tracing his turn to
the philosophy of history – all of these aspects point towards the necessity of engaging with
Schmitt the historical person simultaneously with his ideas. In other words, it is impossible
to separate the ‘intellectual force’ of Schmitt’s writings from their historical context because
101Mouffe, ‘Politics and Passions,’ p. 186.
102Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 102.
103Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 36. Emphasis
added.
104Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 54.
105James Martin and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony, Radical Democracy, and the Political, p. 231, repeated again
p. 232.
106Mouffe, On the Political, pp. 4-5.
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Schmitt’s ideas were themselves historical.
Like Mouffe, Andreas Kalyvas engages with Schmitt in the name of furthering democratic
theory. To that end, Kalyvas issued a call in 1999 for a new wave of Schmitt scholarship,
contrary to the work of John McCormick, William Scheuerman, and David Dyzenhaus, that
would be deliberately ‘reconstructive and selective’ in engaging with Schmitt’s work as ‘a
comprehensive theoretical framework [for articulating] the relationship between constituent
power, sovereign decision and democracy.’107 A reconstructive approach would mean,
for Kalyvas, ‘[removing insights] from their broader theoretical context, philosophical
underpinnings, and political intentions.’108 The concept of constituent power, for example,
could be lifted out of Schmitt’s broader oeuvre and the historical context in which he
mobilized it in the pursuit of radically different ends.109 By freeing concepts from their
historical, theoretical, and political contexts, Kalyvas aimed towards ‘a new reconfiguration,
streeted this time explicitly in the direction of a radical democratic project.’110 Indeed for
Kalyvas, the point of studying Carl Schmitt is to derive normative answers to contemporary
questions of political theory, thus using the German jurist to think through questions such
as ‘What can Schmitt’s theoretical framework tell us about the possibility of a democratic
constitution? How can his work generate those conceptual resources for the redefinition of a
substantive idea of political freedom?’111
These are certainly some of the biggest questions of democratic theory; however, Kalyvas’
approach is even more ahistorical and problematic than Mouffe’s, preferring to ‘productively
appropriate’ components of Schmitt’s theory for their application in contemporary debates.
For Kalyvas, the primary task is to ‘rethink the extraordinary dimension of politics from the
perspective of democratic theory,’ and Schmitt’s work is a mere tool for that end along with
Max Weber and Hannah Arendt.112 However, in doing so, Kalyvas is no longer considering
why and to what end Schmitt was considering ‘the extraordinary,’ or even the function of
concept within Schmitt’s broader collection of writings. In other words, if Mouffe took an
ahistorical approach by separating the person from his work, Kalyvas takes this a step further,
107Andreas Kalyvas, ‘Who’s afraid of Carl Schmitt?’ Philosophy & Social Criticism 25(5) (1999), 87-125, p.
89. See also Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary, p. 11.
108Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary, pp. 293, 81.
109For a historical approach to Schmitt and constituent power, see Duncan Kelly, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Political
Theory of Representation,’ Journal of the History of Ideas 65(1) (2004), 113-134; Duncan Kelly, ‘Egon
Zweig and the Intellectual History of Constituent Power,’ eds. K. Grotke and M. Prutsch, Constitutionalism,
Legitimacy and Power: Nineteenth-Century Experiences (Oxford: University Press, 2014), 332-350.
110Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary, p. 293.
111Kalyvas, ‘Who’s afraid of Carl Schmitt?’ p. 89.
112Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary, p. 8.
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removing concepts from the very works in which they were written.113 As Matthew Specter
has correctly pointed out, ‘the new Left-Schmittians . . . use intellectual history when it suits
their purpose and dispute its relevance when it does not.’114 This, however, does not go
far enough: Left-Schmittians in fact begin with the belief that Schmitt has something to
contribute to contemporary discussions in political theory and reshape the historical context
to fit that narrative. As a result, Kalyvas could argue, for example, that Schmitt was a
forerunner of ‘anticolonial and postcolonial thinkers,’115 even though Schmitt lamented that
Versailles had ‘robbed Germany of its colonies’ – hardly the language of an anticolonial
thinker.116 However, once concepts have been ripped out of a broader body of work, and
their historical context has been deemed a priori irrelevant, Schmitt can be made to articulate
any number of disparate and contradictory positions. In the process, the term ‘Schmittian’
ceases to have any meaning.
1.4 The Afterlives of Saints
To pose an oft-repeated question in contemporary political theory, why study Carl Schmitt
today? Is the point, in the words of Jeffrey Herf, that we are ‘now to go in search of “tough
Germans” like Carl Schmitt to counterbalance the Habermasian softies who talk too much
about talking?’117 Certainly this route has been taken to critique Rawlsian deliberative
democracy and the work contemporary theorists such as Seyla Benhabib from the ‘Left-
Schmittian’ perspective.118 However, is there something more to be gained from thinking
and writing about the infamous twentieth century jurist?
Benjamin Schupmann’s 2017 monograph, Carl Schmitt’s State and Constitutional Theory,
provides one possible alternative: instead of locating the continued value of engaging with
Schmitt in the critique of theories of deliberative democracy, Schupmann sees Schmitt’s
work as a ‘theoretical foundation for liberal democrats today to conceive of themselves, and
their states, politically and as something worth defending in the face of today’s illiberal and
113For my broader criticism of Kaylvas, see Joshua Smeltzer, Review of Carl Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, eds.
Andreas Kalyvas & Federico Finchelstein, in History of Political Thought 39 (2) (2018), 369-372.
114Specter, ‘What’s “Left” in Schmitt?’ p. 428.
115Andreas Kalyvas, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Postcolonial Imagination,’ Constellations 25 (2018), 35-53, p. 36
116Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung, p. 73.
117Jeffrey Herf, ‘Reading and Misreading Schmitt: An Exchange,’ Telos 74 (1987), 133-136, p. 136; Peter Uwe
Hohendahl, Perilous Futures: On Carl Schmitt’s Late Writings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018), p.
120.
118For example Chantal Mouffe, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy,’ in Law as Politics,
159-178, pp. 165-168
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antidemocratic forces.’119 Such a position is quite novel. While Left-Schmittians deploy
Schmitt’s writings to critique the tenuous alliance of liberal democracy in favor of radicalizing
the democratic element, and a previous generation of Frankfurt School legal theorists such
as Ingeborg Maus characterized Schmitt as a bourgeois liberal for the sake of condemning
his theories,120 Schupmann combines aspects of both of these positions. He argues first
that Schmitt ‘believed liberal democratic states must commit politically to liberalism and
individual property rights,’ thereby prioritizing liberalism over democracy, and, second, that
Schmitt himself argued for a ‘commitment to individual liberty’ in his texts.121 Once Schmitt
has been recast as an ardent defender of political liberalism, Schupmann argues that Schmitt’s
theory provides ‘a normative basis and the institutional framework to halt the systematic
erosion of liberal constitutionalism from within.’122 To follow Schupmann, the purpose
of studying Carl Schmitt is therefore to mobilize his theories for the sake of liberalism’s
reinvention, legitimation, and salvation.
Schupmann’s interpretation is only possible as a result of a radical and explicit commit-
ment to ahistoricism. As he explains, ‘this book engages with Schmitt’s pre- and post-Weimar
writings and argues that a coherent theoretical core can be extrapolated from them.’123 This
premise is strikingly apparent in the footnotes: texts written during the Weimar Republic
appear side by side with those published under National Socialism and the Federal Republic.
In a chapter on ‘Basic Rights,’ Schupmann leaps from the Preußenschlag of 1932 to Schmitt’s
1949 commentary on the West German Grundgesetz to arrive at the conclusion that Schmitt
was a defender of individual liberties, omitting any discussion of his National Socialist era
texts.124 This leap of twenty-seven years is justified by Schupmann’s ‘continuity thesis’ that
Schmitt’s writings form a ‘coherent theoretical core’; however, the appearance of continuity
is only achieved by omitting outlying texts, shifts in Schmitt’s arguments, and possible
caesurae. The resulting image of Schmitt is one in which the Weimar era’s fiercest critic of
liberal democracy has been turned into its patron saint.
At the same moment that Schmitt is wheeled out as a defender of liberalism, he is increas-
ingly seen as a source of theoretical inspiration in the fields of International Relations theory
119Benjamin Schupmann, Carl Schmitt’s State and Constitutional Theory: A Critical Analysis (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017), p. 220.
120Ingeborg Maus, Bürgerliche Rechtstheorie und Faschismus. Zur sozialen Funktion und aktuellen Wirkung
der Theorie Carl Schmitts (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1980). For an excerpt in English, see Ingeborg
Maus, ’The 1933 “Break” in Carl Schmitt’s Theory,’ in Law as Politics, 196-216. For the intellectual
background of this argument, see Franz Neumann, Behemoth.
121Schupmann, Carl Schmitt’s State and Constitutional Theory, pp. 219, 200.
122Schupmann, Carl Schmitt’s State and Constitutional Theory, p. 219.
123Schupmann, Carl Schmitt’s State and Constitutional Theory, p. 27.
124Schupmann, Carl Schmitt’s State and Constitutional Theory, p. 200.
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and critical geopolitics. As one scholar posed the question, ‘Carl Schmitt in International
Relations: The Last Refuge of Critical Theorists?’125 William Hooker’s Carl Schmitt’s
International Thought (2009) remains the single most sustained attempt at systematizing
Schmitt’s international political and legal thought for International Relations theory. How-
ever, there are two major issues in Hooker’s contribution that reflect both the sanitization
of Schmitt’s involvement with National Socialism, as well as an acceptance of the passive
historicism of Bendersky and Schwab. Thus, Hooker claims that ‘I have tried in so far as it
is possible to emphasize the more major monographs, utilizing Schmitt’s essay pieces only
to clarify ambiguity, or to trace particular lines in the development of his thought.’126 The
problem with this approach is two-fold: first, it assumes that the monograph is the definitive
statement on a given subject, while all shorter publications were merely building blocks or
first attempts to work out an idea. If one approaches Schmitt’s texts in that fashion, one
cannot help but ignore the changing historical circumstances surrounding the publications.
This approach is particularly problematic given that Nomos of the Earth – the central text for
Hooker’s analysis – was largely conceived before 1945 but published only after the end of
the Second World War. As a result, it was scrubbed of the more overtly National Socialist
elements prior to publication. In other words, Hooker starts with a sanitized version of
Schmitt’s thought without accounting for the particular textual history that accompanies it.
Secondly, by only emphasizing major monographs – leaving aside the question of which
texts fall into that category – the themes and concepts which appear in smaller publications
remain neglected. In Hooker’s analysis, Schmitt’s entire contribution to the law of nations
and international politics ‘prior to the late 1930s,’ consisting of a number of essays but not a
single monograph, is condensed into a single paragraph, clearing the way for a discussion of
Schmitt’s attempt to ingratiate himself with the National Socialist party and his subsequent
fall from grace. In so doing, Hooker seems to follow Antaki’s prior claim that ‘Schmitt’s
turn to international law began after 1936,’ a claim attributed to Bendersky’s biography but
which I have shown above is demonstrably false.127 This distorted periodization culminates
in Hooker’s claim, once again following Bendersky, that ‘partly due to . . . limitations to the
practice of constitutional law, and the frustrations of academic life in Nazi Germany, Schmitt
125David Chandler, ‘The Revival of Carl Schmitt in International Relations: The Last Refuge of Critical
Theorists?’ Millennium 37(1) (2008), 27-48. See the ensuing responses in Millennium: Louiza Odysseos &
Fabio Petito, ‘Vagaries of Interpretation: A Rejoinder to David Chandler’s Reductionist Reading of Carl
Schmitt,’ Millennium 37(2) (2018), 463-475; David Chandler, ‘Textual and Critical Approaches to Reading
Schmitt: Rejoinder to Odysseos and Petito,’ Millennium 37(2) (2018) 477-481. See also Stephen Legg,
Spatiality, Sovereignty, and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos (London: Routledge, 2011).
126William Hooker, The State in the International Theory of Carl Schmitt, (Dissertation submitted at the London
School of Economics and Political Science, 2008).
127Mark Antaki, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Nomos of the Earth,’ Osgoode Hall Law Journal 42(2) (2004), 317-334, p.
319.
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turned his attention to broader questions in international law’ and furthermore that ‘it does
seem that Schmitt was moved by a genuine desire to examine how the radically new Nazi
regime might transform the structures of international law.’128 Hooker effectively quarantines
the National Socialist elements of Schmitt’s thought to the period between 1933 and 1936,
while simultaneously asserting that this international texts were merely ‘an examination’
of National Socialist politics. As a result, Hooker both perpetuates the ‘myth of 1936’ and
transfers the neutralizing, passive historicism of the Bendersky-Schwab interpretation to the
international level.
This dissertation follows a markedly different methodological approach and provides a
different answer to the question, ‘Why Carl Schmitt today?’ The purpose of returning to
Carl Schmitt is not to reveal an eternal characteristic of liberalism, or to advance the cause
of democratic theory; nor is it to provide a new theory of international politics. Instead,
the point is to understand and interpret a pivotal figure in the history of twentieth century
political thought, one who influenced an entire generation of post-war intellectuals on both
sides of the Atlantic.129 In calling for a historically accurate reconstruction of Schmitt’s
ideas, this dissertation certainly not alone among recent scholarship. Günter Maschke has
argued that Schmitt’s work must be read within their ‘historical circumstances,’ and that
Schmitt was part of a broader conservative discourse of the Weimar period: ‘Schmitt was
not a soloist, rather he was a – sometimes superlative – voice in a vast choir.’130 As such,
Maschke laments the ‘de-historicization,’ the ‘de-concretization,’ and the ‘de-politicization’
in the current Schmitt reception.131 Likewise, Peter Uwe Hohendahl has recently urged
‘return to Schmitt’s historical roots’ through ‘[explicating] Schmitt’s late work as part of a
specific historical constellation.’132 This dissertation goes further, however, than these recent
calls by recovering the justification for a historical approach within Schmitt’s own work –
indeed, ahistoricism is a contradiction to his theory, not a consequence of it. To that end, the
following chapter begins with Schmitt’s turn to the founder of the historical school of law,
Savigny, and the beginnings of his concept of historicity which serves as the foundation for
128Hooker, The State in the International Theory of Carl Schmitt, p. 162.
129Matthew Specter, ‘Grossraum and Geopolitics: Resituating Carl Schmitt in an Atlantic Context,’ History
and Theory 56(2) (2017): 398-406; Jan Werner Müller, A Dangerous Mind (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2003).
130Günter Maschke, ‘Zur vorliegenden Ausgabe,’ in Carl Schmitt, Frieden oder Pazifismus (Berlin: Duncker
& Humblot, 2005), p. xix. ‘Schmitt [war] kein Solist, sondern eine – manchmal überragende – Stimme in
einem ausgedehnten Chore.’
131Günter Maschke, ‘Vorwort,’ in Carl Schmitt, Frieden oder Pazifismus (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005),
p. xxvi.
132Hohendahl, Perilous Futures, p. 3. For my broader criticism of the historical inaccuracies in Hohendahl’s
work, see Joshua Smeltzer, ‘Carl Schmitt in and out of History,’ London School of Economics Review of
Books (2019).
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the subsequent chapters of the dissertation.
Furthermore, as I discussed in relation to William Hooker’s monograph, this dissertation
does not place an interpretive priority on Schmitt’s major published monographs. Instead, it
draws material from Schmitt’s essays, reviews, correspondences, diary entries, unpublished
lecture manuscripts, and marginalia from his private library. There are two reasons for taking
this wider approach. First, Schmitt claimed in the postwar period that ‘it is not possible
to write about that which has the power to proscribe [to death],’ and praised Ernst Jünger
for coding his commentary on National Socialism such that only insiders would understand
the true message.133 Given that Schmitt perceived – with more than a bit of dramatic flair –
that his life was in danger if he spoke candidly, he applied the same self-censorship to his
published texts. As a result, unpublished manuscripts, correspondences, and diary entries
can act as an ‘interpretive key,’ revealing his polemical targets and the underlying intended
function of his texts. Second, minors texts represent more than the artist’s sketch leading
to a later masterpiece. As the ‘Synoptic Edition’ of The Concept of the Political has shown,
Schmitt revised and updated his texts depending on the historical context and intended
audience. As I argue in the following chapter, this tendency towards revision is particularly
acute with regards to texts originally composed before 1945 but published thereafter. This
corresponds to Schmitt’s invocation of Heraclitus’s dictum that ‘you cannot step into the same
river twice,’ a ‘truth to which all the speeches and essays [in his edited volume, Positionen und
Begriffe] are subjected.’134 Likewise, in the foreword to his Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze,
Schmitt notes ‘all of [the essays] stem from concrete situations and observations.’135 Minor
texts, in their changing iterations, can help locate and clarify Schmitt’s specific interventions.
By recovering the historical elements within Carl Schmitt’s own work, and using his-
toricity as an interpretive tool for his political and legal theories, this dissertation aims to
offer a new interpretation of Schmitt as a historian of political thought, as well as to correct
both the passive historicism originating in Bendersky and Schwab and the ahistoricism of the
Left-Schmittians. Chapter 3 of this thesis considers Schmitt’s postwar critique of natural law
theories as a type of law ‘without history’: its claim to universal and eternal validity stood
in stark contrast to the historicity of law. Against this, Schmitt would pursue a strategy of
historicizing the origins of natural law, showing that it was merely one age of the historical
development of law, not the uncovering of its true principles. Rejecting natural law theories
133For a discussion of this dictum in the context of Schmitt’s writings on natural law, see chapter 3 of this thesis.
134See Carl Schmitt, Positionen und Begriffe (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2014 [1939]). ‘Die folgenden
Reden und Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1923 bis 1939 sind dieser Wahrheit in vollem Maße unterworfen.’
135Carl Schmitt, Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924-1954 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2003
[1958]), p. 8. ‘alle aber gehen in ihren Thesen und Begriffen auf konkrete Situationen und Beobachtungen
zurück.’
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also allowed Schmitt to reject the so called ’obligation of resistance’ against tyrannical
regimes, a constitutional obligation discussed – and implemented – after the defeat of the
Third Reich. In chapter 4, I turn to a parallel development in international law: the movement
to outlaw war. I argue that Schmitt’s intervention into the reception of Vitoria’s writings
in his The Nomos of the Earth ought to be read as a polemical response to the American
international lawyer, James Brown Scott, and his attempt to reconstruct a liberal international
law based on the principles he uncovered in the Spanish Dominican Francisco de Vitoria.
Schmitt mobilized his concept of historicity to argue that Vitoria’s teachings were historically
bounded to the context of the Respublica Christiana and therefore could not serve as the
foundations of a new, liberal world order. Taken together, chapters 3 and 4 represent two
examples of Schmitt’s rejection of the intrusion of theology into the domain of law.
The following two chapters demonstrate two elements of Schmitt’s critique of technol-
ogy’s corrosive effects on politics and law. I first consider Schmitt’s critique of Marxism,
particularly Leninism, as a form of political acceleration: in locating itself as the teleologi-
cal end-point of the ‘organic’ unfolding of history, revolutionary action is legitimated as a
means of clearing any inorganic obstacles such as the counter-revolutionary efforts of the
Bourgeoisie. I then show that Schmitt saw Liberalism and Socialism as two sides of the same
coin, joined by a common faith in human progress and in technology as the means of its
attainment. Finally, in chapter 6, I turn to utopia and utopianism as the ‘dis-placement’ of
space and human nature, as well as the ‘annihilation’ of law. Similar to Schmitt’s criticism
of natural law doctrines, I begin by showing that Schmitt historicizes the emergence of the
concept of utopia to the ‘British maritime appropriation of the world’ and the subsequent
Industrial Revolution in order to condemn utopianism as a simultaneously British and a deter-
ritorialized theory. I then show that Schmitt’s rejection of utopianism is based on its inherent
philosophy of history: utopianism uses technology as the mechanism for its achievement
within a preordained telos. For Schmitt, however, this process means systematically cutting
off man’s relation to his past for the sake of achieving the future.

Chapter 2
The Turn to Historicity
In the foreword to his postwar history of the law of nations, Der Nomos der Erde im
Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum, Carl Schmitt warned of an ‘existential question’
confronting jurisprudence, ‘which today is being crushed between theology and technology,
if it does not assert the ground of its own existence [Dasein] in a correctly recognized
and fruitful historicity [Geschichtlichkeit].’1 The invocation of an ‘existential question’
demonstrates the significance of this assertion, as it concerns nothing less than the continued
existence of jurisprudence as a discipline. With this concrete dilemma in mind, Schmitt
speaks in the opening line of the text of ‘placing this book on the altar of jurisprudence’ –
an offering meant to rescue the discipline from its impending obliteration. Indeed, Schmitt
considered himself first and foremost a jurist2; Der Nomos der Erde concerns the future of
his own discipline. Faced with a looming existential crisis, Schmitt asserted the concept of
historicity as the potential site for jurisprudence’s salvation, an escape from the dual forces of
theology and technology. However, despite the significance of historicity and its prominence
in the foreword of Der Nomos der Erde, there has been virtually no discussion of the concept
in the rapidly expanding scholarly literature on Schmitt.
This chapter excavates Schmitt’s concept of Geschichtlichkeit, or historicity, as a method-
ological principle for studying legal history, a principle that can be similarly deployed as
an interpretive key for understanding Schmitt’s own work within the broad tradition of the
1 Carl Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum, 5 ed., (Berlin: Duncker
& Humblot, 2011 [1950]), p. 6. Translations of German texts are my own unless stated otherwise. ‘Es
betrifft die Existenzfrage der Rechtswissenschaft selbst, die heute zwischen Theologie und Technik zerrieben
wird, wenn sie nicht in einer richtig erkannten und fruchtbar gewordenen Geschichtlichkeit den Boden ihres
eigenen Daseins behauptet.’
2 See for example his explicit self-identification in the subtitle of Die Tyrannei der Werte. Überlegungen eines
Juristen zur Wert-Philosophie.
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German Staatslehre.3 The concept of historicity emerges in Schmitt’s writings at the same
moment as his turn to the Historical School of Law as a ‘paradigm’ for the future of European
jurisprudence. The resulting depiction of Carl Schmitt as a deeply historical thinker – one
who draws his methodological inspiration from Friedrich Carl von Savigny – forms the basis
of the following chapters of this dissertation in a form of double-historicism: not only did
Schmitt historicize the sources of law and the contributions of individual jurists such as
Francisco de Vitoria and Hugo Grotius, but his own contributions were deeply imbricated in
his political and historical context. Recovering the concept of historicity is thus the first step
towards understanding Schmitt’s interpretation of law as inseparable from the history of its
cognition in jurisprudence.
At the same time, historicity provides an internal justification within Schmitt’s published
work for historicizing his contribution to the legal discipline. That theorists of political
thought are best understood in terms of their historical contexts is, by itself, a well-accepted
proposition4; however, it is not always the case that the thinkers under consideration would
themselves view their work as historical, nor that they themselves would historicize the
contributions of previous theorists. Instead, this chapter employs a hermeneutic approach
to reconstructing Schmitt’s concept of historicity, uncovering the methodological principles
while at the same time using them to aid in the interpretation of the very same concept. The
structure of this chapter follows Schmitt’s own rhetorical strategy of coupling prognosis and
solution – the historical narrative, constructed as a form of prognosis of crisis, generates
the normative solutions that follow. The first section situates Schmitt’s prognosis of a crisis
confronting jurisprudence following the Revolutions of 1848 with reference to the historical
rise of legal positivism as the dominant form of jurisprudence; the second section deals with
Schmitt’s historicization of the Historical School of Law as confronting both natural law
and the rise of legal positivism, yielding a ‘paradigm’ for the future of jurisprudence. The
conclusion then speaks to the reception of Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft
and its significance for the subsequent chapters.
2.1 Crisis and Prognosis
In the foreword to Der Nomos der Erde, framing a discussion of nearly 500 years of the
history of the law of nations, Schmitt constructs a genealogy of the concept of historicity
3 On Carl Schmitt and the German Staatslehre, see Duncan Kelly, The State of the Political: Conceptions
of Politics and the State in the Thought of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Franz Neumann (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
4 See, for example, Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas.’
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running through Johann Jakob Bachofen back to Friedrich Carl von Savigny, the intellectual
father of the Historical School of Law. Savigny’s central position at the outset of Der
Nomos der Erde is striking within the broader context of Schmitt’s oeuvre – Savigny is
not once mentioned in Schmitt’s key jurisprudential texts of the Weimar Republic such
as his Verfassungslehre; nor is Savigny cited in Politische Theologie and Der Begriff des
Politischen. Nevertheless, Schmitt chose to begin his post-war history of the law of nations
with a discussion of the nineteenth century jurist of Roman law and international private law,
a jurist who plays no central role in the rest of the text.5 Why would Schmitt invoke the name
of the great Prussian legal historian in such a cursory manner?
Beyond establishing a distinguished pedigree for the concept of historicity, pointing back
to a famed jurist such as Savigny as its progenitor frames the concept as belonging solely
to the discipline of jurisprudence, ‘a scholarship,’ Schmitt notes, ‘which I have served for
over forty years.’6 Schmitt continues, emphasizing once again that he is a jurist, noting that
‘the connection with the mythical sources of legal-historical knowledge go much deeper than
the connection with geography,’ rejecting the notion that his text is to be understood with
direct reference to the work of political geographers.7 Furthermore, it is significant that
Schmitt specifies ‘legal-historical knowledge’ in the previous quotation, a direct reference to
Savigny’s specific intellectual project. Once again drawing a distinction with geographers,
Schmitt claims that ‘juristic intellectual work remains something different than geography.
Jurists did not gain their knowledge of object and soil, of reality and territoriality from
geographers.’8 This is not to say that Schmitt was unaware of the works of geographers;
rather, the subject of Schmitt’s text remains the history of jurisprudence and of legal thinking,
and he approaches both of these subjects as a jurist. Indeed, reading the text as a contribution
to geography or German Geopolitik would only exacerbate the central problematic posed in
the foreword through other means: the collapse of jurisprudence as a distinct discipline.9
5 The exception is a single sentence dealing with property and marriage laws in Europe. See Schmitt, Der
Nomos der Erde, p. 210.
6 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 5. ‘einer Wissenschaft, der ich über vierzig Jahre gedient habe.’ On
Savigny’s distinguished reputation in German jurisprudence, see Hermann Kantorowicz, ‘Savigny and the
Historical School of Law,’ The Law Quarterly Review 111 (1937): 326-343, p. 330; Joachim Rückert, ‘The
Unrecognized Legacy: Savigny’s Influence on German Jurisprudence after 1900,’ The American Journal of
Comparative Law, 37(1) (1989): 121-137, p. 121.
7 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 5. ‘Viel tiefer als mit der Geographie geht die Verbindung mit den
mythischen Quellen rechtsgeschichtlichen Wissens.’
8 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 5. ‘Trotzdem bleibt die juristische Denkarbeit etwas anderes als Geographie.
Die Juristen haben ihr Wissen von Ding und Boden, von Realität und Territorialität nicht von den Geographen
gelernt.’
9 Schmitt’s frank statements setting himself apart from geopolitics have been overlooked by a series of recent
commentators, eager to frame Schmitt as a political geographer on par with Halford Mackinder, Alfred
Mahan, or Karl Haushofer. See Stephen Legg and Alex Vesudevan, ‘Introduction: Geographies of the
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Instead of relying on geopolitical precursors, Schmitt turns to Johann Jakob Bachofen
as an intellectual intermediary, passing down the ideas of Savigny to the next generation of
legal historians. For Schmitt, ‘[the mythical sources of legal-historical knowledge] have been
opened up to us through Johann Jakob Bachofen . . . the legitimate heir of Savigny.’10 More
than intervening into the historiography of the German Historical School of Law and its
succession after Savigny’s death, Schmitt is instead constructing a narrative of the historical
roots and fundamental shifts in the concept of historicity that he himself will employ in the
text. In that sense, Schmitt claimed that Bachofen ‘continued and made unendingly fruitful
that which the founder of the Historical School of Law understood by historicity.’11 To
understand, then, the concept of historicity and its function as the salvation of jurisprudence
in the post war era – indeed, to understand Schmitt’s post-war writings on law – elucidating
Schmitt’s intellectual relationship to Savigny is a necessary first step.
While Schmitt opens Der Nomos der Erde with reference to Savigny in order to establish
a disciplinary boundary with geographers, the invocation of the Prussian jurist has a second,
more important function: it signals an internal connection between Der Nomos der Erde and
a short pamphlet, titled Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft [The Situation of
European Jurisprudence].12 The pamphlet appeared simultaneously with three other texts in
German, and is Schmitt’s only publication that provides a sustained treatment of Savigny and
the Historical School of Law.13 Originally written as a lecture, Schmitt delivered versions
of the speech six times in five countries and in three languages between February 16, 1943
Nomos,’ in Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos, ed. Stephen Legg, (Oxon:
Routledge, 2011). See in particular Matthew Specter, ‘Grossraum and Geopolitics: Resituating Schmitt in
an Atlantic Context,’ History and Theory 56(3) (2017), 398-406.
10 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 5. ‘Sie sind uns durch Johann Jakob Bachofen erschlossen worden
. . . Bachofen ist der legitime Erbe Savignys.’
11 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, pp. 5-6. ‘Er hat das, was der Begründer der historischen Rechtsschule unter
Geschichtlichkeit verstand, weitergeführt und unendlich fruchtbar gemacht.’
12 The only English translation of this text modifies the title by translating ‘Lage’ as ‘Plight.’ There are
three issues with this: first, it is in itself inaccurate; second, ‘Lage’ has a connotation of positionality and
corresponds to jurisprudence’s position between theology and technology, a connotation erased with ‘plight’;
and third, ‘plight’ obscures the connection to Schmitt’s other texts with a similar title, for example Die
geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus (1923), ‘die politische Lage der entmilitarisierten
Rheinlande’ (1930), and ‘Die geschichtliche Lage der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft’ (1936). See Carl
Schmitt, ‘The Plight of European Jurisprudence,’ trans. Gary Ulmen, Telos 83 1990, 35-70. Moreover, the
French version of the typescript, prepared by Schmitt, is titled ‘La situation présente de la jurisprudence
européene,’ giving a clear cognate for translation. I have used the cognate in this text. See NRW 0265-20925.
13 Carl Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft (1943/44).’ In 1950, Schmitt published four
texts concurrently: 1) Der Nomos der Erde, 2) Ex Captivitate Salus, 3) Donoso Cortes in gesamteuropäischer
Interpretation. Vier Aufsätze, and 4) Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft. The first three texts
appeared with Greven-Verlag, while the last appeared with Serge Maiwald’s Tübinger Universitätsverlag.
The reason for their simultaneous appearance is that Schmitt was banned on publishing until the formation
of the Bundesrepublik in 1949. See Mehring, Carl Schmitt, pp. 470, 472-474.
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and December 1, 1944.14 Before the end of the war, the text would appear in Hungarian, its
only official publication prior to the 1950 edition.15 While this Hungarian text no longer
appears within the Schmitt Nachlaß, a thirty-five page French language typescript of the
lecture, given in Coimbra, Portugal on May 16, 1944, still survives,16 along with three
personal copies of the 1950 publication17 and a copy of the 1958 republication in his volume
on constitutional law, Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze.18 The French typescript is largely
identical to the German publication of 1950, but its divergences in key areas – namely,
Schmitt’s intellectual identification with Savigny – add a further contextual layer to the text:
it is the only version that can offer insight into the content of Schmitt’s lectures during the
war and help to explain the origins of Schmitt’s turn to historicity in 1943/44.
The state of jurisprudence was, according to Schmitt, a state of acute crisis, one which
haunted the discipline in the contemporary moment: Schmitt’s lectures were titled ‘die
heutigen Lage’ or ‘la situation présente,’ a temporal modifier dropped in the postwar German
publication.19 This is the first indication that the text, largely a treatment of the history of
jurisprudence in the nineteenth century, was intended to speak to a specific context present in
1943/44 that subsequently no longer applied in the post-war period. The context was, first
and foremost, the state of jurisprudence. Despite giving his lecture in 1943/44, well after
Schmitt sensed the German war effort would be defeated,20 he nevertheless notes that ‘I do
not wish to speak here of the obvious topic of the consequences of the world war’ but instead
wants to discuss an ‘internal and immanent problem of jurisprudence.’21 Although Schmitt
14 Mehring, Carl Schmitt, pp. 433-434. The dates and locations of Schmitt’s lecture tour is corroborated in
the 1958 afterword to the text in Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze, p. 426. In addition, they are recorded in
Schmitt’s handwritten notes on the cover of his personal copy of Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswis-
senschaft, NRW 0265-27591.
15 See the letter from Schmitt’s translator, Dr. Kuncz Ödön, dated June 1, 1944. NRW 0265-8567. The
Hungarian text appeared as Carl Schmitt, ‘Az európai jogtudomány mai helyzete,’ Gazdaságyjog, 5 (1944),
3-16. For a brief publication history, see de Benoist, Carl Schmitt: Bibliographie seiner Schriften und
Korrespondenzen, p. 32.
16 Contained in the Schmitt Nachlaß in a folder labeled, in his handwriting, ‘Drei Arten,’ a direct reference to
the title of his 1934 essay Über die Drei Arten rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens. See NRW 0265-20925. A
modified version appeared in the Boletim de Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Coimbra, 1945 (20),
603-621. See Benoist, Carl Schmitt: Bibliographie, p. 32.
17 Only the copy labeled NRW 0265-27591 contains marginalia from Schmitt; the other two are clean copies,
NRW 0265-27277 and NRW 0265-28672.
18 See NRW 0265-28282.
19 Emphasis added. See for example the formal invitation to his lecture held in Budapest, 11. November 1943,
in NRW 0265-21554 and glued to the inside cover of his personal copy of the publication, NRW 0265-27591.
See the French typescript, NRW 0265-20925.
20 Zeitlin, ‘Propaganda and Critique,’ pp. xxxvii-xli, particularly the reflections by Nicolaus Sombart and
Julien Freund in footnote 25.
21 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 398. ‘Ich möchte hier weder über das
naheliegende Thema der Auswirkungen des Weltkrieges sprechen’; ‘innere und immanente rechtswis-
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will conclude his speech by undermining the distinction between the war in Europe and
jurisprudence with which he opens, this distinction is nevertheless important in elaborating
the correct situation, or Lage, of European jurisprudence – the situation is defined by internal
considerations, within the history of the discipline itself. Schmitt’s text is an attempt at both
diagnosing this problem facing jurisprudence as well as finding its solution within a study of
the history of European jurisprudence.
In part, Schmitt’s historical project means defending the notion of a common ‘European
jurisprudence,’ a proposition that would perhaps appear absurd in the context of a second
world war. The absurdity, he notes, is due ‘not only [to] the political fracturedness of Europe,
which has torn itself apart in two world wars,’ once more inviting his audience to look
beyond the obvious political context. Instead, Schmitt shifts from politics into legal history,
arguing that the rise of legal positivism had fractured European jurisprudence even more than
the impact of the world wars.22 Thus, at the outset, legal positivism constitutes the target
of Schmitt’s polemic, the force that denies not only the possibility of a unified European
jurisprudence, but also that which forecloses law from legal history.
It is not surprising that Schmitt polemicizes against legal positivism given his well-
documented hostility towards legal positivism in the Methodenstreit of the Weimar Re-
public,23 and yet scholarly treatments of Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft
have overlooked its polemical function. More broadly, the text itself remains neglected in
Schmitt scholarship. For example, in a passage comparing Schmitt to the Historical School
of Law, Jeffery Seitzer relies on the implied divergences in their work, overlooking that
Schmitt in fact wrote directly on Savigny and his views need not be inferred.24 Additionally,
Reinhard Mehring’s magisterial Schmitt biography devotes just two paragraphs to the text.25
In discussing the text’s history, Mehring notes, ‘it is not verifiable what exactly Schmitt said
before 1945 on the role of jurisprudence’26; however, this claim overlooks the existence
of the French language typescript of Schmitt’s speech delivered on May 16, 1944, which
Mehring himself cites but makes no use of.27 Perhaps it is impossible to know what exactly
senschaftliches Problem.’
22 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 386. ‘Nicht nur wegen der Zerrissenheit
Europas, das sich in zwei Weltkriegen selbst zerfleischt hat.’
23 On the Methodenstreit of the Weimar Republic, see Michael Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in
Deutschland, Bd. III (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1999), p. 153.
24 Jeffrey Seitzer, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Internal Critique of Liberal Constitutionalism,’ in Law as Politics: Carl
Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism ed. David Dyzenhaus (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), pp. 291-292.
25 Mehring, Carl Schmitt, p. 434.
26 Mehring, Carl Schmitt, p. 434. ‘Es ist zwar nicht nachweisbar, was genau Schmitt vor 1945 zur Rolle der
Rechtswissenschaft sagte.’
27 Mehring, Carl Schmitt, p. 693n44.
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was said, but it is easily verifiable what Schmitt wrote. Furthermore, given that the French
language typescript contains Schmitt’s handwritten pronunciation aids, it is highly probable
that he intended to speak the very words on the page.
Despite the ‘tsunami’ of secondary literature on Schmitt,28 there are only two sustained
treatments of Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft. The first is an introduction
to the English translation of Schmitt’s text, written by Paul Piccone and Gary Ulmen. In
their interpretation, the text forms Schmitt’s last ‘testament,’ written as ‘a subtle apology
for [his] earlier political mistakes.’29 By ‘political mistakes’ the authors ostensibly mean
Schmitt’s support of National Socialism after 1933, though this assertion is shrouded in a
euphemistic and apologetic reconstruction of his scholarship during the Third Reich. Indeed,
by only examining the 1950 German publication of the text, it is natural that Piccone and
Ulmen would reach such a conclusion – anything overtly National Socialist would have been
scrubbed from the text prior to its publication, especially given Schmitt’s concerted effort to
rehabilitate his reputation in Germany and abroad after the war. Piccone and Ulmen justify
refusing to consider earlier versions of the text by arguing that ‘it was not Schmitt’s way
to alter texts . . . his customary practice was merely to append comments to a given text.’30
Piccone and Ulmen’s claim will be shown to be false with reference to this specific text and
its French language predecessor; however, it is important to note that this claim is generally
false in reference to a number of the republications of his texts.31 In fact, Schmitt both
appended commentaries and modified the texts themselves in order to recontextualize his
arguments.
The second treatment comes from an article and book chapter by William Scheuerman,
who reads Schmitt’s text normatively through the concept of the motorized legislator.32 This
reading then allows, in the last section of Scheuerman’s argument, for a discussion of con-
temporary Anglo-American ‘common-law correctives to statutory legislation.’33 Regarding
the target of Schmitt’s polemic, Scheuerman writes, ‘in Schmitt’s account its [liberal democ-
28 Specter, ‘What’s “Left” in Schmitt,’ p. 426.
29 Paul Piccone and Gary Ulmen, ‘Schmitt’s Testament and the Future of Europe,’ Telos 83 (1990), 3-34, pp.
15-16.
30 Piccone and Ulmen, ‘Schmitt’s “Testament,”’ p. 14n25.
31 See most famously the varying editions of Der Begriff des Politischen which has now produced a ’synoptic’
presentation in Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen. Synoptische Dartellung der Texte, ed. Marco Walter
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2018); Schmitt’s truncation of ‘Die Rheinlande’ which omits all reference to
Catholicism after the encyclical ‘Mit brennender Sorge’ appeared in 1937; and the long, vitriolic anti-Semitic
passages removed between editions of Völkerrechtliche Großraumordung. See RW 0265-20064.
32 William Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2004); William Scheuerman, ‘Motorized Legislation? Statutes in an Age of Speed,’
Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 88(3) (2002): 379-397.
33 Scheuerman, ‘Motorized Legislation,’ p. 391.
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racy’s] preference for the separation of powers, the supremacy of elected legislatures, and the
rule of law allegedly render it incapable of dealing with the necessities of the economic state
of emergency.’34 Elsewhere, Scheuerman writes, ‘we should interpret Schmitt’s comments
about motorized legislation as part of his life-long quest to discredit liberal democracy.’35 In
the very last sentence of the article, Scheuerman concludes, ‘by developing models of regula-
tory law properly suited to the temporal imperatives of the new century, we can rob Schmitt’s
hostile attack on modern liberal democracy of those empirical correlates that misleadingly
imply its plausibility.’36 Each of these three quotations establishes that Scheuerman believes
Schmitt to be attacking liberal democracy in this text.
The problem, however, with Scheuerman’s characterization is that Schmitt’s criticism
is not directly aimed at liberal democracy; instead, it is aimed at the dominance of legal
positivism as a form of jurisprudence – after all, the text is about a crisis in jurisprudence
and not one of caused by a form of state.37 There are at least four textual objections to
Scheuerman’s interpretation. First, Schmitt himself kept a summary of the text, unpublished
but contained within his Nachlaß, in which he writes ‘[jurisprudence] suffers . . . from a
particular inner problematic, the crisis of state-law legality [der gesetzesstaatlichen Legal-
ität].’38 From Schmitt’s other writings, the phrase of ‘state-law legality’ is a direct reference
to legal positivism39; moreover, gesetzesstaatlich is meant as a pejorative description of
the positivist alternative to rechtsstaatlich.40 In addition, Schmitt specifically refers to an
‘inner-problematic’ facing ‘jurisprudence,’ and liberal democracy is not itself not a form of
jurisprudence. Second, in the French language typescript, Schmitt says ‘I believe that this is
actually a crisis of the purely positivist method, rather than a crisis of jurisprudence itself.’41
Noting a ‘crisis of the purely positivistic method’ indeed squarely lays the blame at the feet of
legal positivism and not liberal democracy. Third, Schmitt notes that ‘the crisis of European
jurisprudence started over a hundred years ago with the victory of legal positivism,’ a phrase
which is also contained in the French manuscript.42 And finally, Schmitt only uses derivations
34 Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time, p. 107.
35 Scheuerman, ‘Motorized Legislation,’ p. 380.
36 Scheuerman, ‘Motorized Legislation,’ p. 397.
37 See Schmitt’s theory of state forms in Verfassungslehre, pp. 221-359.
38 Quoted from materials in NRW 0265-20925. ‘sie [die Rechtswissenschaft] leidet auch noch an einer
besonderen inneren Problematik, der Krisis der gesetzesstaatlichen Legalität.’
39 For roughly contemporaneous usage in Schmitt’s work, see Carl Schmitt, ‘Das Problem der Legalität (1950)’
in Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze, pp. 442, 447.
40 See, for example, Carl Schmitt, ‘Nationalsozialismus und Rechtsstaat,’ Juristische Wochenschrift 63 (12-13)
(1934), 713-718. On Friedrich Hayek’s use of this distinction, drawn from Schmitt, see Quinn Slobodian,
The Globalists (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), p. 205.
41 In NRW 0265-20925, Manuscript, 20. ‘Mais je crois, qu’il s’agit ici en réalité d’une crise de la méthode
purement positiviste, plutôt que d’une crise de la jurisprudence elle-même.’
42 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 398. ‘Die Krisis der europäischen Rechtswis-
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of the word ‘liberal’ in the essay in a passing comment on ‘Savigny’s liberal enemies.’43
Although legal positivism and liberal democracy can and often do dovetail, Schmitt himself
does not hold that they are necessarily identical.44 As a result, maintaining this distinction is
important not only for an accurate reconstruction of Schmitt’s argument but also for engaging
with it normatively as Scheuerman proceeds to do. In summary, Scheuerman’s reconstruction
of Schmitt’s argument misses the fundamental target of Schmitt’s polemic and, as a result,
the normative implications Scheuerman draws are similarly extraneous to Schmitt’s text.
Indeed, legal positivism is central to Schmitt’s narrative precisely because he blames
it for precipitating a fracture of European jurisprudence into distinct national spheres: the
‘formal ground for the validity of positive law is here always only enactments [Setzungen],
behind which stands a state will to enact [setzten] . . . For the purely state-based concept
of such a legal positivism there is, as a result, only German, French, Spanish, Swiss and
further single-state law.’45 With its exclusive focus on enacted law as a valid object of legal
study, and in the absence of a ‘European legislative will’ or ‘European central state,’ legal
positivism foreclosed the possibility of a common European jurisprudence because it could
only conceive of law in terms of enacted laws within each individual state.46
Operating at a parallel level, Schmitt notes that legal positivism transformed the monism
underpinning the ‘European law of nations,’ identical with the jus publicum europaeum,
into legal dualism. In Der Nomos der Erde, Schmitt lays out a longer justification for legal
monism based on his understanding of land appropriation. This act of land appropriation, as
a ‘legal-historical fact’ and a ‘great historical event,’ is fundamental for Schmitt’s concept of
nomos, as it ‘establishes law’ ‘towards the exterior (in relation to other peoples) and towards
the interior.’47 This understanding of law as a unified system was undone by the rise of legal
positivism. As a result, ‘the separation of internal and external, of intrastate and interstate
law is so absolute, that . . . there is a complete and pure unrelatedness, such that, formally
senschaft beginnt vor hundert Jahren mit dem Sieg des gesetzlichen Positivismus.’ See also NRW 0265-
20925, Manuscript, p. 11.
43 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 418. ‘Die liberalen Feinde Savignys.’
44 Daniel Dyzenhaus. Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, and Hermann Heller in Weimar
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 39.
45 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 386. ‘Formaler Geltungsgrund des positiven
Rechts sind hier immer nur Setzungen, hinter denen ein staatlicher Wille zur Setzung steht . . . Für die
rein staatsbezogenen Begriffe eines solchen Gesetzespositivismus gibt es infolgedessen nur deutsches,
französisches, spanisches, schweizerisches und weiteres einzelstaatliches Recht.’
46 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 386. ‘mangels eines europäisches Gesamt-
staates und eines europäischen Gesetzeswillens.’
47 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 17. ‘eine rechtsgeschichtliche Tatsache,’ ‘großes historisches Ereignis,’
‘begründet Recht,’ ‘nach Außen (gegenüber anderen Völkern) und nach Innen.’ See as well Chapter 5,
Section 2 of this thesis on the domestic constitutional aspect of Schmitt’s nomos concept.
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seen, it is not even possible for a conflict between the two legal circles.’48 The ultimate
consequence of this version of legal positivism at the international level, with its emphasis
on the contractual basis of international law, was that
after the European spirit had developed a particularly European law of nations from the
seventeenth to the nineteenth century, now, at the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth
century, the law of nations was dissolved into countless and undifferentiated interstate
relationships of fifty or sixty states of the entire earth, i.e. dissolved into a spaceless
universality.49
Thus, the rise of legal positivism meant the fracturing of a common European law of nations
into two distinct spheres at the domestic and the international level: each state enacted its
own domestic laws, while interstate treaties replaced the common jus publicum europaeum.
Recovering a monist conception of law would necessarily be a historical project, one that
would involve excavating the common principles that had been placed under erasure by legal
positivism’s dominance.
Such an erasure, however, was not total. For Schmitt, a genealogy of European legal
history would reveal an overarching unity in European jurisprudence and correct the fracturing
effects of positivism: ‘The entire legal history and legal development of European peoples
[is] a history of reciprocal receptions.’50 In other words, to understand the laws of any
European country, one must look beyond the present day borders of that national legal system,
beyond the codified laws of the present moment, to trace the dispersion and interpenetration
of legal arguments and structures across the continent. However, even if one were to
deny the existence of an ongoing exchange of legal ideas in Europe, Schmitt asserts that
every European country is united in the origins and paradigms of its legal thought. The
reception of Roman law remains the central event in the development of European legal
history, affecting those countries that adapted the system as well as those that did not.
Put succinctly, ‘the history of European jurisprudence over five centuries was in fact the
history of the science of Roman law.’51 Even countries which did not adopt Roman law –
48 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 387. ‘Die Trennung von Innen und Außen ist
so absolut, daß . . . zwischen Innen und Außen volle und reine Beziehungslosigkeit besteht, so daß, formal
gesehen, nicht einmal ein Konflikt zwischen den beiden Rechtskreisen möglich ist.’
49 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 388. ‘Nachdem der europäisches Geist vom
17. bis zum 19. Jahrhundert ein spezifisch europäisches Völkerrecht entwickelt hatte, wurde jetzt, um die
Wende des 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert, das Völkerrecht in zahllose und unterschiedslose zwischenstaatliche
Beziehungen von fünfzig bis sechzig Staaten der ganzen Erde, d.h. in eine raumlose Allgemeinheit aufgelöst.’
50 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 391. ‘Die ganze Rechtsgeschichte und
Rechtsentwicklung der europäischen Völker [ist] eine Geschichte von gegenseitigen Rezeptionen.’
51 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 392. ‘In Wirklichkeit ist die Geschichte der
europäischen Rechtswissenschaft durch fünf Jahrhunderte hindurch eine Geschichte der Wissenschaft des
Römischen Rechts gewesen.’
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and here Schmitt specifically includes England – were still inescapably influenced by its
reception: the English had incorporated Roman law in the form of the law of the seas and
the doctrine of ‘ex aequo et bono [law of equity]’ even if they ultimately diverged in the
practice of common law.52 Roman law had thereby established a common legal tradition
with a ‘common vocabulary’ which had in turn become the ‘language of the legal community’
across Europe.53 Locating a common origin and vocabulary of European jurisprudence
generated by the reception of Roman law in Europe pointed to the possibility of conceiving
the European legal tradition differently than the fractured version enacted by legal positivism.
Or, put differently, legal positivism was itself a historically contingent phenomenon, and as
such, could be challenged by reconstructing historical alternatives such as the legal monism
of the jus publicum europaeum.
Finding a solution to the crisis of jurisprudence was important not just for the future of
jurisprudence but also for the formation and solidification of a common European identity.
As Schmitt claims, the impact of Roman law was nothing short of creating a common
European culture: ‘The cultural edifice, erected by the European spirit [Geist], stands on the
common basis established by a common European jurisprudence.’54 The crisis of European
jurisprudence was thus simultaneously a crisis of the European ‘cultural edifice,’ explaining
why Schmitt would focus on the history of legal thought at the same time that World War II
seemed to provoke a larger geopolitical crisis. Indeed, for Schmitt, by cutting jurisprudence
off from its own history, legal positivism negated cultural commonalities.
If there was a moment in European legal history when it was possible to speak of
a common European jurisprudence, when precisely did the fragmentation into national
traditions take place? One might look to codification efforts, particularly following the
Napoleonic code civile and subsequent iterations in different national contexts, as well as
attempts at revising Prussian codified law by none other than Savigny. However, Schmitt
is clear that fragmentation instead began as a direct consequence of the 1848 Revolutions,
one of Schmitt’s frequent targets for the responsibility of decline of the German state,
culture, and intellectual life.55 While the reception of Roman law was the first formative
moment for the establishment of a Europe-wide legal science, the Revolutions of 1848 spread
52 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 395. ‘Billigkeitsrecht.’
53 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 396. ‘zu einem gemeinsamen Vokabularium,
zur Sprache rechtswissenschaftlicher Gemeinschaft.’
54 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 396. ‘Das kulturelle Gebäude, das der
europäische Geist sich hier errichtet hat, steht auf dieser gemeinsamen, durch eine gemeinsame europäische
Rechtswissenschaft geschaffenen Basis.’
55 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 397. On the significance of 1848 in Schmitt’s
thought, see Joshua Smeltzer, “‘Germany’s Salvation”: Carl Schmitt’s Teleological History of the Second
Reich,’ History of European Ideas (2019).
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across the continent ‘and finally spread to the entire world’ establishing ‘an entire system of
concepts and institutions’ that appeared universal in their scope.56 The revolutions cemented
commonalities in national legal traditions and the written constitutions of European peoples
came to resemble one another in their structure. New fields of law, such as administrative
law, corporate law, and labor law could be seamlessly transposed onto the legal systems of
neighboring states, and it became possible for the ‘educated jurist of a European state . . . to
find his way in the legal world of another state.’57
Schmitt’s argument mobilizes the history of legal positivism in order to generate his
normative criticism: the Revolutions of 1848 caused both a fragmentation into national legal
spheres at the same time that it created commonalities across them. This interconnected and
shared cultural heritage of the European legal tradition allowed legal positivism to spread
into every legal system and led to the overarching crisis defining jurisprudence at the time
of Schmitt’s writing in 1943/44. Less than five years prior, Schmitt’s contemporary Paul
Koschaker – an editor of the Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung from 1936 until 1944 and the
holder of Savigny’s chair in the Faculty of Law at Berlin University where Schmitt also
taught – had diagnosed a ‘crisis in Roman law’ in 1939.58 Like Schmitt, Koschaker sought
the origin of this crisis beyond the present moment, beyond the marginal position given
to Roman law under National Socialism. However, Koschaker’s diagnosis differed from
Schmitt’s, ascribing the fatal moment as the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch in replacing the
significance of the Digest in 1900, both in terms of the instruction of private law at German
universities as well as the flight of Romanists away from contemporary jurisprudence to
a purely historical study of Roman law. For Koschaker, Savigny and his successors were
themselves partly to blame:
Regardless of Savigny’s own plea for the study of legal history . . . the main thrust of
his endeavor and that of the German Pandect science had led to the instrumental use of
the Justinian code for the construction of a systematic German science of private law
rather than a historical study of the development of private law from the Roman Era to
the nineteenth century.
This process of disjunction between legal history and contemporary law culminated in the
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch as a definitive break with Roman law.
56 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 397. ‘schließlich auf die ganze Erde aus-
gedehnt’; ‘ein ganzes System von Begriffen und Institutionen.’
57 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 397. ‘Die jeden wissenschaftlich gebilde-
ten Juristen eines europäischen Staates in den Stand setzt, sich in der Rechtswelt eines anderen Staates
zurechtzufinden.’
58 Koschaker is first listed as an editor in the Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung, Volume 56, (1936); by volume 65
(1947), the first post war publication, he had been removed
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Schmitt shares Koschaker’s diagnosis of a collapse in Roman law, but instead locates
the trigger of the collapse half a century prior: ‘the victory of legal positivism’ over other
forms of jurisprudence in 1848.59 Here, Schmitt claims ‘Our fathers and grandfathers cast
aside an outlived natural law and saw in the transition to that which they called “Positivism”
a great advance from illusion to reality.’60 In so doing, legal positivism banished the
doctrine of natural law to the confines of theology. As Schmitt quotes Bernhard Windscheid,
the nineteenth century jurist instrumental in early attempts at drafting the Bürgerliches
Gesetzbuch, ‘the dream of natural law has come to an end.’61
Vanquishing natural law, in Schmitt’s view, is undoubtedly to positivism’s credit, though
the victory would turn out to be pyrrhic: at the same moment that legal positivism celebrated
its victory over natural law, Schmitt argues it simultaneously opened an abyss in reformulating
‘the relationship between jurisprudence and the modern method of legislation.’62 Quoting
from a lecture by the nineteenth century jurist Julius Hermann v. Kirchmann on ‘the
Worthlessness of Jurisprudence as Science,’ Schmitt sees legal positivism as establishing
a condition in which ‘the stroke of the legislators’ feather and entire libraries become
wastepaper [Makulatur].’63 Behind this apocalyptic statement is a temporal claim that
‘science will never catch up with the law,’ or put another way:
What remains of a discipline whose sense and purpose is nothing other than the commen-
tating and interpretative accompaniment [Begleitung] of continuously shifting, positive
regulations from government agencies, who for their part can themselves best know and
say what their genuine will is and what the meaning and purpose of their regulations
are?64
As long as jurists were concerned with interpreting the Digests or divining the eternal princi-
ples of natural law, the object of their discipline remained relatively stable: interpretations
might shift, historical documents might emerge, but the source of law was itself relatively
59 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ pp. 394, 398.
60 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 398. ‘Unsere Väter und Großväter warfen ein
überlebtes Naturrecht beiseite und sahen in dem Übergang zu dem, was sie “Positivismus” nannten, einen
großen Fortschritt von der Illusion zur Wirklichkeit.’
61 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 398. ‘Der Traum des Naturrechts ist aus-
geträumt.’
62 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 399. ‘das Verhältnis von Rechtswissenschaft
und moderner Gesetzgebungsmethode.’
63 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 399. ‘Ein Federstrich des Gesetzgebers und
ganze Bibliotheken werden Makulatur.’
64 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 400. ‘Was bleibt von einer Wissenschaft
übrig, deren Sinn und Zweck nichts anderes ist als die kommentierende und interpretierende Begleitung
fortwährend wechselnder, positiver Anordnungen von staatlichen Stellen, die ihrerseits doch wohl selber am
besten wissen und sagen können, was ihr eigentlicher Wille und was der Sinn und Zweck ihrer Anordnungen
ist?’
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fixed. However, the crisis confronting European jurisprudence is not necessarily due to the
changing relationship of jurisprudence to its object of study, but rather the pace at which
positive law could be written, amended, or discarded. Drawing on the temporal claim made
above, Schmitt notes, ‘the European jurists of the nineteenth century could . . . still feel
seemingly safe, as the method and tempo of legislation . . . remained in a close relationship
with jurisprudence even after 1848, during the second half of the nineteenth century.’65
Thus, in the early period of legal positivism, the acceleration characteristic of the ‘motorized
legislator’ had not yet taken hold, though the decoupling between law and jurisprudence and
established the conditions of its possibility. While the stroke of a feather could now render
everything written on the law into wastepaper, such shifts rarely occurred in the decades fol-
lowing the Revolutions of 1848. Indeed, legal positivism necessitated a distinction between
‘the objective law’ and ‘the subjective opinion of the creator of the law,’ which meant that
jurisprudence could take the text of the law as its object of study and draw interpretations
that would be antithetical to the subjective opinion of the legislator.66 Thus, it was possible
to quip, following a quotation from Max Ernst Eccius, that ‘the law is smarter than the
legislator.’67 In fact, Schmitt notes that the distinction ‘gave the jurist . . . a new, separate
authority and an almost legislative dignity.’68 In Schmitt’s typed notes of Eccius’ text, it is
clear that he agreed on another level as well: that, under positivism, ‘legal life will lose its
firm basis.’69
However, the brief moment of legislative dignity afforded to jurists under legal positivism
disappeared in the twentieth century with the introduction of what Schmitt terms ‘the
motorized legislator.’ The term ‘motorized’ refers here to the pace at which laws are enacted,
a pace so rapid that jurisprudence could no longer follow changes in the law. For Schmitt,
the ‘motorized legislator’ is a phenomenon of the twentieth century: while the Revolutions
of 1848 had laid the path for the spread of legal positivism into European legal thought, the
year 1914 – marking the beginning of the Great War – symbolized the rise of the ‘motorized
legislator.’ Here, Schmitt claims
65 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 401. ‘Die europäischen Juristen des 19.
Jahrhunderts konnten sich . . . noch ziemlich sicher fühlen, denn die Methode und das Tempo der Gesetzge-
bung . . . blieben auch nach 1848, während der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts, in enger Verbindung mit
der Rechtswissenschaft.’
66 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 402. ‘von objektivem Gesetz und subjektiver
Meinung der Urheber des Gesetzes.’
67 Schmitt kept a typed note of Eccius’ extended quotation together with his materials for Die Lage in a folder
labeled ‘Drei Arten.’ The phrase ‘Das Gesetz ist stets klüger als der Gesetzgeber’ is underlined. See RW
0265-20925.
68 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 403. ‘Das Gesetz ist klüger als der Gesetzgeber’;
‘Sie gab den Juristen . . . eine neue, eigene Autorität und eine fast legislatorische Würde.’
69 See RW 0265-20925; the phrase ‘eine feste Grundlage verlieren’ is underlined.
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Since 1914, all great historical events and developments in European countries have
contributed to the process of legislation becoming constantly quicker and constantly
in a more summary manner, the path of materialization of a legal provision becoming
constantly shorter, and share of jurisprudence becoming constantly smaller.70
For Schmitt, this process of motorization and acceleration is grounded in the history of the
European states in the twentieth century: the crisis of jurisprudence was deeply imbricated in
the ‘war and post-war, mobilization and demobilization, revolution and dictatorship, inflation
and deflation,’ all of which have ‘led to the same result in all European countries, that
the process of legislation became increasingly simplified and increasingly accelerated.’71
During the course of the war, ‘the “decree,” the “ordinance,” displaced the law [Gesetz].’72
Schmitt points to the exact moment in German history when this process of displacement
was unleashed: August 4, 1914, the date of the Gesetz über die Ermächtigung des Bundesrats
zu wirtschaftlichen Maßnahmen und über die Verlängerung der Fristen des Wechsel- und
Scheckrechts im Falle kriegerischer Ereignisse at the start of the World War. This law enabled
government agencies to issue decrees and administrative ordinances with the force of law.
The reliance on decrees and ordinances only intensified after the war as a deeply fractured
Reichstag could not pass an Ermächtigungsgesetz, instead relying on the ‘dictatorial measures
of the Reichspräsident’ contained in Article 48 of the Weimar constitution.73
As a result of this motorization, jurisprudence could no longer keep up with the rapid pace
of decrees and ordinances meant to counter moments of acute political crisis, themselves
emerging at ever increasing rates. As Schmitt notes, ‘the legislative machine increased
its tempo to an unforeseen extent, and the positivist-legal commentary and interpretation
could barely manage to keep up.’74 Thus, jurisprudence became disjointed from its own
subject matter – the discipline of law, as a product of human labor, could not become
70 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 404. ‘Seit 1914 haben alle großen
geschichtlichen Ereignisse und Entwicklungen in allen europäischen Ländern dazu beigetragen, daß das
Verfahren der Gesetzgebung immer schneller und summarischer, der Weg des Zustandekommens einer
gesetzlichen Regelung immer kürzer, der Anteil der Rechtswissenschaft immer kleiner wurde.’
71 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft, p. 404. ‘Krieg und Nachkrieg, Mobilmachung und
Demobilmachung, Revolution und Diktatur, Inflation und Deflation . . . in allen europäischen Ländern zu
dem gleichen Ergebnis geführt, daß das Verfahren der Gesetzgebung immer mehr vereinfacht und immer
mehr beschleunigt wurde.’
72 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 404. ‘Das “Dekret”, die “Verordnung”,
verdrängte das Gesetz.’
73 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 405. ‘Diktaturmaßnahme des Reichspräsi-
denten.’ Schmitt does not acknowledge his own role as a proponent of Article 48 powers of the Weimar
Constitution. See in particular Carl Schmitt, ‘Die Diktatur des Reichspräsidenten nach Art. 48 der Reichsver-
fassung,’ in Schmitt, Die Diktatur. See Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy, 70-85.
74 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 406. ‘Die Gesetzgebungsmaschine steigerte
ihr Tempo in ungeahntem Ausmaße, und die positivistisch-rechtswissenschaftliche Kommentierung und
Interpretierung vermochte ihr kaum zu folgen.’
44 The Turn to Historicity
‘motorized’ in the same way that law itself had become motorized. At the same time, however,
the acceleration of law became a recursive process, as the law moved into administrative
mechanisms such as ordinances, orders, and measures with legal force: ‘Just as the ordinance
[Verordnung] could be called “motorized law,” so could the order [Anordnung] be called a
“motorized ordinance.”’75 For Schmitt, ‘the statutory law [Gesetz] transformed into a means
of planning, the act of administration into an act of intervention.’76 The ultimate consequence
of this shift from motorized law to motorized ordinance was that it was no longer possible to
distinguish between the law and the legislator, as Schmitt had argued could still be done in
the decades following 1848. For Schmitt,
It can make sense to say that the law is smarter than the legislator; however, it is
something entirely different to assert that a steering measure [Lenkungsmaßnahme]
enacted according to the situation of the matter is smarter than the steering regulator
[Lenkungsstelle], who is best informed on the state of the matter.77
Thus, the dominance of legal positivism put jurisprudence in the impossible position of
being permanently outpaced by the rate of changing laws. Moreover, the rate of acceleration
would only increase.78 Jurisprudence, by virtue of the changing nature of the object of its
study, could no longer produce commentaries on its own subject matter. The shift into rapid
ordinances and orders, into rapid measures designed to combat technical problems – echoed
in Schmitt’s choice repetition of ‘steering measures’ and ‘steering agencies’ – had finally
widened the abyss between jurisprudence and the law.
Jurisprudence found itself confronted by an existential crisis: as long as law was mo-
torized, designed to be rapidly enacted to respond to rapidly unfolding technical crises, the
discipline could not overcome the temporal acceleration of its object of study. Indeed, one
might frame this in terms of ‘law’s abnegation,’ the rise of administrative and bureaucratic
control over technical issues.79 In forming his prognosis of the existential crisis facing
75 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 407. ‘Wie die Verordnung ein “motorisiertes
Gesetz”, so konnte die Anordnung eine “motorisierte Verordnung” genannt werden.’
76 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 407. ‘Das Gesetz verwandelt sich in ein Mittel
der Plannung, der Verwaltungsakt in einen Lenkungsakt.’
77 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 408. ‘Es kann einen guten Sinn haben, zu
sagen, daß das Gesetz klüger ist als der Gesetzgeber; es ist aber etwas ganz anderes, zu behaupten, daß eine
nach Lage der Sache ergangene Lenkungsmaßnahme klüger sei als die anordnende, über die Lage der Sache
am besten informierte Lenkungsstelle.’
78 Even after 1950, Schmitt maintained that he was correct regarding the accelerated pace of legislation. On
the front cover of his personal copy, Schmitt has taped a newspaper clipping from 1958 reviewing Franz
Schlegelberger’s Zur Rationaliserung der Gesetzgebung. Schmitt has underlined ‘Es seien zuviel Beamte
unrationell mit Gesetzgebungsarbeiten beschäftigt’ – a diagnosis that fits within the domain of his essay. See
NRW 0265-27591.
79 Adrian Vermeule, Law’s Abnegation: From Law’s Empire to the Administrative State (Boston: Harvard
University Press, 2016).
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jurisprudence, Schmitt turned to the history of legal thought, constructing a genealogy that
connected the rise of legal positivism following the Revolutions of 1848 to the exacerbated
crises of ‘the present situation’ of 1943/1944. Legal positivism’s list of crimes in Schmitt’s
account was long: it had fractured jurisprudence into national legal spheres, transformed the
monism of the jus publicum Europaeum into a system of interstate treaties, and unwittingly
unleashed the motorized legislator. To combat the existential crisis created by legal posi-
tivism, Schmitt will follow the same strategy as he used to diagnose it: only by searching
within its own history could jurisprudence save itself.
2.2 Historicizing the Historical School of Law
In giving an answer to the crisis confronting European jurisprudence, Schmitt points to the
work of Friedrich Carl von Savigny as a historical ‘paradigm’ for combatting the hegemonic
position of legal positivism. Drawing on two of Savigny’s most famous texts – Vom Beruf
unsrer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft of 1814 [On the Vocation of our
Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence] and Stimmen für und wider neue Gesetzbücher
of 1816 – Schmitt lays out a vision of a unified European jurisprudence grounded in an
historical approach inspired by the foundational thinker of the Historical School of Law.
This historicism means, however, that Schmitt cannot simply announce a ‘return to Savigny,’
as doing so would violate his oft-repeated dictum: ‘a historical truth is only true once.’80
Instead, Schmitt mobilizes the Prussian legal historian as a paradigmatic thinker whose
commentary on the sources of law could be revised and reapplied to ‘the present situation’ of
European jurisprudence.
To reclaim Savigny’s historical approach, Schmitt reads his intellectual predecessor
within the historical context of the development of German legal thought in the nineteenth
century. For Schmitt, this is necessarily a critical endeavor, as the rise of legal positivism
after Savigny’s death inspired a revisionist account in which the Historical School of Law
was at best an distraction and at worst a retrogression on the path towards positivism’s
ascendance. According to this conception, ‘[Savigny] simply stood on the wrong side in the
historical development of law; his “historical” tendency only had a quixotic, antiquarian,
and reactionary meaning because it stood impedingly in the way of the urgently historical
development towards the codification of state law.’81 For Schmitt, such a conception of
80 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 415. Emphasis in the original. ‘Zurück zu
Savigny’; ‘Eine geschichtliche Wahrheit ist nur einmal wahr.’ Schmitt repeats this formulation in Schmitt,
Dialogues, p. 72.
81 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 410. ‘Demnach hätte er in der rechts-
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Savigny’s significance in the history of legal thought could itself only emerge during a period
of hegemonic legal positivism, in which the object of legal studies was exclusively limited
to positive law. Thus, in this conception, Savigny was on the wrong side of history in his
polemic against Thibaut and early attempts to create a codification of German law.82
Schmitt’s text offers a counter-reading of this historical narrative – while positivism still
ultimately wins, the historical element of Savigny’s thought is nevertheless worth saving. As
Schmitt claims, one needs to keep in mind that Savigny’s work of 1814 ‘was an existential
reflection of jurisprudence on itself, that it was a great call to jurisprudence as the guardian
of not only enacted law [gesetzten Rechts], while his critique of codifications of state law had
only the sense of clarifying the profession of jurisprudence, of saving the dignity of a legal
class, and of evoking an entirely specific threat.’83 Over the course of the following section
of his text, Schmitt emphasizes that Savigny’s work arose in the context of an ‘existential
struggle’ facing jurisprudence, one which took place in Savigny’s time but is refracted
forward into the contemporary crisis of European jurisprudence.
The French language manuscript of Schmitt’s text of 1944 reveals a second historical
parallel between Schmitt and Savigny, entirely omitted in the published 1950 version: both
thinkers are writing at a moment of war. As Schmitt notes, ‘this [intellectual] strength [shown
by Savigny] was not just the private affair of a great man. These were the intellectual and
moral energies of the Napoleonic wars of German liberation . . . It is within the alliance of
the scientific spirit and the conscience, awakened by war, of a new spiritual strength, that
resides the true secret of Savigny’s great appeal to European jurisprudence.’84 In the first
instance, Schmitt’s commentary displays the extent to which he identifies his own fate with
that of Savigny’s: both urge a return to legal history at a moment of intense war and the
fracturing of Europe. A second striking feature of Schmitt’s conclusion is the claim that war
is in fact conducive to the ‘awakening’ of the ‘scientific spirit.’ This argument as well could
geschichtlichen Entwicklung einfach auf der falschen Seite gestanden; seine “historische” Tendenz hätte nur
einen lebensfremden, antiquarischen und reaktionären Sinn, weil sie der zur staatsgesetzlichen Kodifikation
drängenden geschichtlichen Entwicklung hemmend in den Weg trat.’
82 Klenner, ‘Savigny’s Research Program,’ p. 72.
83 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 411. ‘Man achtete nicht darauf, daß eine
Abhandlung eine existentielle Besinnung der Rechtswissenschaft auf sich selbst, daß sie ein großer Aufruf
zur Rechtswissenschaft als der Hüterin des nicht nur gesetzten Rechts war, während seine Kritik der
gesetzesstaatlichen Kodifikation nur den Sinn hatte, den Beruf zur Rechtswissenschaft klarzustellen, die
Würde eines Rechtsstandes zu retten und eine ganz bestimmte Gefahr zu beschwören.’
84 NRW 0265-20925, 34. Strikethrough in the original text. ‘Cette force n’était pas uniquement l’affaire privée
d’une homme génial. C’étaient les énergies intellectuelles et morales de l’époque des guerres napoléon
“allemandes de libération” . . . C’est dans l’alliance de l’esprit scientifique et de la conscience, éveillée par
la guerre, d’une force spirituelle et neuve, que réside la véritable secret du grand appel de Savigny à la
jurisprudence européenne.’
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be reflected onto the present moment: Schmitt believed his work was similarly granted a level
of intellectual ‘elevation’ by virtue of the unfolding world war and the clarity it provided.
However, the French typescript reveals a third reason for drawing on Savigny in 1944,
one that forms the very last paragraph of Schmitt’s lecture and the last impression he would
have left with his audience.
In the suffering and horrors of the present world war, new germs of the scientific spirit
will be born; these germs will find, even in the noise of the battles and under the terror
of aerial bombardments, the mysterious calm indispensable to their growth, and they
will eventually flourish. Such is the faith I draw from Savigny’s call to jurisprudence.
With increased intensity, the European spirit becomes aware of itself, and the genius that
has never abandoned Europe during the terrible periods it has gone through in the past
will also save us from the present misfortune.85
Referencing the ‘terror of aerial bombardments’ points to Schmitt’s own life: Schmitt’s house
in Dahlem, Berlin was struck by a bomb on August 23, 1943, forcing him to relocate first
to Schlachtensee and then to his family home in Plettenberg.86 However, Schmitt’s closing
lines also point to the possibility of a sustained future of jurisprudence – not despite the war,
but rather precisely because of it, new possibilities were emerging to save jurisprudence
from the twin forces of theology and technology. That Schmitt concludes with ‘the present
misfortune’ or ‘du malheur présent’ allows him to maintain a critical ambiguity: while
Schmitt framed his lecture as a discussion of the present situation of jurisprudence, even
saying in the introduction that he does not wish to speak of the ‘horrible world war,’ he
nevertheless closes the lecture with precisely the war in mind. Schmitt’s intervention in 1944
was to demonstrate a level of historical self-consciousness of the European ‘spirit’ – in the
course of his speech, European jurisprudence – embodied in Schmitt – becomes aware of its
historical position.
Schmitt’s turn to a historical jurisprudence follows from Savigny’s sources doctrine
in opposition to the legality-oriented legal positivism: ‘The law as concrete order cannot
be separated from its history. True law is not enacted [gesetzt], but rather emerges in an
unintentional development.’87 This brief statement illuminates three further aspects of
85 NRW 0265-20925, p. 34. ‘Dans les souffrances et dans les horreurs de la guerre mondiale actuelle, naîtront
de nouveaux germes de l’esprit scientifique; ces germes sauront trouver, même dans le bruit des batailles
et sous la terreur des bombardements aériens, le calme mystérieux indispensable à leur croissance, et ils
finiront par s’épanouir un jour. Telle est la foi que je puise dans l’appel de Savigny à la jurisprudence. Ave
une intensité accrue, l’esprit européen prendre conscience de lui-même, et le génie qui n’a jamais abandonné
l’Europe au cours de périodes terribles qu’elle a traversées dans la passé nous sauvera aussi du malheur
présent.’
86 Villinger, Verortung des Politischen, p. 35. Mehring, Carl Schmitt, p. 414.
87 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 411. ‘Das Recht als konkrete Ordnung läßt
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Schmitt’s appropriation of Savigny: first, Schmitt attempts to reclaim Savigny’s legacy
for his own methodological project, recasting him as the first jurist to correctly grasp the
relationship between legality and legitimacy and even uses the term ‘concrete order’ in this
connection; second, Savigny is credited as the first to understand that law does not develop
along a preordained teleology, that its future cannot be given in advance precisely because it
unfolds ‘unintentionally,’ an essential element of their common anti-rationalism88; and third,
Savigny’s emphasis on the relationship between history and law is one that Schmitt will carry
forward into his own analysis. For ‘what true law is, determines itself today therefore in the
concrete historical form of existence of jurists [Juristentum], in which the growth arises to
consciousness.’89
The pivotal distinction in Savigny’s thought turns on three sources of law: first, in the
sense of ‘legal institutions and valid rules’; and second, in the sense of ‘a purely historical’
source of law. However, the third source poses Savigny’s radical significance for Schmitt’s
project: ‘jurisprudence is precisely itself the real source of law.’90 Laws themselves are, in
this interpretation, ‘only material, which [jurisprudence] shapes and refines where possible,’
thus leaving it to jurists to develop systematic interpretations of law. Indeed, Schmitt writes
‘Savigny knows the value of a good law, but he knows first, that the law is only one of many
manifestations of concrete orders, and second, that the essence and value of the law lay in its
stability and longevity.’91
Schmitt’s third claim, that ‘jurisprudence is precisely itself the real source of law,’ follows
closely Savigny’s source doctrine in Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit. In Schmitt’s personal copy of
Savigny’s text, acquired in 1935, he has underlined the exact passage wherein Savigny
describes the intellectual division of labor allowing jurists to refine the law: ‘In an advanced
sich nicht von seiner Geschichte loslösen. Das wahre Recht wird nicht gesetzt, sondern entsteht in einer
absichtlosen Entwicklung.’
88 On Savigny as an anti-rationalist, see Ernst Rothacker, ‘Savigny, Grimm, Ranke. Ein Beitrag zur Frage nach
dem Zusammenhang der Historischen Schule,’ Historische Zeitschrift 128(3) (1923), 415-445, p. 441; See
as well Max Weber, ‘Roscher and Knies and the Logical Problems of Historical Political Economy’; Gary
Ulmen misreads this commonality between the two thinkers as a result of reading Schmitt’s earliest critiques
of Political Romanticism nearly thirty years forward into this text. See Gary Ulmen, ‘The Sociology of the
State: Carl Schmitt and Max Weber,’ State, Culture and Society 1(2) (1985), 3-57, p. 21.
89 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 411. ‘Was wahres Recht ist, bestimmt sich
demnach heute in der konkreten geschichtlichen Existenzform des Juristentums, in welchem das Wachstum
zum Bewußtsein kommt.’
90 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 412. Emphasis added. ‘Die Rechtswissenschaft
ist eben selbst die eigentliche Rechtsquelle.’
91 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 412. ‘Savigny kennt den Wert eines guten
Gesetzes, aber er weiß erstens, daß das Gesetz nur eine von mehreren Erscheinungsformen des Rechts
konkreter Ordnungen ist, und zweitens, daß Wesen und Wert des Gesetzes in seiner Stabilität und Dauer
liegen.’
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culture all activities of the people become specialized to an ever increasing extent, . . . as such
a specialized class now appear jurists as well.’92 Such an interpretation of Savigny’s sources
doctrine radically differed with the standard interpretation during the Third Reich, which
read the concept of Volksgeist as belonging solely to the German people, not a particular
class within it.93
The law’s stability and longevity was ensured by its embeddedness in legal science as
the ‘genuine guardian of the law [Rechtswahrerin].’94 Central to this conception is that the
law is based in the idea of a jurisprudence that would ‘bring [the law’s] development to
consciousness’ as a ‘carrier and guardian of the law and to raise it to the core of a genuine
legal class [Rechtsstand].’95 Here, Schmitt once again echoes the language he found in
Savigny’s Vom Beruf, emphasizing the legal class as the source of law in an advanced
and specialized culture. Even if Savigny’s attempt was ultimately unsuccessful, Schmitt
nevertheless viewed it as a central development in the history of European jurisprudence and
a paradigm for its future development.
Confined to a footnote, Schmitt cites the central passage from Savigny’s method for his
text, defining a ‘strictly historical method of jurisprudence’ in the following way:
Its endeavor is much to follow every given subject matter to its roots and to discover an
organic principle, whereby that which is still living will necessarily differentiate itself
from that which has died off and belongs to history.96
This brief description of a historical jurisprudence conforms to Schmitt’s own approach
in his the history of the law of nations, Der Nomos der Erde. Thus, it is no surprise that
the immediately following paragraph contains the same language as the foreword to Der
Nomos der Erde: Schmitt claims that ‘the true successor of Savigny in the nineteenth century
was neither Puchta nor Ihering, but rather Johann Jacob Bachofen,’ once again claiming to
92 NRW 0265-27061, Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit, p. 12. Underlining follows Schmitt’s own handwritten mark-
ings. ‘Bei steigender Cultur nämlich sondern sich alle Thätigkeiten des Volkes immer mehr, und was sonst
gemeinschaftlich betrieben wurde, fällt jetzt einzelnen Ständen anheim. Als ein solcher abgesonderter Stand
erscheinen nunmehr auch die Juristen.’ I have kept Savigny’s antiquated orthography.
93 In agreement, see Andreas Rahmatian, ‘Friedrich Carl von Savigny’s Beruf und Volksgeistlehre,’ Journal of
Legal History 28(1) (2007), 1-29, p. 5.
94 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 414. ‘der eigentlichen Rechtswahrerin.’ It
should be noted that Rechtswahrer is a NS legal term.
95 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 415. ‘die Entwicklung zum Bewußtstein
bringende Rechtswissenschaft zur Trägerin und Hüterin des Rechts und zum Kern eines echten Rechtsstandes
zu erheben.’
96 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 415. This same passage is quoted in Böcken-
förde, ‘Die Historische Rechtsschule,’ p. 11n7. ‘Ihr Bestreben geht vielmehr dahin, jeden gegebenen Stoff
bis zu seiner Wurzel zu verfolgen, und so ein organisches Prinzip zu entdecken, wodurch sich von selbst
das, was noch Leben hat, von demjenigen absondern muß, was schon abgestorben ist und auch noch der
Geschichte angehört.’
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find Savigny’s true successor in Bachofen.97 The linguistic parallels extend further, with
Schmitt referring to making jurisprudence ‘fruitful’ once again.98 While all references to
Bachofen do not appear in the French typescript of 1943, their presence in the 1950 published
edition suggests that Schmitt was consciously attempting to link each of his works into
a coherent argument. In this regard, Schmitt praises Bachofen for ‘[ignoring] the current
affairs of the positivistic age and went his own way in the fruitful depth and stillness of
mythological research.’99 By following in the footsteps of Savigny and Bachofen and taking
a turn to history and the mythological, Schmitt declares that ‘[we are allowed] to let the dead
positivism of the nineteenth century bury its deceased.’100
Schmitt’s declaration of triumph over positivism comes not as a result of the specific
substantial conclusions of Savigny’s texts, which Schmitt declares as full of ‘contradictions of
the most obvious type.’101 Furthermore, Schmitt is anxious to gloss over Savigny’s role in the
codification of Prussian law, as that would run contrary to Schmitt’s preferred interpretation
of Savigny as an archetype of anti-positivism.102 Instead, Savigny’s work forms an effective
weapon against positivism because of the ‘intellectual situation, which the historical value
is given to his main argument, his theory of the unintentional development of law, because
it makes jurisprudence into the antithesis of a merely de facto law of enactment, without
throwing law into the civil war slogans of natural law.’103 Thus, Savigny’s contribution, for
Schmitt’s narrative, is not his analysis of Roman Law in itself, nor is it his contribution to
private law, as Schmitt would lament in his notebooks.104 Rather, Savigny’s contribution to
the development of jurisprudence lies in the strategy of turning to legal history, specifically
of turning to Roman law as a bulwark against the advance of positivism and the resurgence
of natural law theories. For Schmitt, this same strategy could be replicated in the face of the
contemporary crisis with a return to historicity as the foundation of law; however, this would
97 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 416. ‘Der wahre Erbe Savignys im 19.
Jahrhundert war weder Puchta noch Ihering, sondern Johan Jacob Bachofen.’
98 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 416; Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 6.
99 Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 416. ‘Freilich ließ er die Aktualitäten des posi-
tivistischen Zeitalters links liegen und ging er einen Weg in die Fruchtbare Tiefe und Stille mythologischer
Forschung.’
100Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 416. ‘[Wir dürfen] den toten Positivismus des
19. Jahrhunderts seine Toten begraben lassen.’
101Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 416. ‘Widersprüche auffälligster Art.’
102Matthias von Rosenberg, Friedrich Carl von Savigny im Urteil seiner Zeit (Frankfurt: Verlag Lang, 2000).
103Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ pp. 417-8. ‘Seine Bedeutung liegt nicht in
einer Argumentation, sondern in der geistigen Situation, die seinem Hauptargument, seiner Lehre von der
absichtslosen Entstehung des Rechts, erst die geschichtliche Größe gibt, weil sie die Rechtswissenschaft
zum Gegenpol des bloß faktischen Setzungsrechts macht, ohne das Recht in die Bürgerkriegsparolen des
Naturrechts zu werfen.’ On the relationship between civil war and natural law, see chapter 3, section 2 of
this dissertation.
104Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 80.
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require that the current position of jurisprudence to be correctly understood in relation to its
historical development.
Thus, when Schmitt ultimately answers the question posed by the title of his lecture –
what is the situation of European jurisprudence? – he once again uses identical language to
the foreword to Der Nomos der Erde, placing its position as between two opposing forces:
‘the position of European jurisprudence has namely . . . always been defined through two
oppositions, that of jurisprudence to theology, metaphysics, and philosophy on the one hand,
and to a purely technical science of norms [Normenkunde] on the other hand.’105 This
bifurcation directly mirrors the language used and the problematic posited in the opening
of Der Nomos der Erde, where Schmitt warns of an existential threat facing jurisprudence,
‘which today is being crushed between theology and technology.’106 Indeed, Schmitt goes
on in Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft to characterize Savigny as laying
the groundwork for an attack against theology and ‘secularized theology’ in the form of
natural law; likewise, Savigny is credited with understanding the potential danger of a pure
‘Setzung von Setzungen’ [‘Enactment of Enactments’] emerging as a result of positivism
and of ‘Napoleonic Codification.’107 In a critical moment, Schmitt argues for a separation
between law and theology, writing that ‘in the self-surrender to theology and philosophy,
jurisprudence would cease, in a particular way, to be its own, autonomous science.’108 At
the same time, however, technology exposes law to all of the pitfalls of legal positivism:
‘In the subjugation under the mere legality of an only enacted [gesetzten] Ought, it would
completely lose its dignity as a science [Wissenschaft] and would degenerate into a no longer
particularly useful instrument of a technical prosthesis operation, which treats the earth as
a tabula rasa of a spaceless and lawless planning.’109 For Schmitt, technology produces
the motorized legislator and, as I will argue in chapter 6 of this dissertation, ultimately the
negation of law through utopian thought.
105Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 420. ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswis-
senschaft ist nämlich, . . . immer durch zwei Gegensätze bestimmt gewesen, den der Rechtswissenschaft zur
Theologie, Metaphysik und Philosophie auf der einen und zu einer bloß technischen Normenkunde auf der
anderen Seite.’
106Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 6.
107Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 421. ‘Eine Setzung von Setzungen’ is one of
Schmitt’s favorite pejorative terms for legal positivism, used frequently in his postwar writings. See Schmitt,
Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 58, as well as Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 65.
108Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 421. ‘In der Selbstauslieferung an Theologie
und Philosophie würde die Rechtswissenschaft aufhören, in spezifischer Weise eine eigene, autonome
Wissenschaft zu sein.’
109Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 421. Emphasis in original. ‘In der Unterwerfung
unter die bloße Legalität eines nur gesetzten Sollens würde sie ihre Würde als Wissenschaft überhaupt
verlieren und zu de nicht einmal mehr besonders nützlichen Instrument eines technischen Prothesen-Betriebes
herabsinken, der die Erde als tabula rasa einer raum- und rechtlosen Planung behandelt.’
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Bracketing for a moment the exact nature of the dual oppositions to jurisprudence in
theology and technology, which forms the basis of the subsequent chapters of the thesis, a
number of issues arise in Schmitt’s thinking: aside from being published in the same year,
the repeated language and identification of the dual forces confronting jurisprudence posits
a close relation between the two texts, one that has been entirely overlooked due to the
scant attention paid to Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft, let alone the French
unpublished manuscript, in Schmitt scholarship. One might argue that such similarities are to
be expected given the texts were simultaneously published and composed during roughly the
same period; however, this similarity has been overlooked, and the nature of their interaction
with one another in Schmitt’s thought has similiarly not been explored. The relationship
between the two texts is specifically one of method and application – Die Lage excavates a
historical approach to the study of law uncovering Savigny as a paradigm for the future of
jurisprudence, while Der Nomos der Erde applies this method to writing a history of the law
of nations.
Indeed, as Schmitt continues in his description of the dangers facing European jurispru-
dence, ‘the danger, which today threatens the legal spirit [Geist] of Europe, comes no longer
from theology and still only occasionally from a philosophical metaphysics, but rather from
an unchained technicism [Technizismus], which serves state law as its instrument.’110 To
prevent any misinterpretation, by Schmitt declaring that theology no longer poses a threat,
he does not mean that jurisprudence should forget the progress made after Gentili’s ‘silete
theologi!’ and flee once more into the stability afforded by natural law; rather, Schmitt is
offering a historical argument that the ‘unchained technicism’ of the twentieth century has
effectively neutralized the argumentative force of natural law doctrines, reflected in his use
of temporal modifiers such as ‘no longer,’ ‘only still occasionally,’ and ‘today.’ This should
be taken as a warning against reading Schmitt deterministically through the lens of his earlier
writings on political Catholicism and Politische Theologie, as Schmitt explicitly aims to limit
the influence of theology on jurisprudence. Indeed, Schmitt clarifies this relation, noting
that ‘the scholarly jurist is not a theologian and not a philosopher; he is however also not a
mere function of a somehow “enacted” ought and of its enactment of enactments [Setzung
von Setzungen].’111 It was Savigny’s great achievement that the opened a third path for
jurisprudence through legal history, one that Schmitt thought could serve once again as the
110Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 422. ‘Die Gefahr, die heute dem rechtswis-
senschaftlichen Geist Europas droht, kommt nicht mehr aus der Theologie und nur noch gelegentlich aus
einer philosophischen Metaphysik, sondern aus einem entfesselten Technizismus, der sich des staatlichen
Gesetzes als seines Werkzeuges bedient.’
111Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 422. ‘Der wissenschaftliche Jurist ist kein
Theologe und kein Philosoph, er ist aber auch keine bloße Funktion eines irgendwie “gesetzten” Sollens und
seiner Setzung von Setzungen.’
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foundation of jurisprudence.
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Upon publication of Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft, Schmitt made sure to
send his newest text to his Spanish contacts – after his extended period of ‘exile’ in Spanish
academia following the war – as well as former students such as Ernst Forsthoff, and German
academics such as Werner Weber, Hans Barion, Gustav von Schmoller, and Carl Bilfinger.112
And yet, it was through Joseph Kaiser’s outreach to émigré Germans in the United States that
Schmitt found one of his most supportive readers: the political scientist Eric Voegelin. After
receiving his copy, Voegelin wrote directly to Schmitt on two separate occasions regarding
the text. In the first, dated July 3, 1950, he claimed ‘your study shows . . . the old mastery.’
Voegelin continued, ‘I ask myself . . . if the attempt should be made, to publish this in an
American journal.’113 In the second letter, nearly a year later, Voegelin laments that American
publications do not favor the length of Schmitt’s typical pamphlets – too long for a journal
and yet too short for a book – but nevertheless still hopes to see its publication in the United
States.114 Such plans would only come to fruition after Schmitt’s death with an English
translation appearing in the journal Telos in spring of 1990.115
Perhaps the most significant reaction to the text came from Schmitt’s former student,
Ernst Rudolf Huber. Schmitt wrote to Huber on March 24, 1950 indicating he had enclosed a
copy of Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft dedicated with his frequent dictum,
‘Der Feind ist unsere eigene Frage als Gestalt.’116 Huber’s response, dated nearly three
months later, contains a detailed commentary on the text. In the first instance, Huber notes
that the text shows ‘the continuity of your scholarly thought, which manifests itself so clearly
for the expert of your oeuvre.’ Huber’s praise for his former teacher continues, noting that
‘your old theses on the existential situation and on concrete order are advanced here, stronger
than in previous publications, under a secular aspect.’117
112See Miguel Saralegui, Carl Schmitt pensador español (Madrid: Trotta 2016). See Forsthoff’s brief discussion
of the text in Briefwechsel Ernst Forsthoff-Carl Schmitt 1926-1974, eds. Dorothee Mußgnug, Reinhard
Mußgnung und Angela Reinthal (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007), p. 68.
113Eric Voegelin to Carl Schmitt, July 3, 1950. NRW 0265-17335. ‘Ihre Studie zeigt . . . die alte Meisterschaft.’
114Eric Voegelin to Carl Schmitt, May 8 1951. NRW 0265-17336.
115Carl Schmitt, ‘The Plight of European Jurisprudence.’
116Carl Schmitt and Ernst Rudolf Huber, Briefwechsel 1926-1981, ed. Ewald Grothe (Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot, 2014), p. 359n1678.
117Schmitt and Huber, Briefwechsel, p. 362. ‘die Kontinuität Ihres wissenschaftlichen Denkens, die sich in
ihm für den Kenner Ihres Gesamtwerkes so deutlich manifestiert’; ‘Ihre alten Thesen von der existentiellen
Situation und von der konkreten Ordnung sind hier starker noch als in früheren Schriften unter einen
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While Huber agrees with Schmitt on the danger of legal positivism, he nevertheless
criticizes his former mentor’s turn to Savigny. Huber argues ‘I am not at all sure whether
Savigny’s doctrine of the “unintentional formation of law” is adequate . . . and if it is sufficient
as a counter-position.’118 His argument is that Schmitt’s primary example of a unity of
European jurisprudence – the reception of Roman law – was itself not unintentional, but
rather a deliberate effort. However, Huber’s claim is in fact more general: ‘that all legal crises
can only be overcome in a determination for conscious reform.’119 Thus, even the choice to
return to Roman law was itself a rational decision, one that reveals the ‘source of the logical
contradictions’ of the Historical School of Law.120 This presents a rebuttal of Schmitt’s
specific mobilization of Savigny as an anti-rationalist and the potential effectiveness of that
mobilization for defending jurisprudence from legal positivism.
But Huber also pushes back on Schmitt’s attempt to bind the ‘decomposition visible in the
crisis of legality’ with ‘the modern concept of statutory law [Gesetz].’121 Here, he chastises
Schmitt, arguing ‘with every polemic against the legalistic instrumentalization, it cannot be
forgotten, that in the end phase of this decomposition, not only the “statutory law” [Gesetz],
but also “natural law” [Naturrecht] was made into a tool of despotism, discrimination, and
terror.’122 Huber’s response to Schmitt was a direct criticism of his former mentor’s own
involvement with National Socialism: ‘The appeal to “concrete order,” to a “healthy legal
and popular sentiment,” to irrational energies, to nature or reason, to justice and humanity, to
Christian natural law and divine commandment, all of this became just like “statutory law”
[Gesetz] a weapon for systematic discrimination, the deprivation of rights, annihilation.’123
As a result, Huber’s second line of attack establishes two related claims: first, that legal
positivism was not solely responsible for the horrors of National Socialism, as other doctrines
such as natural law were also mobilized when advantageous; and second, that Schmitt’s
säkularen Aspekt gebracht.’
118Schmitt and Huber, Briefwechsel, p. 363. ‘so wenig ist mir sicher, ob Savignys Lehre von der “absichtslosen
Entstehung des Rechts” der Situation adäquat ist . . . und ob sie als Gegenposition ausreicht.’
119Schmitt and Huber, Briefwechsel, p. 363. ‘Jede Rechtskrise aber kann nichts anderes als im Entschluß zur
rationalen und bewußten Reform überwunden werden.’
120Schmitt and Huber, Briefwechsel, p. 363. ‘die Quelle der logischen Widersprüche.’
121Schmitt and Huber, Briefwechsel, p. 363. ‘die in der Krise der Legalität sichtbar gewordene Degeneration
. . . mit dem modernen Begriff des Gesetzes.’
122Schmitt and Huber, Briefwechsel, pp. 365-366. ‘Bei aller Polemik gegen die legalitäre Instrumentalisierung
darf dann wohl auch nicht vergessen werden, daß in dieser Endphase der Dekomposition nicht nur das
“Gesetz”, sondern auch das “Naturrecht” zu einem Werkzeug der Willkür, der Diskriminierung und des
Terrors wird.’
123Schmitt and Huber, Briefwechsel, p. 366. ‘Die Berufung auf “konkrete Ordnung”, auf “gesundes Rechts- und
Volksempfinden”, auf irrationale Energien, auf Natur oder Vernunft, auf Gerechtigkeit und Menschlichkeit,
auf christliches Naturrecht und auf göttliches Rechtsgebot wird so gut wie das “Gesetz” zu einer Waffe der
planmäßigen Diskriminierung, Entrechtung, Vernichtung.’
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own earlier work on concrete order thinking, and even Savigny’s texts, were themselves
implicated in this critique.
Schmitt never answered Huber’s critique, instead ignoring Huber for six months and
beginning a period of only sporadic communication between the two. Nevertheless, Huber’s
commentary provides a significant contextual insight into the reception of Schmitt’s text
by one of his closest students. This commentary sought to pull Schmitt’s previous work
into his critique and thereby undercut its normative function. This chapter has avoided a
normative evaluation of Schmitt’s arguments, instead placing Die Lage der europäischen
Rechtswissenschaft within its historical and political context and within Schmitt’s wider body
of works. I have argued that Schmitt was a deeply historical thinker, seeing Friedrich Carl von
Savigny as providing a paradigm for the future of jurisprudence and a possibility of escape
from the dual forces of theology and technology. Schmitt’s concept of Geschichtlichkeit, or
historicity, provides the basis of the critiques laid out in the following chapters: the history
of legal and political thought will be Schmitt’s chosen field of battle.

Chapter 3
Law without History? Carl Schmitt
contra Natural Law
In the words of the Austrian legal positivist Hans Kelsen, Carl Schmitt’s text The Guardian
of the Constitution (1931) revealed him to be a ‘natural lawyer’: his thought mobilized a
‘natural law ideal of “unity” based upon wishful thinking [in] the place of the constitution
as a piece of positive law.’1 Such a characterization was undoubtedly meant pejoratively.
Following Kelsen’s separation thesis, the ‘Trennungsthese,’ this meant that Schmitt had
made an unacceptable appeal to a moral, ‘metaphysical,’ and therefore non-legal category.2
In interpreting Schmitt as a natural law theorist, Kelsen was hardly alone. Another of
Schmitt’s contemporaries, Ludwig Waldacker, had reviewed Der Wert des Staates (1914) in
1916 claiming that Schmitt was a ‘constructivist conceptual legal theorist of the natural law
school.’3 John Herz, the influential German émigré and scholar of international law, likewise
included Schmitt in a list of National Socialist legal scholars who ‘attempt[ed] to furnish
a natural law foundation for international law’ after 1933.4 For Herz, National Socialism
1 Hans Kelsen, ‘Who ought to be the Guardian of the Constitution?’ in The Guardian of the Constitution:
Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of Constitutional Law, ed. Lars Vinx (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2015), 174-221, p. 218.
2 On Kelsen’s separation thesis, see Lars Vinx, Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of the Law: Legality and Legitimacy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 30-41; Peter Langford and Ian Bryan (eds.), Hans Kelsen
and the Natural Law Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 2019); on Kelsen and Natural Law, see Hans Kelsen,
‘Naturrechtslehre und Rechtspositivismus,’ Politische Vierteljahresschrift 3(4) (1962), 316-327.
3 Quoted in Ellen Kennedy, Constitutional Failure: Carl Schmitt in Weimar (Durham: Duke University Press,
2004), p. 73. Beyond reconstructing the intellectual history of natural law theories preceding the rise of legal
positivism in Germany, natural law theories do not play a role in Kennedy’s analysis of Schmitt’s thought.
4 John Herz, ‘The National Socialist Doctrine of International Law and the Problems of International Orga-
nization,’ Political Science Quarterly 54(5) (1939), 536-554, p. 542n17. Other National Socialist lawyers
identified along with Carl Schmitt include Viktor Bruns, Carl Bilfinger, and Ernst Wolgast.
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relied upon natural law as a ‘weapon in the battle against the existing state of law,’ and it
was Schmitt’s mobilization of the interrelated concepts of the Reich and Großraum that had
advanced this cause the furthest.5
The depiction of Schmitt as a natural lawyer still survives in the contemporary reception
of his ideas. One scholar has recently rendered ‘Nomos der Erde’ as simply ‘natural law,’
implying the text advanced a natural law theory.6 In Volker Neumann’s magisterial study
Carl Schmitt als Jurist (2014), Schmitt is described as having rejected ‘the second front of
[Kelsen’s] pure theory of the law, specifically against the strict distinction between positive
law and natural law.’ This leads Neumann to argue that Schmitt’s writings on international
law ‘must work with natural law anachronisms’ in the absence of an international authority
capable of taking a sovereign decision.7 According to Gerhard Donhauser, ‘Carl Schmitt can
be recognized as one of the most prominent and powerful representatives of the twentieth
century natural law tradition’ because ‘the presence [of] theological sources . . . constitute[s]
an essential orientation for his position.’8 In addition, Benjamin Schupmann, in his Carl
Schmitt’s State and Constitutional Theory (2017) has argued that Schmitt ‘believed valid
law rested on an at least quasi-natural law foundation’ and that he has a ‘quasi-natural law
orientation.’9 Although what precisely makes it ‘quasi’ remains undefined, Schupmann
nevertheless sees Schmitt’s state theory as presenting a form of ‘quasi-natural law’ because
‘when . . . only positive laws were recognized as valid law, Schmitt’s theoretical solutions
would appear arbitrary and irrational, especially his theory of dictatorship or his arguments
about exceptions to positive legal order.’10 Here, however, Schupmann makes two untenable
assumptions regarding Schmitt’s legal theory: first, and symptomatic of his broader study,
that Schmitt’s thought is meant to form a coherent and non-contradictory system across time,
and that rationality is an important criterion of this system11; and second, that theories of
5 Eduard Bristler, Die Völkerrechtslehre des Nationalsozialismus (Zurich: Europa-Verlag, 1938), p. 77.
Eduard Bristler is a pseudonym for John Herz. On the polemical function of Schmitt’s concept of the Reich,
see Joshua Smeltzer, ‘Reich, Empire, Imperium: Carl Schmitt and the “Overcoming of the Concept of the
State,”’ in Edward Cavanagh (ed.), Empire and Legal Thought: Ideas and Institutions from the Ancients to
the Moderns (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).
6 Clint Goodson, ‘About Schmitt: Partisans and Theory,’ The New Centennial Review 4(3) (2004), 1-7, p. 6.
7 Volker Neumann, Carl Schmitt als Jurist (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), pp. 423, 507. ‘gegen die zweite
Frontstellung der reinen Rechtslehre gerichtet, nämlich gegen die strikte Unterscheidung von positivem
Recht und Naturrecht’; ‘Schmitt [muss] mit naturrechtlichen Anachronismen arbeiten.’
8 Gerhard Donhauser, ‘Nomos or Law? Hans Kelsen’s Criticism of Carl Schmitt’s Metaphysics of Law and
Politics,’ in Hans Kelsen and the Natural Law Tradition, p. 372.
9 Benjamin Schupmann, Carl Schmitt’s State and Constitutional Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2017), pp. 18-20.
10 Schupmann, Carl Schmitt’s State and Constitutional Theory, p. 20.
11 For a criticism of Schupmann’s ‘continuity thesis’ of Schmitt’s work, see Joshua Smeltzer, ‘Carl Schmitt In
and Out of History,’ review of Schupmann, Carl Schmitt’s State and Constitutional Theory and Peter Uwe
Hohendahl, Perilous Futures, London School of Economics Review of Books (2019).
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jurisprudence must fall on a scale between positive law and natural law, and as it is clear
that Schmitt is vehemently against legal positivism, he must therefore present some type of
‘quasi-natural law.’
A separate reading of Schmitt as a straightforwardly Catholic theorist of politics and
law would likewise lead one to the assumption that he stands in a long tradition of Catholic
natural law theorists, from Augustine through Aquinas to the School of Salamanca and
contemporaries such as John Finnis. For example, Peter Uwe Hohendahl claims that Schmitt
identifies in the post-war period with Francisco de Vitoria and that his work underwent
a ‘Catholic revival’ with an increasing emphasis on theology in relation to law.12 Such
interpretations largely rely upon Heinrich Meier’s reading of Political Theology and the
‘theological twist’ he instigated, arguing that ‘whoever wishes to confront Schmitt’s thought
. . . must enter into the self understanding of the political theologian so as to not miss the
decisive question from the outset.’13 However, Meier does not claim that Schmitt was a
natural lawyer; rather, this is a misrepresentation of his argument. Instead, Meier argues
‘Political theology names the core of Schmitt’s theoretical enterprise. It characterizes the
unifying center of an oeuvre rich in historical turns and political convolutions, in deliberate
deceptions and involuntary obscurities.’14 For Meier, political theology means ‘[denying]
the possibility of a rational justification of one’s own way of life’ and ‘believing in the truth
of faith.’15 Neither of these propositions are synonymous with natural law as a form of
jurisprudence, certainly not in its later manifestation as Vernunftsrecht. Indeed, previous
scholars have pointed out that Schmitt cannot be classified as a natural lawyer,16 while others
have noticed that Schmitt in fact viewed natural law doctrines critically.17 As Reinhard
12 Peter Uwe Hohendahl, Perilous Futures: On Carl Schmitt’s Late Writings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2018), pp. 33, 57-8.
13 See Donhauser, ‘Nomos or Law?’, p. 372n1. On the ‘theological twist,’ see Heinrich Meier, Carl Schmitt
and Leo Strauss (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. xiv.
14 Heinrich Meier, Was ist Politische Theologie? What is Political Theology? (Munich: Carl Friedrich von
Siemens Stiftung, 2017 [2006]), p. 19.
15 Meier, Was ist Politische Theologie? What is Political Theology?, p. 30; Heinrich Meier, Die Lehre Carl
Schmitts. Vier Kapitel zur Unterscheidung Politischer Theologie und Politischer Philosophie (Stuttgart: J.B.
Metzler’sche Verlag 2009 [1994]), p. 40.
16 See for example Stefan Breuer, ‘Nationalstaat und pouvoir constituant bei Sieyes und Carl Schmitt,’ Archiv
für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 70(4) (1984), 495-517, p. 511; Martin Rhonheimer, “‘Autoritas non veritas
facit legem’: Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt und die Idee des Verfassungsstaates,’ Archiv für Rechts- und
Sozialphilosophie 86(4) (2000), 484-498, p. 493; William Scheuerman, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberal
Constitutionalism,’ The Review of Politics 58(2) (1996), 299-322, p. 307.
17 See Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Carl Schmitt and International Law,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt eds.
Jens Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 592-611. p. 597; Reinhard
Mehring, ‘Macht im Recht: Carl Schmitts Rechtsbegriff in seiner Entwicklung,’ Der Staat 43(1) (2004),
1-22, p. 2; Reinhard Mehring, ‘Der “Nomos” nach 1945 bei Carl Schmitt und Jürgen Habermas,’ Forum
historiae iuris (2006); Graham McAleer, ‘Introduction to the Transaction Edition,’ in Carl Schmitt, Political
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Mehring has argued, ‘his positions on jurisprudence and the political did not correspond to
church doctrine either. Schmitt profoundly rejected Catholic natural law and its juridical
representatives.’18
The question still remains, however, on what grounds Schmitt rejected natural law
doctrines, and why they became a frequent polemical target in the post-war period. In this
chapter, I offer two related explanations: first, natural law was fundamentally incompatible
with Schmitt’s increased focus on the historicity of law as drawn from Savigny. The basic
characteristic of natural law doctrines to which Schmitt objected was its claim to universality
and eternal validity; or, to follow the natural lawyer John Finnis’ later characterization, that
natural law claimed to form a type of law that ‘has no history.’19 Instead, Schmitt would
pursue a strategy of historicizing the origins of natural law, showing that it was merely one
age of the historical development of jurisprudence, not the uncovering of its true principles.
In particular, the first section examines Schmitt’s reading of Hegel’s early treatment in
Über die Wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts (1802/3), a text Schmitt
considered required reading for any commentary on natural law. I then turn towards a set
of contextual explanations for Schmitt’s criticism of natural law: first, the role of natural
law in unleashing civil war and ‘world civil war’ [Weltbürgerkrieg], a condition Schmitt felt
had been on display in the war against Nazi Germany and the treatment of war criminals
after 1945; and second, that Schmitt argued that the supposedly eternal principles of natural
law were evolving at a rapid pace in relation to the right of resistance, or Widerstandsrecht.
For Schmitt, the emergence of a new ‘duty’ or ‘obligation’ to resist tyrannical regimes, a
so-called Widerstanspflicht, meant that he personally would have been culpable for failing to
actively resist the National Socialist Gewaltherrschaft.
The arguments presented in this chapter form only one half of the discussion of natural
law: Schmitt’s criticism of natural law doctrines is intimately linked to the subject of the
following chapter of this thesis, his account of the revival of the Spanish Scholastics and
particularly the work of Francisco de Vitoria. In the index for Der Nomos der Erde (1950),
which Schmitt himself created and modified over the years for later editions, the entry for
‘Naturrecht’ instructs the reader to ‘s. Vitoria,’ or ‘see Vitoria.’20 The subsequent chapter thus
focuses on the origins of the Vitorian renaissance in the work of the American jurist James
Brown Scott, as well as Schmitt’s bitter polemic over the interpretation of Vitoria’s work
Romanticism (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2011), p. xviii.
18 Reinhard Mehring, ‘A “Catholic Layman of German Nationality and Citizenship”? Carl Schmitt and the
Religiosity of Life,’ in Jens Meierhenrich, The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2017), 73-95, p. 79-80.
19 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), p. 24.
20 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 306.
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as one of the first texts he published (anonymously) after 1945. To frame that subsequent
discussion, however, I first focus in this chapter on Schmitt’s criticisms of natural law
doctrines more broadly, in order to turn back to the specific dispute over Vitoria’s place in
the history of international law and his significance for the just war tradition in the following
chapter.
3.1 Defining Natural Law
That Schmitt would take seriously natural law doctrines in the second half of the twentieth
century might appear at first glance as an anachronism – after all, Schmitt had approvingly
cited Windscheid’s dictum in 1943/4 that the ‘dream of natural law’ had come to an end at
the hands of legal positivism before the end of the nineteenth century. However, Schmitt’s
historical narrative of the discipline is at odds with what the legal historian Michael Stolleis
has termed the ‘turn to natural law’ after the end of World War I in German jurisprudence,
embodied in figures such as Erich Kaufmann and Gustav Adolf Walz, and, later, the Austrian
international lawyer Alfred Verdross.21 Such authors joined a chorus of calls for a renewal
in natural law, for example Hermann Kantorowicz’s 1906 ‘Der Kampf um die Rechtswis-
senschaft,’ published under the pseudonym ‘Gnäus Flavius,’ which had urged a ‘resurrection
of natural law’ suitable ‘for the 20th century,’ albeit one that had replaced its faith in univer-
sally valid claims with culturally specific supra-positive legal propositions.22 At the same
time, Jesuits and other Catholic jurists such as Viktor Cathrein sought to undermine legal
positivism by showing that it in fact relied upon natural law principles such as pacta sunt
servanda, which individuals and states had an obligation to uphold ‘whether or not statutory
laws recognize it.’23 Writing in the same issue of Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphiloso-
21 Michael Stolleis, History of Public Law in Germany, Vol. III, pp. 159-160. On Verdross’ turn to natural
law, see Bruno Simma, ‘The Contribution of Alfred Verdross to the Theory of International Law,’ European
Journal of International Law 6(1) (1995), 33-54, pp. 33-5; Bruno Simma, ‘Alfred Verdross (1890-1980),’
in eds. Peter Häberle, Michael Kilian, & Heinrich Wolff, Staatsrechtler des 20. Jahrhunderts (Berlin: De
Gruyter, 2015), pp. 342-5; Jochen von Bernstorff, The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 281-3.
22 Hermann Kantorowicz, Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2002
[1906]).
23 Viktor Cathrein, ‘Naturrechtliche Strömungen in der Rechtsphilosophie der Gegenwart,’ Archiv für Rechts-
und Wirtschaftsphilosophie 16(1) (1922), 54-67, pp. 65-6. Cathrein was the most prominent defender of
natural law at the turn of the twentieth century. See for example the contemporaneous review of the field in
Fritz Berolzheimer, ‘Die deutsche Rechtsphilosophie im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert (1900-1906),’ Archiv für
Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie 1(1) (1907), 130-148, pp. 141-4.
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phie in which Schmitt’s essay on ‘Zur Staatsphilosophie der Gegenrevolution’24 appeared,
such Catholic authors argued that ‘Catholic natural law is therefore not to be confused with
the natural law of the so-called Enlightenment, which believed it could derive a complete
legal system through mere human reason.’25 However, the natural law renewal extended
beyond purely Catholic authors. To the sociologist Franz Oppenheimer, writing in 1909, ‘it
is obvious that natural law is the correct form of law,’ one need only to determine its correct
principles.26 By 1932, Walther Schönfeld would claim, in a modification of Windscheid’s
dictum, ‘the dream of positive law has come to an end.’27 The natural law tradition was
therefore still present throughout the Weimar Republic, although it had lost much of its
significance as the dominant form of jurisprudence.
Twentieth century natural lawyers consciously drew upon the natural law doctrines
of the early modern period, a period of revival beginning in the mid-sixteenth century
with contributions from the Spanish Scholastics, through to Hugo Grotius, Christian Wolff,
and Samuel Pufendorf, among others.28 Natural law doctrines, however, remained in the
plural: as contemporary historians such as Annabel Brett have argued, one can distinguish
clearly between Catholic and Protestant conceptions in the early modern period, though the
latter is itself in no sense a unified doctrine.29 Growing out of the reception of Aquinas’
teachings, natural law provided a form of legal monism, as well as a framework through
which ‘confessional and colonial conflicts’ in the early modern period could be adjudicated.30
The abundance of diverse and, at times, contradictory doctrines appearing under the
label of ‘natural law’ from the early modern period onwards makes it into a moving target,
particularly by the time of Schmitt’s writing; however, we can still turn to Schmitt’s earlier
publications to help define his specific understanding of natural law and its sources in the
24 Carl Schmitt, ‘Zur Staatsphilosophie der Gegenrevolution,’ Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie
16(1) (1922), 121-131; republished as Chapter 4 of Politische Theologie (1922) and Chapter 1 of Donoso
Cortés in der gesamteuropäischer Interpretation (1950).
25 Johann Haring, ‘Recht und Gesetz nach katholischer Auffassung,’ Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphiloso-
phie 16(1) (1922), 67-73, p. 70.
26 ‘Diskussionsbeiträge zu den Referaten über Rechtsphilosophie und Allgemeine Rechtslehre,’ Archiv für
Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie 3(4) (1909), 579-594, p. 589.
27 Walther Schönfeld, ‘Der Traum des positivien Rechts,’ Archiv für civilistische Praxis 135(1) (1932), 1-66, p.
1.
28 Michael Stolleis & Lorraine Daston, ‘Introduction,’ in Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early Modern
Europe: Jurisprudence, Theology, Moral and Natural Philosophy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p. 3. See also
T.J. Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006).
29 Annabel Brett, Changes of State: Nature and the Limits of the City in Early Modern Natural Law (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 10.
30 Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.
61.
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passing references and discussions he provides on the doctrine, and in the process, provide a
point of comparison to his post-war writings. In his 1921 article on ‘Politische Theorie und
Romantik,’ Schmitt discusses natural law in conjunction with contractualism in the work of
Jean Jacques Rousseau and his reception through Fichte, Feuerbach, Schlegel, and Schelling.
For Schmitt, all of these authors are committed to the belief that both ‘the law and the state
are explained by the coexistence of man, by the realization of the necessity of self-limitation
which arises when free and autonomous men desire to live together.’31 For example, he
notes that Fichte ‘always held onto the idea of the natural law foundation of the state through
contract.’32 Such interpretations emphasized the free individual existing prior to both society
and the state, using natural law as a tool for explaining why individuals would choose to
restrict their own freedom.
In Die Diktatur (1922), Schmitt examines natural law jurists of the previous century,
for whom natural law ‘separated into two completely different systems’ which he labels
as ‘justice’ natural law and a ‘scientific, i.e. natural science-exact’ natural law.33 The
former, which he associates with Grotius, views ‘law with a particular content as arising
prior to the state,’ while the latter is associated with Hobbes, ‘whose system is based on
the proposition that prior to the state and beyond the state there is no law; and the value
of the state consists precisely in that it creates law.’34 Schmitt’s interpretation of Hobbes
emphasizes the conclusion of chapter 13 of Leviathan – ‘where there is no common Power,
there is no Law’ – over the following two chapters, which enumerate a list of ‘the Lawes
of Nature [which] are Immutable and Eternall.’35 However, Schmitt also points to chapter
26, where Hobbes notes that natural laws are ‘not properly laws’ until the creation of the
Common-wealth, as ‘it is the Soveraign Power that obliges men to obey them.’36 In Politische
Theologie (1922), he notes that ‘for the authors of natural law in the seventeenth century,’ and
for Pufendorf in particular, ‘the question of sovereignty was understood as the question of
31 Carl Schmitt-Dorotic, ‘Politische Theorie der Romantik,’ Historische Zeitschrift 123(3) (1921), 377-397,
p. 379. ‘Recht und Staat werden hier überall aus der Koexistenz der Menschen erklärt, aus der Einsicht
in die Notwendigkeit der Selbstbeschränkung, die sich ergibt, wenn freie und selbstständige Menschen
zusammenleben wollen.’
32 Schmitt-Dorotic, ‘Politische Theorie der Romantik,’ p. 379. ‘Immer an der naturrechtlichen Begründung des
Staates durch Vertrag festgehalten.’
33 Schmitt, Die Diktatur, p. 21. ‘In zwei völlig verschiedene Systeme trennt’; ‘Gerechtigkeits- und wis-
senschaftlichem (d.h. naturwissenschaftliche-exaktem) Naturrecht.’
34 Schmitt, Die Diktatur, p. 22. ‘Daß ein Recht mit bestimmten Inhalt als vorstaatliches Recht besteht . . . Daß
es vor dem Staate und außerhalb des Staates kein Recht gibt und der Wert des Staates gerade darin liegt, daß
er das Recht schafft.’
35 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 90, 110. For the contrasting
interpretation, see Noel Malcom, ‘Hobbes’s Theory of International Relations,’ in Noel Malcolm, Aspects of
Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 432-456, pp. 437-439.
36 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 186.
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the decision over the state of exception.’37 This conception then disappears with the rise of
Lockean doctrines and Kant in the German context, after which ‘the vivid awareness of the
meaning of the exception that was reflected in the doctrine of natural law of the seventeenth
century was soon lost on the eighteenth century.’38 Such a blindness extends, for Schmitt,
from Kant all the way to the key neo-Kantian jurist of the twentieth century, Hans Kelsen.
However, Schmitt’s criticism of Kelsen’s positivism for its neglect of the exception does not
mean that Schmitt urged a return to natural law; rather, he presented a historical narrative of
the development of jurisprudence, at the end of which stood the dictum of decisionism: ‘all
law is “situational law.”’39
In Verfassungslehre (1928), Schmitt specifically includes ‘Catholic natural law’ as one of
several ideologies to have influenced the basic rights included in the Weimar Constitution
without defining which rights or how in particular.40 At the same time, however, he notes that
natural law has ‘lost its evident quality,’ and in the process problematized the basic concept
of the Rechtsstaat: justice, or Gerechtigkeit.41 To follow Schmitt, it was in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries that ‘the bourgeoisie found the force of an actual system, namely
the individualistic reasoned and natural law [Vernunft- und Naturrecht] and formed norms
valid in themselves out of concepts such as private property and individual liberty. [These
norms] were valid before and above any political existence.’42 As a consequence of the
loss of ‘belief in the metaphysical presuppositions of bourgeois natural law,’ Schmitt argues
that the idea of a unified constitution had dissolved into a series of ‘positive constitutional
laws’ characteristic of Kelsen’s legal positivism.43 Individual norms were still held to be
absolute and above the power of the state, but they had lost their metaphysical justification.
As a result, their validity was only guaranteed by virtue of their inclusion in the constitution,
despite any rhetorical protestations to the contrary.
One might expect to find that natural law forms one of the ‘Three Types of Juridical
Thinking’ Schmitt outlined in 1934 in front of the Association of National Socialist German
Jurists (BNSDJ); however, the three types are in fact normativism, decisionism, and concrete
37 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, p. 16. ‘Auch bei den Autoren des Naturrechts im 17. Jahrhundert [wurde] die
Frage der Souveränität als die Frage nach der Entscheidung über den Ausnahmefall verstanden.’
38 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, End of ch 1.
39 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, Ch. 1.
40 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, p. 30.
41 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, p. 142. ‘Seine Evidenz verloren hat.’ On this point, see Dyzenahus, Legality and
Legitimacy, p. 63.
42 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, pp. 8-9. ‘[Das Bürgertum] fand die Kraft zu einem wirklichem System, nämlich
zu dem individualistischen Vernunft- und Naturrecht, und bildete aus Begriffen wie Privateigentum und
persönliche Freiheit in sich selbst geltende Normen, welche vor und über jedem politischen Sein gelten.’
43 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, p. 11. ‘die metaphysischen Voraussetzungen des bürgerlichen Naturrechts
Glauben fanden.’
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order thinking. Instead, natural law is a subordinate conception of law which can be classed
within the tripartite structure depending on the specific version of natural law under consider-
ation. Thus, Schmitt explains that ‘the Aristoltelian-Thomistic natural law of the middle ages
for example is legal order thought [rechtswissenschaftliches Ordnungsdenken], while law
based on reason [Vernunftsrecht] of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in contrast is
partially abstract normativism and partially decisionism.’44 The categorization depends on
whether there is a norm, a decision, or an (institutional) order from which the law proceeds.
Regardless of its categorization as a type of legal thought, Schmitt rejects natural law
as a foundation for a National Socialist conception of the law of nations in his short essay,
‘Nationalsozialismus und Völkerrecht [National Socialism and the Law of Nations].’ Here,
Schmitt argues against both legal positivism’s emphasis on pure legality, and at the same
time, natural law or “‘meta-juristic” morality’ as a foundation of law, which he equates with
delivering a type of ‘lawless morality [Moral].’45 The charge is that natural law proceeds
from the moral sphere to the legal, thereby subverting the legal order. Instead, Schmitt
posits that National Socialist international law must remain ‘inseparably bound’ to both
‘justice and ethical life [Sittlichkeit].’46 In so doing, Schmitt maintains a distinction between
Moral as the domain of natural law doctrines, and Sittlichkeit as the proper emphasis of a
National Socialist jurisprudence of the law of nations. Emphasizing Sittlichkeit is, in part, a
continuation of the emphasis in Hitler’s address to a Leipzig Conference of Jurists of October
3, 1933, which Schmitt explicitly cites as part of his practice in this period of referring to
Hitler’s speeches as authoritative for the formation of ‘German law.’ On the other hand,
distinguishing between Sittlichkeit and Moral while expressing a preference for the former
maps onto Hegel’s distinction in Philosophie des Rechts, in which Sittlichkeit is the domain
of the state and the ‘idea of freedom,’47 as well as the site of obligations of individuals
towards their community. As Charles Taylor has summarized Hegel’s position, ‘the common
life which is the basis of my sittlich obligation is already there in existence . . . in Sittlichkeit,
there is no gap between what ought to be and what is, between Sollen and Sein.’48 As such,
the Hegelian notion stood in direct contrast to Kelsen’s Pure Theory of the Law, while at the
44 Schmitt, Über die Drei Arten, p. 8. ‘Das aristotelisch-thomistische Naturrecht des Mittelalters z.B. ist
rechtswissenschaftliches Ordnungsdenken, das Vernunftrecht das 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts dagegen teils
abstrakter Normativismus, teils Dezisionismus.’
45 Schmitt, ‘Nationalsozialismus und Völkerrecht,’ in Frieden oder Pazifismus, p. 398. ‘eine “metajuristische”
Moral’; ‘rechtlose Moral.’
46 Schmitt, ‘Nationalsozialismus und Völkerrecht,’ p. 398. ‘untrennbar Gebunden’; ‘Gerechtigkeit und
Sittlichkeit.’
47 G.W.F. Hegel, Gesammelte Werke Bd 14,1, Philosophie des Rechts (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2009),
p. 201. This is opposed to the equivalence of the two terms in Fichte and Kant.
48 Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 376.
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same time rejecting claims of a universal validity in (moral) natural law.
After the end of World War II, Schmitt’s dairy entries contain a sustained commentary
on the development of natural law doctrines: there are at least fifteen entries in which he
explicitly discusses natural law. These entries demonstrate something between contempt
and dismissiveness towards the theory. For example, Schmitt characterizes natural law
as ‘dozens of completely contradictory postulates, a heap of vague general clauses, the
supposed concepts of which – the concept of nature and that of law are at the fore – remain
undefined and offer the impression of a hundred different faces with a hundred wax noses [ed.
‘wächsernen Nasen’ means here ‘fools’ or ‘jesters’].’49 In a letter to Ernst Forsthoff dated 26.
September 1955, Schmitt takes much the same approach: ‘Gradually, every respectable jurist
must have had enough of the infiltration of natural law rambling – an insidious rambling.’50
It is then clear that Schmitt held an exceptionally low view of natural law doctrines as ‘a
heap of vague general clauses’ – hardly the words of someone who himself might be a
‘quasi-natural lawyer.’
Beyond revealing his distain for natural law, the entries in Glossarium reveal which texts
Schmitt was reading, when he was reading them, and what arguments he would make against
them. Only one of the entries on natural law was important enough for Schmitt to include in
the index he created for his diaries under the term ‘Naturrecht.’51 This entry, dated April 12,
1950, begins with a common complaint of many academics that no one had read or taken
seriously an aspect of his work:
In 1926 I wrote and published: that one can recognize in every work concerning
constitutional questions whether the author knows the text of the young Hegel. 25 years
later I see how childish this appeal was to the education of German legal professors.
I am writing this today under the effect of reading once again the Wiss. Behandlung
des Naturrechts. To think, that I published a book, The Guardian of the Constitution
in 1931 with a long reference to Hegel – how naïve! That today natural law is still
being discussed by people who have not once familiarized themselves with this essay
from Hegel. Speaking of the Rechtsstaat without knowing the passage on the towering
Erdengeist.52
49 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 142. ‘Einige Dutzend völlig entgegengesetzter Postulate, ein Haufen vager
Generalklauseln, deren supponierte Begriffe – der Begriff der Natur und der des Rechts an der Spitze –
unbestimmt bleiben und ein Bild von hundert verschiedenen Gesichtern mit hundert wächsernen Nasen
bieten.’
50 Carl Schmitt to Ernst Forsthoff, Briefwechsel, No. 83, p. 114. ‘Allmählich muß doch jeder anständige Jurist
von der Unterwanderung durch das naturrechtliche Geschwafel – ein hinterlistiges Geschwafel – genug
bekommen.’
51 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 398.
52 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 228. ‘1926 schrieb und veröffentlichte ich: daß man jeder Arbeit über Verfassungs-
fragen einsieht, ob der Autor die Schrift des jungen Hegel kennt. 25 Jahre später sehe ich, wie kindlich
dieser Appell an die Bildung deutscher Rechtslehrer war. Ich schriebe das heute unter einer nochmaligen
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Already on December 23, 1947, Schmitt had referred to Hegel’s text, writing that ‘with
every discussion of natural law, I look to see if the author is familiar with Hegel’s Über
die Wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts (1802/3).53 If the author is not
familiar, I recommend him the reading, unless the author has shown himself to be Hegel-inept
[Hegel-unfähig]. In this unfortunately most common case, I switch off.’54 This text, which
Schmitt viewed as required reading on the subject of natural law, and which appears in the
diary entry indexed as ‘Naturrecht,’ can help to elucidate Schmitt’s views on the subject.
Hegel’s essay, published as part of the Kritisches Journal der Philosophie, sets out two
conceptions of natural law which he holds to be insufficient – the empirical and formal (a
priorism) versions of natural law. Following Hegel’s reconstruction, the empirical treatment
of natural law seeks the validity of its claims in observations of human nature, for example in
the anthropology set out in Hobbes’ Leviathan, and uses these characteristics as the basis for
deriving a legal theory. As Hegel explains, ‘to explain the relation of marriage, procreation,
the holding of goods in common, or something else is proposed [as the determinant] and,
from such a determinate aspect, is made prescriptive as the essence of the relation.’55 For
Hegel, the Hobbesian view is arbitrary in selecting a series of characteristics that it holds
to be determinate, ultimately selecting an attribute in order to derive a desired outcome.56
These empirical treatments of natural law proceed in the first instance by ‘[thinking] away
everything that someone’s obscure inkling may reckon amongst the particular and the
transitory as belonging to particular manners, to history, to civilization, and even to the state,
then what remains is man in the image of the bare state of nature, or the abstraction of man
with his essential potentialities.’57
In contrast, Hegel viewed the formalist approach, associated with Kant and Fichte,
Lektüre der Wiss. Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts. Zu denken, daß ich 1931 ein Buch ‘Der Hüter der
Verfassung’ mit einem langen Hinweis auf Hegel veröffentlichte – wie naiv! Daß heute immer noch über
Naturrecht geredet wird, von Menschen, die nicht einmal diesen Aufsatz Hegels kenne! Von Rechtsstaat
reden, ohne die Stelle über den sich emporrichtenden Erdengeist zu kennen.’
53 Schmitt’s Nachlaß contains a 1927 edition of this essay, and an annotated version of Hegel’s Philosophie des
Rechts published in 1911. See respectively NRW 0265-24637; NRW 0265-24730.
54 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 50. ‘Jeder noch so flüchtigen und beiläufigen, erst recht aber jeder eingehenden und
vertieften Erörterung des Naturrechts sehe ich an, ob der Autor Hegels Aufsatz über die “Wissenschaftlichen
Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts” (1802/03) kennt oder nicht. Kennt er ihn nicht, so empfehle ich ihm
die Lektüre, es sei denn, daß die Erörterung den Autor als Hegel-unfähig erkennen läßt. In diesem leider
häufigsten Fall stelle ich ab.’
55 G.W.F. Hegel, ‘The Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law,’ in G.W.F. Hegel, Natural Law (Pittsburg:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976), p. 60.
56 Kenneth Westphal, ‘Context and Structure of Philosophy of Right,’ in ed. Frederick Beiser, The Cambridge
Companion to Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). See also Schlomo Avineri, Hegel’s
Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 82.
57 Hegel, ‘The Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law,’ p. 63.
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as being ‘a complete abstraction from all content.’58 Yet law must have some content,
thus leading to an inevitable ‘self-contradiction’ articulated in the language of universal
applicability. This is Hegel’s critique of the categorical imperative: ‘every specific matter
is capable of being clothed with the form of the concept and posited as a quality; there is
nothing whatever which cannot in this way be made into a moral law.’59 Instead, it is only
through the community – and not the powers of reason belonging to the abstract individual –
that the content of moral laws can be established. As Charles Taylor explains, through the
Hegelian Sittlichkeit, ‘the state which is fully rational will be one which expresses in its laws
the institutions and practices the most important ideas and norms which its citizens recognize
and by which they express their identity.’60
Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit as a historically conditioned and community-based foun-
dation of law appealed to Schmitt, as it denied both the pure legality of positivism while still
emphasizing an organically achieved particularity. To follow Hegel, ‘the ethical vitality of
the people lies precisely in the fact that the people has a shape in which a specific character
is present . . . as something absolutely united with universality and animated by it.’61 As such,
Hegel attributes to history a corrective role in the study of law:
If something has no true ground in the present, its ground lies in a past; and so we must
look for a time in which the specific feature, fixed in law but now dead, was a living
ethos and in harmony with the rest of the laws. But beyond precisely this aim to know,
the effect of a purely historical explanation of laws and institutions cannot go. It would
exceed its function and truth if it were used to justify, for the present time, the law which
had truth only in a life that is past. On the contrary, this historical knowledge of the
law, which can exhibit the ground of the law only in lost customs and a life that is dead,
proves precisely that now in the living present the law lacks understanding and meaning,
even though it still may have power and force on the strength of the form of law, owing
to the fact that parts of the whole are still in its interest and survive because of it.62
As Frederick Beiser has argued, ‘instead of seeing natural law as an eternal law above the
process of history, Hegel historicizes it, so that it becomes the purpose of history itself.’63
This strategy mirrors Schmitt’s own in relation to natural law: to historicize its origins as
part of the development of jurisprudence, and to show that natural law – to follow Hegel –
‘had truth only in a life that is past.’
58 Hegel, ‘The Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law,’ p. 76.
59 Hegel, ‘The Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law,’ p. 77.
60 Taylor, Hegel, pp. 377, 388.
61 Hegel, ‘The Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law,’ p. 126.
62 Hegel, ‘The Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law,’ p. 130. Emphasis added.
63 Frederick Beiser, ‘Hegel’s Historicism,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, p. 279. See as well the
claim that Hegel’s theory of natural law is ‘fundamental’ to his theory in Beiser, ‘The Puzzling Hegel
Renaissance,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, pp. 13-4.
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Such a reading of Hegel would follow from the work of one of Schmitt’s favorite
professors while in Berlin, Josef Kohler, an expert on Hegel’s legal philosophy.64 In an
unpublished manuscript titled ‘Autobiographical Sketches’ dated to 1946/7, Schmitt describes
Kohler as ‘the only professor of law in Berlin who rose above the cul-de-sac of legal
positivism and above the heaped materials of legal historians; who spoke of Hegel and
Bachofen and who appeared to us to open a window to the world.’65 For Kohler, Hegel
had made a crucial breakthrough in identifying the historical development of culture as ‘the
scientific principle of our entire humanities’ including jurisprudence – laws are part of the
cultural development of a specific community and a specific moment. This neo-Hegelian
jurisprudence rejected the idea that history would proceed along a rational path, leading to
Hegel’s owl of Minerva taking flight; rather, history was often ‘illogical and absurd’ in its
progression.66 Nevertheless, Kohler’s Hegel appropriation was intended as a direct challenge
to the revival of natural law doctrines, which threatened a form of ‘regression, that one
recedes from the historical Hegel to the ahistorical natural lawyer Kant.’67 Natural law
was thus a doctrine which, for Kohler, had been surpassed or overcome in the historical
development of jurisprudence with Hegel’s historicism.68
In Schmitt’s earliest entry on natural law, dated November 24, 1947, he likewise dismisses
natural law as an anachronistic form of jurisprudence. His entry begins by referring to the
exact text he was reading: Otto Viet’s essay on natural law, published in the journal Merkur.
He notes that while Otto Viet creates a list of antitheses which features the opposition of
natural law to positive law, that such a distinction is in fact confused. He says, ‘I consider
such concepts as legal-historical, if not anachronistic restorations of helplessly philosophizing
jurists; the contemporary concept and distinction is of legality and legitimacy.’69 This is a
direct reference to the title of his 1932 piece Legalität und Legitimität, borrowed from the
essay with the same title by Georg Lukács. Schmitt asks why it is the case that Viet neglects
to include the opposition of legality and legitimacy ‘in an otherwise so complete list of
64 See NRW 0579-760. For a listing of the courses Schmitt took with Kohler, see Mehring, Carl Schmitt, pp. 8,
17.
65 See NRW 0579-760. Carl Schmitt, ‘Autobiographische Skizze.’ ‘Dieser Mann war für mich der einzige
Berliner Rechtslehrer, der sich über die Sackgasen des staatlichen Gesetzespositivismus und über die
Materialhaufen der Rechtshistoriker erhob, der von Hegel und Bachofen sprach und uns ein Fenster in die
grosse Welt zu öffnen schien.’
66 Josef Kohler, ‘Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie,’ Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie 2(1) (1908),
30-42, p. 38.
67 Kohler, ‘Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie,’ p. 41.
68 See Rudolf Leonhard, ‘Kohler und Hegel,’ Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie 15(1) (1921/2),
1-11, p. 7.
69 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 37. ‘Ich halte solche begriffe für rechtshistorische, wenn nicht anachronistische
Repristinationen hilflos philosophierender Juristen; der zeitgemäße Begriff und Distinktion ist Legalität und
Legitimität.’
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antitheses.’ His answer is that ‘the distinction natural law-positive law has been superseded;
it no longer deals with “nature” (which would result in the best case in a biological law, which
we’ve all already had enough of); it is about history, whether that is the Heilsgeschichte,
whether it is the human made history, constantly more deliberate, more planned, and with
increasing intensity of historical consciousness (and of total planning).’70 This shows once
again that Schmitt’s criticism of natural law turns on the relationship of history to law along
two lines: first, the doctrine itself belonged to legal history as it had been surpassed; and
second, natural law doctrines denied their own historical and cultural specificity. Indeed, less
than a month later, and Schmitt repeats the same argument in a letter to Freda Winckelmann,
the wife of Johannes Winckelmann, an editor of Max Weber’s work in German. This time,
he notes that ‘I am sure, that the great problem today should no longer be dealt with under
the antithesis of law-natural law (that belongs to legal-history), but rather under the antithesis
of legality-legitimacy, which, since 1848, is much more current.’71
For Schmitt, the overcoming of natural law as a form of jurisprudence was a done deed –
the ‘dream of natural law’ was over even if some jurists still professed their faith in it. Such
a realization, to follow Schmitt’s view, was so obvious that even the criminal mastermind of
Bertolt Brecht’s Dreigroschenroman, a classic of the late Weimar Republic, had understood
it:
‘Macheath explains to his people . . . you must work legally. The whole speech . . . is
an incredible, uncanny illustration of my thesis of the distinction between legality
and legitimacy. Whoever doesn’t understand that now and proceeds with natural law,
belongs to the êtres destinés à périr. “Brutal violence is over. Today, one doesn’t send
out murderers when one can send a court marshal.”’72
The lesson understood by even a common gangster was that more could be achieved through
the instrumentalization of legality than through brute force and violence. However, the
revival of natural law doctrines threatened potentially two separate forms of violence: the
70 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 38. ‘Weil die Distinktion Naturrecht – positives Recht überholt ist; es handelt sich
nicht mehr um ‘Natur’ (das ergäbe heute bestenfalls ein biologisches Recht, von dem wir ja alle genug
haben); es handelt sich um die Geschichte, sei es die Heilsgeschichte, sei es die von Menschen gemachte,
immer bewußter, immer planvoller, mit steigender Intensität des geschichtlichen Bewußtseins (und der
totalen Planung) gemachte Geschichte.’
71 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 48. ‘[Ich] bin sicher, daß das große Problem heute nicht mehr unter der Antithese
positives Recht – Naturrecht (das gibt nur Rechts-Historie), sondern unter der seit 1848 viel aktuelleren:
Legalität – Legitimität behandelt werden wollte.’
72 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 229. ‘In Bertolt Brechts Dreigroschenroman . . . belehrt der Führer der Verbrecheror-
ganisation, Macheath, seine Leute: Man muß legal arbeiten; das ist ebenso guter Sport. Die ganze Rede, die
er bei dieser Gelegenheit hält, ist eine ungeheuerliche, unheimliche Illustration zu meiner These von der
Unterscheidung Legalität und Legitimität. Wer es jetzt noch nicht versteht und jetzt noch mit Naturrecht
kommt, gehört zu den êtres destinés à périr. “Die grobe Gewalt hat ausgespielt. Man schickt keine Mörder
mehr aus, wenn man den Gerichtsvollzieher schicken kann.”’
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bloodshed of civil war and the introduction of a duty of resistance against tyrannical regimes.
To each of these I will turn in the next subsections.
3.2 Natural Law and World Civil War
By the end of World War II, Schmitt became focused on the concept of ‘world civil war’ or
‘Weltbürgerkrieg’ as a description of the changing nature of war,73 particularly as a descrip-
tion of the emerging Cold War as ‘the contemporary global world civil war.’74 Schmitt’s
Heidelberg students appropriated, harnessed, and reformatted this description: Nicolaus Som-
bart’s recollections of his time in Heidelberg, titled Rendevous mit dem Weltgeist, describes
the aspiration of starting a journal on the subject together with Reinhart Koselleck and Hanno
Kesting. The imagined journal would have carried the title Das Archiv für Weltbürgerkrieg
und Raumordnung, two concepts which pay homage to Schmitt’s influence.75 While the
journal itself never came to fruition, Kesting would eventually title his doctoral dissertation
Geschichtsphilosophie und Weltbürgerkrieg, while Koselleck’s Kritik und Krise also made
use of the concept.76
Weltbürgerkrieg is a compound concept, implying a process of expansion and larger scale
than traditional civil wars. What is it, however, that makes civil wars unique for Schmitt
in contrast to simply war? For Schmitt, one of the key characteristics of civil war is that it
displays a heightened degree of violence among participants. Civil wars, he claims, ‘are the
worst type of war, which also bring with them the worst type of defeats.’77 However, the
distinction is not merely to do with the degree of violence; rather civil wars are constitutive
moments for political concepts. As Schmitt explains, ‘everything that one says about war
unfortunately receives its last and bitter meaning only in civil war,’ a thought Schmitt finds
in the writings of Heraclitus: ‘War is the father of all things. Few, however, dare to think
about civil war.’78 It is clear, then, that Schmitt attaches a particular importance to civil
73 For an earlier use, see Carl Schmitt, ‘die letzte Globale Linie [1943],’ in Schmitt, Staat, Großraum, Nomos,
441-52.
74 Carl Schmitt, Donoso Cortés in gesamteuropäischer Interpretation (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2009
[1950]), pp. 7, 21. ‘der globale Weltbürgerkrieg der Gegenwart.’
75 See Niklas Olsen, ‘Carl Schmitt, Reinhart Koselleck, and the Foundations of History and Politics,’ History
of European Ideas 37(2) (2011), 197-208, p. 199.
76 Reinhart Koselleck, Kritik und Krise (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2017); Niklas Olsen, History in the Plural (New
York: Bergbahn, 2014), p. 72; see as well the letter from Koselleck to Schmitt discussing his appropriation
of Weltbürgerkrieg, in Olsen, ‘Carl Schmitt, Reinhart Koselleck and the Foundations of History and Politics,’
p. 202n28.
77 Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 30. ‘Der schlimmsten Art von Krieg, die auch die schlimmste Art von
Niederlagen mit sich bringt.’
78 Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 26. ‘Leider erhält alles, was man vom Kriege sagt, erst im Bürgerkrieg
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wars not only for the heightened level of violence they instigate, but equally because civil
wars are moments of ‘concrete oppositions’ in which the meaning of political concepts is
established.79 It is precisely in this moment of concrete opposition that civil war is connected
to natural law doctrines, and the connection is drawn directly from Schmitt’s self-styled
‘intellectual brother,’ Thomas Hobbes: natural law doctrines are merely ‘slogans of civil
war,’80 a tool for denying authority to the sovereign by appealing to a higher source of law.
If it is true, as Benno Teschke has claimed, that ‘Schmitt’s texts on war have received
very little explicit attention,’ this applies even more so for the concept of civil war.81 In-
deed, Teschke spares not a single sentence for considering the concept, even though civil
war occupies a privileged position within Schmitt’s wider oeuvre. As one of Schmitt’s
editors, Günter Maschke has noted, ‘particularly within civil war, the famous “formula” [of
friend/enemy] functions like a flash of lightning, illuminating the scene, and which marks
the most important condition of victory. Whoever fails to make this distinction is doomed.’82
Schmitt establishes the connection between natural law and civil war in the titular essay
of his 1950 monograph, Ex Captivitate Salus. Civil war has two characteristics: first, that it
is fought within the same ‘political unity, and therefore the same legal order’; and second,
that ‘both sides simultaneously absolutely assert and absolutely deny this political unity.’83
Schmitt continues, asserting that ‘to the essence of civil war belongs the subjugation under
the jurisdiction of the enemy.’ The explicit relationship between natural law and civil war is
that ‘one side applies a legal law [legales Recht], the other a natural law. One side a right
of obedience, the other a right of resistance.’84 In other words, natural law is the means by
which one party can assert a right of resistance or revolution, and thereby deny the legitimacy
of the laws issued by the sovereign. In such a moment, the unity of the state becomes
seinen letzten und bitteren Sinn. Viele zitieren den Satz des Heraklit: Der Krieg ist der Vater aller Dinge.
Wenige aber wagen es, dabei an den Bürgerkrieg zu denken.’ This point has been taken up by David Armitage
in Civil Wars: A History in Ideas (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 12.
79 Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, p. 92.
80 Mehring, Carl Schmitt, p. 212.
81 Benno Teschke, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Concepts of War: A Categorical Failure,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Carl
Schmitt eds. Jens Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons, The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014), 367-400. p. 367.
82 Günter Maschke, ‘Freund und Feind – Schwierigkeiten mit einer Banalité Supérieure. Zur neueren Carl
Schmitt-Literatur,’ Der Staat 33(2) (1994), 286-306, p. 286. ‘Besonders im Bürgerkrieg wirkt die berühmte
“Formel” wie ein die Szene erhellender Blitzstrahl, der wie wichtigste Bedingung des Sieges markiert. Denn
wem diese Unterscheidung nicht gelingt, der ist verloren.’
83 Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 56. ‘weil er innerhalb einer gemeinsamen . . . politischen Einheit und
innerhalb derselben Rechtsordnung geführt wird . . . und weil beide kämpfenden Seiten diese gemeinsame
Einheit gleichzeitig absolut behaupten und absolut verneinen.’
84 Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 57. ‘Zum Wesen des Bürgerkrieges gehört die Unterwerfung unter
Jurisdiktion des Feindes.’
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fragmented, and those who once belonged to the same political unit of a people now view one
another as enemies. However, the character of their conflict is qualitatively different from
that of an inter-state war, as both sides accuse the other of illegitimacy – either in violating
positive law or in violating natural law. It is this categorization of the enemy as a ‘criminal’
that changes the nature of a war into a civil war, leading to the heightened degree of violence
Schmitt feared. Indeed, in appealing to natural law, civil wars become wars of annihilation:
‘the enemy must be annihilated,’ Schmitt wrote, ‘he is no longer an enemy who can be forced
back within his own territory.’85
In the postwar period, Schmitt sees ‘world civil war’ [Weltbürgerkrieg] as a return to a
previous era of conflict – natural law was itself an anachronism and its reintroduction led to a
regression to an already superseded form of warfare. Elsewhere, he notes that ‘in many ways,
the type of civil war of the confessional wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in
Europe and in colonial territories repeats itself today.’86 This claim of repetition operates
on the level of personal identification as well, as Schmitt experiences a ‘new connection
with the past, a personal coexistence with the thinkers whose situation corresponds to our
own position.’87 Such a statement does not reflect the cyclical philosophy of history of
Oswald Spengler; rather, it is about intellectual identification with thinkers of the past and
of reconstructing the ‘intellectual-historical lines’ which ‘explain where we actually are,
from where we came, and to where our Leidensweg proceeds.’88 These thinkers thus act as
guideposts as they have experienced similar, though not identical, historical situations. Thus,
the immediately following section identifies the thinkers closest to him as Jean Bodin and
Thomas Hobbes – thinkers who he refers to as his ‘brothers’ – because these are ‘names that
[have arisen] from the period of confessional civil wars’ in Europe, which in turn match his
diagnosis of his own period as one characterized by a new type of world civil war.89 These
thinkers had lived through ‘civil wars fermented by theologians and sectarians,’ and Schmitt
would claim to live through the same process on a larger scale.90
Once again, Schmitt’s Glossarium provides an additional layer of context for interpreting
85 Schmitt, Begriff des Politischen, p. 114. ‘[er muss] definitiv vernichtet werden, also nicht mehr nur rein in
seine Grenzen zurückzuweisender Feind ist.’ Emphasis in original.
86 Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 14. ‘In mancher Hinsicht wiederholt sich heute, mit säkularisierten Parolen
und in globalen Dimensionen, die Art von Bürgerkrieg, die in den konfessionellen Kriegen des 16. Und 17.
Jahrhunderts in Europe und auf kolonialem Boden ausgetragen wurde.’
87 Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 61. ‘eine neue Verbindung mit der Vergangenheit, eine persönliche
Koexistenz mit den Denkern, deren Situation unser eigenen Lage entspricht.’
88 Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 68. ‘Belehrt uns darüber, wo wir eigentlich sind, woher wir kommen und
wohin unser Leidensweg geht.’
89 Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 64. ‘Diese beiden Namen aus dem Zeitalter der konfessionellen Bürg-
erkriege.’
90 Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 68. ‘Der von Theologen und Sektierern geschürte Bürgerkrieg.’
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his statements on the inter-relation of natural law and civil war. In his very first entry, dated
August 28, 1947, he discusses a new mixture of war and civil war: ‘State = sovereignty =
decision = end of civil war within the (newly constituted) state. World government likewise
the end of civil war? No, rather the combination of war and civil war.’91 Later that day, he
adds in a separate entry that this combination introduced the ‘indistinguishability of war
and peace.’92 In Schmitt’s broader historical narrative, the state emerges as ‘essentially the
product of religious civil war,’ or what he elsewhere terms ‘confessional civil war.’93 He
describes this process as one of ‘de-theologization [Ent-theologisierung]’ or ‘secularization’
as the decisive step in preventing future civil war; however, one that stopped short of
collapsing into ‘positivization’ and ‘technologization’ of the law.94 This is, once again,
a direct parallel to the foreword of Der Nomos der Erde, in which Schmitt claims that
jurisprudence is being crushed by theology and technology. For Schmitt, the re-emergence
of natural law doctrines was precisely the re-encroachment of theology into the field of law.
This mirrors Schmitt’s first journal entry to use the compound term ‘Weltbürgerkrieg,’
dated October 8, 1947. Here, he notes:
Just war, that is, depriving the opponent of rights and the self-empowerment of the just
party; that means: transformation of state war (that is of war in the law of nations) into a
war, which is both colonial and civil at the same time . . . War becomes world civil war
and ceases to be war between states.95
There are two aspects of this entry that deserve closer attention. First, the original German
contains a play on words that elucidates Schmitt’s position – the waging of just war as
gerechter Krieg leads to the deprivation of rights of the enemy, as Entrechtung. In other
words, the appeal to natural law theories in fact leads to the elimination of rights of the enemy,
rather than securing them. The second aspect is that in Schmitt’s historical narrative, the age
of confessional civil wars only came to an end as a result of separating law from theology.
This is the famous dictum from Gentili, Silete Theologi, a phrase that Schmitt repeats several
91 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 3. ‘Staat = Souveränität = Dezision = Beendigung des Bürgerkrieges innerhalb des
(eben da erst entstehenden) Staates. Weltherrschaft ebenfalls Beendigung des Bürgerkrieges? Nein, sondern
Kombination von völkerrechtlichem Krieg und Bürgerkrieg.’
92 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 4. Schmitt had already used this same formulation in his writings on the Rheinland
in 1924. See Joshua Smeltzer & Duncan Kelly, ‘Carl Schmitt on the Theory and Practice of Occupation
and Dictatorship’ in International Law and History, eds. Annabel Brett, Megan Donaldson and Martti
Koskenniemi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
93 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 15.
94 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 15.
95 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 22. ‘Der gerechte Krieg, d.h. die Entrechtung des Kriegsgegners und die Selbst-
Ermächtigung des gerechten Teiles; das bedeutet: Verwandlung des Staaten-Krieges (d.h. des völker-
rechtlichen Krieges) in einen Krieg, der Kolonial- und Bürgerkrieg zu gleicher Zeit ist . . . Der Krieg wird ja
Weltbürgerkrieg und hört auf, zwischenstaatlicher Krieg zu sein.’
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times in the works published in 1950.96 In so doing, the ‘jurists established themselves as the
guardians of their own tradition,’ one that had its own ‘not spiritual but intellectual authority.’
This ‘authority was secularized, but not yet profane,’ an attribute that Schmitt only comes
to ascribe to secular law after the rise of ‘positivism and pure technicity.’97 The point of
this oft-repeated dictum is two-fold: first, that the separation of law from theology was an
essential historical moment because it rendered ineffective natural law claims against the
state; and second, that this division was essential for the creation of the profession of the
jurist, with which Schmitt himself identifies. The re-emergence of natural law, however,
had undermined the cordon sanitaire between law and theology, and transformed interstate
warfare back into a type of civil war on the global stage.
Scholars such as Peter Uwe Hohendahl have expressed confusion over the origins of the
concept of global civil war in Schmitt’s work. He writes ‘Schmitt did not explain why the
first half of the twentieth century can or must be understood as an age of civil war. There
is no explanation of how the civil war started or who was responsible.’98 Such a view is
myopic, as Schmitt addresses this question directly within Glossarium, claiming that the
responsibility for the reintroduction of ‘world civil war’ as being firmly in the hands of the
United States and Russia. Thus, in one entry, Schmitt notes ‘America + Russia. Colonial War
+ Civil War. That is the reality of the reintroduction of just war.’ On the following day, he
expands, ‘What was the core of the inter-state jus publicum europaeum? The overcoming of
civil war and the exclusion of colonial wars. What is the significance of the reintroduction of
just war brought about by America and Russia? The reversion of state war back into colonial
and civil war!’99
Although these entries date from after the war, they refer back to Schmitt’s commentary
at the end of World War II, and not, as he would later use the term world civil war, for the
origins of the Cold War. In a 1943 lecture, delivered in Spanish under the title ‘Cambio de
estructura del Derecho Internacional,’ and published only posthumously in German under
the title ‘Strukturwandel des Internationalen Rechts,’ Schmitt associates the term ‘world civil
war’ with the United States and the Soviet Union in opposition to the National Socialists.
96 See Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, repeated on pp. 92, 96, 212; repeated in Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus,
pp. 70, 75.
97 Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 72, repeated again p. 75. ‘Sie bleiben Hüter einer eigenen Tradition und
Autorität . . . Ihre Autorität war säkularisiert, aber bei weitem noch nicht profaniert.’
98 Hohendahl, Perilous Futures, p. 47.
99 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 189. ‘Amerika + Rußland; Kolonialkrieg + Bürgerkrieg. Das ist die Wirklichkeit
der Wiedereinführung des gerechten Krieges.’; ‘Was war der Kern des zwischenstaatlichen jus publicum
Europaeum? Die Überwindung des Bürgerkrieges und die Ausgrenzung des Kolonialkrieges. Was bedeutet
die von Amerika und Rußland bewirkte Wiedereinführung des gerechten Krieges? Die Rückverwandlung
des Staatenkrieges in Kolonial- und Bürgerkrieg!’
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He argues that, due to the ‘pan-interventionism’ of the US, ‘the discrimination of other
regions lays in [its] hands . . . they also maintain the right to appeal to peoples against their
governments and to transform a state war into a civil war. Thus, the discriminating world war
in the American style becomes a total and global world civil war.’ This, Schmitt continues,
is ‘the key to the connection between western capitalism and eastern Bolschevism, which
appears at first glance to be highly unlikely.’100 While I will discuss Schmitt and Bolschevism
in detail in chapter five of this thesis, it is sufficient to point out here that it was the enemies
of National Socialism who Schmitt holds responsible for the reintroduction of natural law
doctrines. While in published texts after the war, Schmitt refers to the Cold War as a type
of world civil war, he is in fact protesting the treatment of National Socialist Germany as
a criminal state and its highest officials as war criminals at the Nuremberg tribunals.101
Moreover, it is the Nazis who, according to Schmitt, in this comparison were acting within
the existing legal order, while it was the Allied Powers who had appealed to an anachronistic
conception of natural law.
The National Socialist thread runs deeper when one looks at Schmitt’s rather idiosyncratic
comments on civil war and suicide. Part of the reason civil wars are so horrible, he argues,
is that they lead to a higher rate of suicide, taking Condorcet as his example.102 Suicide
is similarly present on the dedication page of Ex Captiviate Salus: dedicated to Wilhelm
Ahlmann, who committed suicide after the failed 20. July assassination attempt on Hitler.103
In Schmitt’s notebooks he argues that in times of civil war, suicide even becomes justified:
‘If my name is on a proscription list,’ then ‘I kill myself in order to remove the triumph of
my murder from my enemies. I don’t take my own life – the enemy takes my life. I merely
define the modus moriendi . . . This is the particularity of this type of self-killing in acute
civil war. It is the last expression of the free self-determination of man.’104 The parallel to
Herman Göring’s own suicide, which Schmitt had discussed in Ex Captivitate Salus and
Glossarium, is unmistakable.105 And here as well, the dating of Schmitt’s diary entry is
crucial, as the entry was composed within two days of the anniversary of Göring’s suicide.
In such a reading, Göring was not a war criminal, but rather merely another casualty of the
100Carl Schmitt, ‘Strukturwandel des Internationalen Rechts,’ in Frieden oder Pazifismus, p. 669.
101Jan-Friedrich Missfelder, ‘Die Gegenkraft und ihre Geschichte: Carl Schmitt, Reinhart Koselleck und der
Bürgerkrieg,’ Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 58(4) (2006), 310-336, p. 328.
102Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 43.
103Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 5.
104Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 25. ‘Wenn mein Name auf der Proskriptionsliste steht . . . Ich töte mich ja nur, um
dem Feind nicht den Triumph meiner Ermordung zu lassen. Nicht ich nehme mir das Leben – das nimmt der
Feind. Ich bestimme nur den modus moriendi . . . Das ist doch die Besonderheit dieser Art Selbsttötung im
akuten Bürgerkrieg. Sie ist der letzte Ausdruck der freiheitlichen Selbstbestimmung des Menschen.’
105See Smeltzer, Review of Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, eds. Kalyvas and Finchelstein, in History of Political
Thought.
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world civil war waged by the allied forces.
3.3 Natural Law, the Right of Resistance, and Collabora-
tion
At the very center of the twentieth century ‘awakening of natural law’ lies the right of
resistance, or Widerstandsrecht, against tyrannical regimes.106 Against the backdrop of
twelve years of National Socialist Gewaltherrschaft, such a right appeared as an imperative
check against injustice. However, the debate extended beyond the question of a right of
resistance to ask whether there was a positive duty or obligation of citizens to resist incursions
on the basic rights contained within the constitution. Thus, Article 21 of a draft constitution
supported by the French Communists and Socialists, and put to popular vote in France in
1946, proposed ‘When the government violates these freedoms and rights guaranteed by the
constitution, resistance in all its forms is the most sacred of rights and the most imperative of
duties.’107 To the Ministerialrat Adolf Arndt, a constitutionally guaranteed right of resistance
formed something like the mirrored image of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution: while
in Weimar the Reichspräsident had been empowered to suspend statutory law in times of
emergency, Article 21 made the people into the guardians of the constitution, creating a
check from below rather than above.108
In the German states under allied occupation, a right of resistance was written into state
and federal constitutions, and where it was not, it was still an integral point of discussion. For
example, the German Grundgesetz, enacted in May 1949, dictates ‘all Germans shall have
the right to resist any person seeking to abolish this constitutional order if no other remedy
is available,’ neglecting to to enshrine a positive duty or obligation into the basic law.109
However, in the German state of Baden-Württemberg, a member of its constitutional commit-
tee proposed ‘in the case that the government or another institution violates constitutionally
guaranteed rights, every citizen has the right and the duty to use all means to restore the
constitutionally guaranteed condition.’110 Likewise, the constitution of the state of Hessen
106F. Wieacker, ‘Zur Erweckung des Naturrechts,’ Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung 4(4) (1949), 295-302. This
is in direct contrast to the early modern period, see Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, p. 43: ‘the
Calvinists were not putting forward a theory of natural rights.’
107‘Quand le gouvernement viole les libertés et les droits garantis par la constitution, la résistance sous toutes
ses forms est le plus sacré des droits et le plus impérieux des devoirs.’ Emphasis added.
108Adolf Arndt, ‘Grundfragen des Verfassungsrechts im Spiegel des französischen Entwurfs,’ Süddeutssche
Juristen-Zeitung 1(4) (1946), 81-84, p. 82.
109Grundgesetz Art. 20 Abs. 4.
110Richard Schmid, ‘Umschau,’ Deutsche Rechts-Zeitschrift 1(6) (1946), 176-178, p. 176.
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in 1946, still in effect today, includes in Article 147 an explicit ‘duty for the protection of
the constitution’ as well as a ‘duty to resist’: ‘resistance against unconstitutional exercise of
public authority is the right and duty of every person.’111 Although Schmitt lived in neither
of these states, he was nevertheless a keen observer of the Hessen state constitution, drafting
a legal opinion for the Buderus Iron company on Article 41 of the Hessian constitution on
the immediate socialization of key industries and which mentions Article 147 in passing.112
Discussions of the right of resistance in legal circles after the war extended beyond
constitutional framing to questions over the very meaning of what constituted resistance.
For example, the American occupying authorities push for and achieved legislation within
their occupation zone that vacated the sentences of any Germans found to have resisted the
National Socialist regime.113 The answer settled upon in the judgment was that resistance
required some sort of action: it was not enough to merely ‘have shared your inner and
true convictions with an inner circle,’114 nor was fleeing from the National Socialist regime
sufficient.115
However, for the intellectual development of a duty of resistance, it was Karl Jaspers’
1946 series of lectures and subsequent book on Die Schuldfrage that brought the discussion
to a broad audience.116 Appearing at the beginning of the Nuremberg Trials, the series had
made Jaspers into ‘the most famous – or perhaps most notorious – intellectual in Germany’
after the war by arguing that ‘every German, without exception, is obligated to look clearly
into the question of our guilt.’117 While he rejected the notion of collective criminal or
moral guilt, ‘each of us has culpability, insofar as he remained passive’ and tolerated Hitler’s
policies.118 Although Jaspers’ claim regarding the obligation to resist the Nazi regime
remained a form of moral culpability and not criminal, political, or metaphysical, Die
Schuldfrage was nevertheless a highly influential text for clarifying the types of guilt in the
immediate postwar period. Schmitt was aware of this text, and refers to Jaspers in connection
111Article 147, Hessische Verfassung.
112Carl Schmitt, ‘Rechtsstaatlicher Verfassungsvollzug (1952)’ in Schmitt, Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze,
452-488, p. 461.
113‘Die Gesetzgebung der Länder (Amerikanische Zone),’ Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung 1(4) (1946), 99-102, p.
101.
114‘Das Recht der politischen Säuberung,’ Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung 2(5) (1947), 281-284, p. 281.
115O. Küster, ‘Wiedergutmachungsrecht,’ Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung 6(6) (1951), 180-1, p. 180.
116See for example Carl Haensel, ‘Zum Nürnberger Urteil: 2. Beitrag: Schuldprinzip und Gruppenkriminalität,’
Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung 2(1) (1947), 19-26, p. 25.
117Mark Clark, ‘A Prophet without Honour: Karl Jaspers in Germany, 1945-48,’ Journal of Contemporary
History 37(2) (2002), 197-222, p. 211; Hermann Lübbe, ‘Moralische Entscheidung, politische Option und
der Lauf der Welt. Karl Jaspers als politischer Denker,’ Zeitschrift für Politik 46(4) (1999), 367-388, p. 374.
Karl Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage (Munich: Piper Verlag, 2016 [1965]), p. 17.
118Karl Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage, p. 53. Hennig Ottmann, Geschichte des politischen Denkens, Bd. 4 (Stuttgart:
J.B. Metzler Verlag, 2012), p. 25.
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to the right of resistance, though his engagement with Jaspers remains superficial at best: ‘A
preacher such as Jaspers, who was not once beaten up, deserves no interest.’119
In a series of now famous interventions published in the Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung,
Gustav Radbruch and his interlocutors debated the extent to which National Socialist law
was indeed law. Pinning much of the blame on legal positivism, Radbruch claimed that the
‘fundamental proposition “law is law”’ had enabled judges to apply harsher penal statutes to
criminal cases during the Third Reich.120 While the appeal to natural law was in part based
on ‘de-politiciziation’ of the law and an attempt to shield ‘the independence of judges from
interventions by the occupying powers,’121 it also sought to assert justice – Gerechtigkeit –
as the highest value of law, and one that could be used to judge whether a positive law was in
fact law. Thus, to follow Radbruch, ‘where justice is not even striven for . . . there the statute
is not just incorrect law, but it loses its legal nature.’122
Helmut Coing, in his response to Radbruch, explicitly took up the question relating to
the culpability of judges during National Socialism who applied unjust positive law, even
to the extent that they issued death sentences.123 For Coing, the only way there could be a
question of culpability is if the judges are held to a standard originating in natural law: under
legal positivism, judges were merely following the law as it had been enacted. He continues,
‘Natural law . . . commands a refusal of obedience for specific laws which violate these values,
there is a right of resistance against them; however, it demands no punishment of he who
does not follow this command, of he who makes no use of this right.’124 Thus, judges had a
right to ignore the unjust laws, but could not have been held culpable for following them.
This debate over the culpability of judges went to the very heart of questions of jurispru-
dence and the role of legal positivism in enabling National Socialism. Furthermore, it gave
new traction to natural law theories, a development that was in no way lost on contempo-
raries.125 After all, if it was a ‘blindness to values’ in legal positivism that had enabled
National Socialist rule, then a substantive conception of justice and morality in conjunction
119Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 126. ‘Ein Bußprediger wie Jaspers, der nicht einmal verprügelt worden ist, verdient
kein Interesse.’
120Gustav Radbruch, ‘Gesetzliches Recht und übergesetzliches Recht,’ Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung 1(5)
(1946), 105-108, pp. 105, 107. See as well Clara Maier, ‘The Weimar Origins of the West German
Rechtsstaat, 1919-1969,’ The Historical Journal (Online First), 1-23, pp. 4-5.
121Michael Stolleis, Nahes Unrecht, Fernes Recht (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2014), p. 81.
122Radbruch, ‘Gesetzliches Recht,’ p. 107.
123On Helmut Coing, the Frankfurt legal historian, see Klaus Luig, ‘Helmut Coing (28.2.1912-15.8.2000),’
Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (119) (2002), 662-678.
124Helmut Coing, ‘Zur Frage der strafrechtlichen Haftung der Richter für Anwendung naturrechtswidriger
Gesetze,’ Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung 2(2) (1947), 61-64, p. 63.
125Heinrich Herrfahrdt, ‘Der Streit um den Positivismus in der gegenwärtigen deutschen Rechtswissenschaft,’
Deutsche Rechts-Zeitschrift 4(2) (1949), 32-3.
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with the law could form a bulwark against further violations by recognizing a right and a
duty of resistance against unjust laws. After 1945, Schmitt appears at first glance to rely on
natural law arguments, particularly in reference to the right of revolution; however, Schmitt
is instead working within the logic of his opponents to show the contradictions internal to
their arguments. For example, when he denies that he was under any moral obligation to
oppose the National Socialist regime, he writes in Latin that ‘it is not possible for me to write
directly about those who are able to directly proscribe [to dictate death].’126 Schmitt uses this
phrase on at least two separate occasions: in Ex Captivitate Salus, and in Glossarium. Its use
in Ex Captiviate Salus is perhaps the most revealing due to its context, as Schmitt argues that
in the absence of an external power that can ‘protect . . . against the terror’ unleashed within
the state, it is up to the individual to set the ‘boundaries of their own loyalty’ to the regime.
Thus, he argues that ‘the duty to unleash a civil war, to commit sabotage, and to become a
martyr has its limits. Here, one must leave [this decision] to the victim [dem Opfer] of such
situations and not judge from the outside.’127 For Schmitt, writing in a passage after 1945,
it is quite clear that by ‘the victim,’ Schmitt means himself, and he even refers to the ‘the
danger of these twelve years [1933-1945] which we experienced,’128 seemingly ignoring the
victims of the Shoah. The passage concludes with reference to Plato and Thomas More as
examples of great philosophers who worked with tyrants and who receive no contemporary
condemnation. Indeed, Schmitt thinks that there is a type of ‘oppositional force of remaining
silent,’129 or in a type of veiled criticism, as he characterizes Ernst Jünger’s Marmorklippen
(1939). As one might expect, Schmitt’s active support of the regime is entirely omitted in
this post-war apologia, and it seems that describing a period in which one is elevated to the
honorary position of Preußischer Staatsrat can hardly be considered as one in which he felt
direct danger.
The key to understanding the above passage is the shift from a Widerstandsrecht to ein
Pflicht, Widerstand zu leisten – a shift from a right of resistance to a duty to resist unjust
regimes. Turning back for a moment to one of Schmitt’s last writings in the Weimar Republic,
Legalität und Legitimität, one of Schmitt’s central arguments is that the drive to total legality,
and the transformation of legitimacy into pure legality, had the primary function of denying
126Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 280. ‘Non possum directe scribere de eo qui potest directe proscribere.’ This phrase
is attributed to Schmitt in Ernst Jünger’s diary entry of October 16, 1941. See Ernst Jünger, Strahlungen I:
Das erste Pariser Tagesbuch (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1979[1949]); for a discussion of the phrase in Schmitt’s
work, see Samuel Zeitlin, ‘Propaganda and Critique,’ in Carl Schmitt, Land and Sea, p. xxxvii.
127Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, pp. 20-21. ‘Die Pflicht, einen Bürgerkrieg zu entfesseln, Sabotage zu treiben
und zum Märtyrer zu werden, hat ihre Grenzen. Hier wird man einiges dem Opfer solcher Situationen
überlassen müssen und nicht nur von Außen urteilen dürfen.’
128Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 23. Emphasis added.
129Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 23. ‘Die Gegenkraft des Schweigens.’
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the right of resistance. The ‘rule of statutory law [Herrschaft des Gesetzes]’ meant that ‘the
state is statutory law; statutory law is the state.’ This presupposed a melting of the distinction
between Recht and Gesetz: ‘the guardian of right [Recht]’ became the legislator, literally the
Gesetzgeber. Only by collapsing this distinction could one ‘remove the right of resistance
. . . and concede the unconditional priority of statutory law.’130 As a consequence, what was
once asserted as a fundamental individual right became a form of ‘illegality’: so long as
statutory laws were procedurally valid, ‘only the statutory law is demanded obedience.’131
Thus, in a short book review published in 1955, he praises Hebert von Borch’s Obrigkeit
und Widerstand for its conclusion that ‘in the centralized executive apparatus of the modern
state, it is only the position of a free and, at the same time, strong professional civil service
that allows for an effective protection of freedom.’132 To be clear, Schmitt’s approval is not
a normative statement as to how he thinks the right of resistance ought to be constructed;
rather, he agrees with von Borch’s historical diagnosis of the most recent transformation of
resistance as only being possible through legal means.
Even in the later years of National Socialism, Schmitt seemingly endorsed the view that
there could be no such thing as a right of resistance against the state. In reference to Hobbes,
he argues that ‘In Hobbes’ absolutist state, a right of resistance as a “right” on the same level
as state law would be, in every aspect, factual as well as legal, illogical and absurd.’133 In
Schmitt’s reading, either it is the case that the state provides ‘tranquility, security, and order,’
in which case he has ‘all objective and subjective law on his side’; or it is the case that state
does not provide the function of ‘securing the peace,’ in which case there is no state present
against which one could revolt.134
The pivotal moment in Schmitt’s narrative of the right of resistance comes after the
execution of Robert Brasillach in France, on February 5, 1945, after a trial by the liberation
government.135 Brasillach was an enthusiastic and vocal supporter of French collaboration,
130Schmitt, Legalität und Legitimität, p. 276. ‘Das Widerstandsrecht . . . entfernte, und dem Gesetz jenen
unbedingten Vorrang zubilligte.’
131Schmitt, Legalität und Legitimität, p. 276, p. 286. ‘Nur dem Gesetz wird Gehorsam geschuldet.’
132Carl Schmitt, Review of Herbert von Borch, Obrigkeit und Widerstand. Zur Politischen Soziologie des
Beamtentums, in Das historisch-politische Buch 3 (1955), p. 72. ‘’in dem zentralisierten Vollzugsapparat
des modernen Staates sei es nur die Haltung eines freien und zugleich starken Berufsbeamtentums, die einen
wirksamen Schutz der Freiheit ermögliche.’ For Schmitt’s copy of von Borch’s text, with marginalia, see
NRW 265-24900
133Schmitt, Leviathan, p. 71. ‘Im absoluten Staat des Hobbes ist ein Widerstandsrecht als “Recht” auf einer
Ebene mit dem staatlichen Recht in jeder Hinsicht, faktisch wie rechtlich, widersinnig und eine Absurdität.’
134Schmitt, Leviathan, pp. 71-2. ‘Ruhe, Sicherheit und Ordnung . . . alles objektive und alles subjektive Recht
auf seiner Seite . . . Funktion der Friedenssicherung.’
135On Brasillach and his trial, see Alice Kaplan, The Collaborator: The Trial and Execution of Robert Brasillach
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
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publishing numerous articles in his journal, Je suis partout. For Schmitt, Brasillach’s
execution signalized a shift such that now ‘non-resistance is itself a form of collaboration,’
and an elimination of the ‘Right of non-resistance.’136 For Schmitt, who himself had been a
cheerleader of Vichy France, and, as Sam Zeitlin has drawn attention to in a forthcoming
article, a contributor to the Vichy journal Deutschland-Frankreich to which Brasillach also
regularly contributed,137 Schmitt certainly would have read the trial transcript. Of particular
interest was the prosecutor, Reboul, invoking ‘le crime intellectual, la trahison des clercs.’
For Schmitt, this signaled a shift to non-resistance itself being a crime.138
On November 25, 1949, Schmitt turns the Latin phrase cited above – ‘it is not possible
to directly write about that which has the power to directly proscribe [to death]’ – into his
verdict on the Federal Republic of Germany. He claims that Ernst Jünger has shown that it is
still possible to write about Jews, Nazis, and the SS by simply labeling them Parsis, Demos,
and Mauratanians respectively.139 Thus, ‘it is all wonderfully non-binding, and the curious
reader, who wants to know what the author thinks about Jews and Nazis, remains just as led
on [gefoppt] as the author remains free . . . In a Lizenzstaat, this is the right method to publish
on current affairs.’140
This repeated usage of the exculpatory Latin phrase is important because Schmitt’s
diary entry is at almost exactly the same moment that he publishes the phrase in connection
with the National Socialist dictatorship. The implication of this double usage is one of
equivalence between National Socialist Germany and the Federal Republic, one of Schmitt’s
favorite rhetorical tactics not just in the postwar period.141 For example, Schmitt had
declared, ‘Genocide – moving concept. I have experienced the concept with my own body:
extermination of the Prussian-German Beamtentum in 1945. Automatic Arrest. They were
pushed into suicide.’142 He laments that ‘German bureaucrats are not a protected group,’
136Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 126. ‘Nicht-Widerstand ist von selbst collaboration.’
137Samuel Zeitlin, ‘Politics and the History of Political Thought: Carl Schmitt’s Bodin in Nazi-Occupied Paris’
(forthcoming). The reference to Brasillach is also owed to correspondence with Zeitlin.
138For CS, who was still under a ban on publication, the idea of the ‘licensees of 1945’ in Germany being able
to force publication was enough for him to imagine Gustav Radbruch as a ‘Maquis’ or resistance fighter
against National Socialist occupation in France and Spain. See Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 126.
139Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 213.
140Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 213. ‘Es ist alles wunderbar freibleibend und der eifrige Leser, der nur wissen
möchte, was der Autor über die Juden oder die Nazis denkt, bleibt ebenso gefoppt wie der Autor freibleit
. . . aber wahrscheinlich ist das doch die richtige Methode, in einem Lizenzstaat über aktuelle Dinge zu
publizieren.’
141See Samuel Zeitlin’s unpublished article on ‘The Rhetoric of Tyranny.’
142Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 201. ‘Genocide, Völkermorde, rührender Begriff; ich habe ein Beispiel am eigenen
Leibe erlebt: Ausrottung des preußisch-deutschen Beamtentums im Jahre 1945 Automatical Arrest. Man
triebt sie in den Selbstmord.’
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and that he has been the subject of ‘ideocide.’143 He also noted ‘there are crimes against
humanity and crimes for humanity. Crimes against humanity are committed by Germans.
Crimes for humanity are committed against Germans.’144 Such comments are shameless
in their equivocation. But it perhaps has even more significant consequences regarding the
correct methodical approach for Schmitt’s work, namely that what Schmitt has published
should not always be taken at face value; rather, it is precisely the unpublished documents
that can provide the true meaning and intent of his texts.145 Not only does this solidify
the significance of the approach developed in this dissertation, but it also implies that non-
contextual approaches, the vast majority of contemporary secondary literature on Schmitt,
would miss the specific intent behind his writings.
3.4 An Isolated Perspective
When Schmitt criticizes natural law, he is referring to something altogether different than the
contemporary Anglo-American understanding of the concept. A contemporary scholar of
jurisprudence would likely associate the theory with Lon Fuller’s The Morality of Law (1964).
There are certain key differences, however, that must be kept in mind: first, Fuller describes
his understanding of natural law as a secular concept, which has ‘nothing to do with any
“brooding omnipresence in the skies.”’146 In contrast, Schmitt critiques both divine natural
law as well as Vernunftrecht, or natural law based on reason, for their claim to universal and
eternal validity. Second, Fuller’s theory is meant as a procedural or institutional account of
natural law with his eight desiderata for the internal morality of the law.147 On the internal
morality of law, Schmitt is largely silent. Here, however, Fuller returns to the fundamental
question of the postwar period, the question of whether Nazi law was in fact law: Fuller
explicitly refers to National Socialism and the law on at least seven occasions, including the
infamous Röhm Putsch, which was justified by only one public law professor in Germany
– Carl Schmitt – and Fuller is quite familiar with German language sources, although he
includes no word on Schmitt himself. While Fuller’s text advances the conclusion that
the laws under National Socialism were no laws at all, he nevertheless argued that ex post
143Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 201. ‘die deutschen Beamten sind keine geschützte Gruppe etc’; ’Ideocide.’
144Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 214. ‘Es gibt Verbrechen gegen und Verbrechen für die Menschlichkeit. Die Ver-
brechen gegen die Menschlichkeit werden von Deutschen begangen. Die Verbrechen für die Menschlichkeit
werden an Deutschen begangen.’
145Although today Glossarium has seen two editions, it was almost certainly not intended for publication given
both its unpolished style and content. See Giesler & Tilke, ‘Einleitung,’ in Glossarium, p. x.
146Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press,1964), p. 98.
147Fuller, The Morality of Law, pp. 98, 184.
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facto criminal statutes were a clear violation of his theory of the internal morality of law –
something Schmitt would have emphatically agreed with at Nuremberg.148
Indeed, Carl Schmitt was first and foremost a jurist.149 Der Nomos der Erde, as he notes,
was an offering placed at the alter of jurisprudence, a field which he claimed to have served
for over forty years. Reading Schmitt as advancing a theory of ‘quasi-natural law’ obfuscates
the extent to which he sought to prevent the re-encroachment of theology into jurisprudence.
This is one sense of Schmitt’s oft-repeated dictum that ‘I am the last conscious representative
of the jus publicum europaeum’ – an epoch of the law of nations that Schmitt claims began
with the demand to theologians to be silent.150 This is not to say that religion had any role
to play in Schmitt’s thought over the many decades in which he was intellectually active;
rather, this chapter has made the claim that, in the period after 1945, Schmitt emphatically
rejected any intrusion of theology into the domain of law, the domain with which Schmitt
would identify and characterize his own work. In a diary entry dated September 23, 1947,
Schmitt writes, ‘I have only ever spoken and written as a jurist, and as a result, only ever
to and for jurists.’151 Similarly indicative is the cover of book three of Glossarium, which
is inscribed in Schmitt’s own handwriting with the words ‘Materials for the clearing of a
(juristic) existence.’152 On this matter, Schmitt could not have been clearer: ‘I am however a
jurist and not a theologian.’153 Perhaps it is time, then, to take Schmitt at his word and stop
reading his Catholicism as determinate of his writings on jurisprudence.
Furthermore, Schmitt’s entries on natural law are temporally proximate to his writings on
utopia and legal positivism.154 Indeed, some entries contain discussions (and criticisms) of
both theories. While utopianism and legal positivism will be the subjects of chapters 6, it is
important to note here that Schmitt was waging a two-front war against both the dominance
of legal positivism and the rebirth of natural law doctrines using legal history as his weapon
of choice. Schmitt is clear about the terrain of conflict: ‘Ernst Jünger thinks . . . that the
philosophers of history are today more important than atomic physicists. I, the diagnostician
of the discriminating concept of war and the transformation of state war into civil war, am
not surprised.’155 It should thus come as no surprise that Schmitt turned precisely to the
148Fuller, The Morality of Law, pp. 59, 107.
149On this point, see Günter Maschke, ‘Carl Schmitt in den Händen der nicht-Juristen,’ Der Staat 34(1) (1995),
104-129.
150Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 75. ‘Ich bin der letzte, bewußte Vertreter des jus publicum europaeum.’
151Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 13. ‘Ich habe immer nur als Jurist gesprochen und geschrieben und infolgedessen
eigentlich auch nur zu Juristen und für Juristen.’
152Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 395. ‘Materialien zur Lichtung eines (juristischen) Daseins.’
153Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 89. ‘Ich bin aber Jurist und kein Theologe.’
154See for example Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 65.
155Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 95. ‘Ernst Jünger meint . . . daß die Geschichtsphilosophen heute wichtiger sind
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foundational figure of the historical school of jurisprudence, Savigny, as a way of challenging
both positivism and natural law, a jurist who had launched a challenge against codification
and positivism ‘without recourse of the civil war slogans of natural law.’156
One might object to this interpretation of Schmitt’s work by arguing that his 1950 Nomos
der Erde in fact perpetuates the distinction between Christian and non-Christian peoples,
as well on its focus of the ‘hostes perpetues’ of the (Catholic) Church.157 This objection
holds that Schmitt views colonialism as justified on the grounds that it spreads Christianity
to non-Christian peoples. Furthermore, this objection argues that Schmitt’s 1942 Land and
Sea, republished in 1954 and 1981, advances the view that Papal arbitration of colonial
land disputes is legitimate and constitutive of peace, particularly in regards to the Treaty of
Tordesillas of 1494. As this volume was republished multiple times through to the end of
Schmitt’s life, and without substantive changes, this objection holds that Schmitt consistently
acknowledged papal authority as constitutive of international law until the end of his life.
The objection is vulnerable on two levels. First, and more generally, one should not
interpret republication of a text as itself evidence of a specific intent on behalf of an author,
and certainly not in Schmitt’s case. As he wrote in the introduction to Positionen und Begriffe,
Schmitt follows Heraclitus’ dictum that it is not possible to step into the same river twice, and
then stated that the essays in the collection were republished merely as historical documents.
Second, however, the underlying claim regarding papal authority in relation to international
law is itself not sufficiently historicized. The relevant passage appears in section 14 of Land
und Meer:
‘As long as Portugal and Spain, two Catholic powers, were alone among themselves
[in the New World], the Pope in Rome could intervene as the creator of legal titles, as
the order ordaining new land-appropriations, and as claims judge between the two land-
appropriating powers . . . The papal line of partition from 1493 stands at the beginning of
the battle for the new fundamental order, for the new nomos of the earth.’158
Papal arbitration was possible for Schmitt only so long as both of the powers were Catholic
and recognized papal authority; however, Schmitt acknowledges that this period came to
a close ‘through the Reformation, [because] the peoples who became Protestant openly
withdrew from any authority of the Pope.’159 In a parallel argument in Nomos der Erde,
als die Atom-Physiker. Natürlich. Ich, der Diagnostiker des diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriffs und der
Verwandlung des Staatenkrieges in den Bürgerkrieg, bin davon nicht überrascht.’
156Schmitt, Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft, p. 418 See also the letter from Ernst Forsthoff to
Schmitt, Briefwechsel, Nr. 35.
157I owe these objections to previous correspondence with Samuel Zeitlin.
158Schmitt, Land and Sea, pp. 65-66.
159Schmitt, Land and Sea, p. 66.
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Schmitt locates the origins of the jus publicum europaeum to the ‘dissolution of the medieval
spatial order borne by imperial rule [Kaisertum] and the papacy [Papsttum].’160 Thus, while
papal arbitration is central to the Respublica Christiana as evinced in the Treaty of Tordesillas
of 1494, it is nevertheless a historicized concept within Schmitt’s history of the law of nations.
As such, it does not establish that Schmitt continued to believe in papal authority as a
mechanism for solving international disputes, nor does it imply a theological basis for the
validity of law. Rather, the opposite conclusion follows from the text: all law, including that
underwritten by the Pope himself, is historically bounded.
In some ways, Schmitt’s criticism of natural law doctrines remains disappointing, as his
commentary appears too fragmented and stunted by bitter polemics against his contempo-
raries. For example, one might expect at least some engagement with Radbruch’s formula,
discussed above, given its centrality in the history of twentieth century jurisprudence and its
particular origins as a response to National Socialism and the law.161 It is clear that Schmitt
was aware of Radbruch’s publication, but chose not to engage with it at a substantive level.
Instead, Schmitt merely provides the thoughts of a bitter man – ‘Homo homini Radbruch!’,
a phrase Schmitt would repeat well after Radbruch’s death.162 Later, writing in English,
Schmitt claims that Radbruch is a master of ‘character assassination,’ specifically the as-
sassination of Schmitt’s character,163 and that Radbruch’s ‘indignation in relation to me is
intellectually identical to that of Hitler’s fury towards degenerate art.’164 Equally, Schmitt’s
correspondents during his period of ‘inner-exile’ – ‘exul in patria mea’ as he described it165 –
were equally dismissive of Radbruch’s formula: Ernst Forsthoff, in a letter from 1950, writes
‘those who today ramble on about natural law are merely failed positivists who are now
helpless; this applies in my opinion above all for Radbruch.’166 A substantive rejection was
not forthcoming.
Instead of directly challenging his enemies, Schmitt would publish his single longest
commentary on natural law doctrines anonymously in the year 1949 as an interpretation
of the Spanish Scholastic, Francisco de Vitoria. For Schmitt, this was a way of cutting off
the renaissance of natural law doctrines at its origins: historicizing the origins of the law of
160Schmitt, Nomos der Erde, p. 25. ‘Aus der Auflösung der mittelalterlichen, von Kaisertum und Papsttum
getragenen Raumordnung entstanden.’
161See Jens Meierhenrich, The Remnants of the Rechtsstaat: An Ethnography of Nazi Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2018), pp. 3-5.
162Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 103. Repeated again, p. 235, twice on p. 298, and again on p. 299 and p. 302.
163Schmitt, Glossarium, p.257, repeated p. 261.
164Schmitt, Glossarium, p.18. ‘ihre Entrüstung über mich geistig identisch ist mit der Wut Hitlers über die
entartete Kunst.’
165Carl Schmitt to Ernst Forsthoff, Briefwechsel, No. 24, p. 52.
166Ernst Forsthoff to Carl Schmitt, Briefwechsel, No. 35, p. 68.
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nations would protect against the reemergence of claims of universal and eternal validity of
natural law. In so doing, Schmitt had a particular enemy in mind: the work of James Brown
Scott, and through him, Robert Jackson. Before Jackson came to sit on the United States
Supreme Court, he was the chief American prosecutor at Nuremberg, and Schmitt makes
clear the association in several of his diary entries. As he writes on June 29, 1948,
‘I now worry that my chapter on Vitoria in “Nomos” is far too sparing, considerate, and
almost shrouded, and therefore it loses its power. What is said very discretely there
about Nys, James Brown Scott (and thereby also Jackson), implies just the same as
Augustin Cochin, Valléry-Radot . . . and others.’167
To relocate Schmitt’s Vitoria interpretation as a response to the American jurist James Brown
Scott, then, is the task of the following chapter.
167Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 130. ‘Ich fürchte jetzt, daß mein Kapitel über Vitoria im Nomos viel zu schonend,
rücksichtsvoll und fast verschleiernd ist, und dadurch seine Kraft verliert. Was dort sehr unauffällig über
Nys, James Brown Scott (und damit über Jackson) gesagt ist, bedeutet doch in der Sache ebensoviel wie da,
das Augustin Cochin, Valléry-Radot . . . ’ The same connection is made on p. 80.

Chapter 4
On the Use and Abuse of Francisco de
Vitoria: James Brown Scott and Carl
Schmitt
In Der Nomos der Erde, Carl Schmitt devotes more pages to discussing the Spanish Scholas-
tic Francisco de Vitoria than any other theorist of the law of nations. Originally published
anonymously the year prior in the Catholic journal Die Neue Ordnung under the title ‘Fran-
cisco de Vitoria und die Geschichte seines Ruhmes [Francisco de Vitoria and the History
of His Renown],’1 Schmitt sought to ‘purify [Vitoria’s] portrait from false overpaintings
[Übermalungen] and to return to his words their true sense.’2 In this chapter, I argue this
intervention into the reception of Vitoria’s writings ought to be read as a polemical response
to the American international lawyer, James Brown Scott, and his attempt to reconstruct a
liberal international law based on the principles he uncovered in the Spanish Dominican. For
if Schmitt was concerned with ‘overpaintings,’ there was only one person who had become so
identified with Vitoria that his face was substituted for Vitoria’s: when the artist in charge of
painting murals of the founding fathers of jurisprudence in the new United States Department
of Justice building could not locate a portrait of Vitoria,
The artist returned to his mural and painted the figure of Vitoria garbed true to life as a
Dominican friar but with an excellent likeness of the head and hands of James Brown
Scott. So there in the halls of justice at Washington . . . is a good portrait of Dr. Scott
1 Schmitt changes the title of the section in der Nomos der Erde to ‘Die Rechtfertigung der Landnahme einer
Neuen Welt (Francisco de Vitoria).’ See Carl Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum
Europaeum (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2011), p. 69.
2 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 96. ‘Unsere eigene Intention ging dahin, sein Bild von falschen Über-
malungen zu reinigen und seinen Worten ihren wahren Sinn zurückzugeben.’
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disguised in the habit of the Dominican theologian who expounded the law of nations
one hundred years before the classic treatise of Grotius.3
In the first section of this chapter, I provide an overview of James Brown Scott’s role in
leading a renaissance of scholarship on Vitoria in the interwar period as well as the principles
for the law of nations he derives from Vitoria’s teachings. In short, I aim to show how
Scott came to conceive of Vitoria as a liberal internationalist avant la lettre and how Vitoria
became linked to developments in twentieth century international law such as the Treaty of
Versailles (1919), the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), and even the Nuremberg Charter (1945).
In the second section, I explore Schmitt’s reconstruction of Vitoria’s thought in relation to
Schmitt’s theory of the pre-modern nomos of the Respublica Christiana and then present
what Schmitt claims to be the exploitation of Vitoria’s writings after 1919 in the Versailles
legal order. Using Schmitt’s journal entries from the period immediately prior to publication,
I argue that Schmitt sought to undercut liberal internationalist just war theory by denying
the origin of its principles in the Spanish scholastics. Instead, Schmitt argued that Vitoria’s
thought was intrinsically linked to its origins in the Respublica Christiana, and therefore
could not form the foundations of contemporary liberal internationalism. By locating Schmitt
as a respondent to James Brown Scott, this paper offers a historicist reading of Schmitt’s
‘discriminatory concept of war,’ and, in so doing, reveals Schmitt as a thinker engaged in
constructing an alternative narrative for the history of legal and political thought.
4.1 James Brown Scott and the Vitorian Renaissance
In 1931, the prestigious Institut de droit international held its annual meeting at Emmanuel
College, Cambridge, bringing together a group of influential international lawyers to debate
matters ranging from the conflict of criminal law to the issuing of mandates by the League of
Nations. Over lunch, members of the institute agreed to found an International Association
of Francis of Vitoria and of Suarez, in honour of the 400th anniversary of the former’s
landmark lectures, De indis recenter inventis and De jure belli. Following the founding of
an Asociación Francisco de Vitoria in 1926 and the establishment of a Francisco de Vitoria
Chair at the University of Salamanca in 1927, Vitoria had emerged as the ‘voice of humanity’
in the shadow of the Great War.4 Members of the society, dedicated to the study of the
3 George Finch, ‘James Brown Scott, 1866-1943,’ The American Journal of International Law 38(2) (1944),
183-217, p. 199. See also John Hepp, ‘James Brown Scott and the Rise of Public International Law,’ The
Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 7(2) (2008), 150-179, p. 171.
4 James Brown Scott, ‘Asociación Francisco de Vitoria,’ The American Journal of International Law 22(1)
(1928), 136-139, p. 138.
4.1 James Brown Scott and the Vitorian Renaissance 91
two Spanish scholastics, were to present manuscripts the following year at the first official
meeting in Oslo. Four monographs would be prepared, each detailing one step in the gradual
development of what James Brown Scott called the ‘modern temple of international justice’:
Jan Kosters would write on Augustine, ‘who laid the first stones of the modern temple of
international justice’; Louis Le Fur would write on Aquinas, ‘who built on the foundation of
St. Augustine’; James Brown Scott would write on Vitoria, ‘in whose constructive hands the
temple of international justice took definite form’; and Alfred Verdross would provide the
final volume on Francisco Suarez, who ‘furnished the temple of international justice with
its philosophy, which, through the masterly description of Grotius, is known to the world at
large.’5 These four greats of international law in the interwar period would thereby attempt
to rewrite the foundations of international law in which Hugo Grotius, author of De jure belli
ac pacis would play only a supporting role to the seminal thought of the Spanish.
As Scott recounts in an article summarizing the meeting’s proceedings, the purpose of
such a historical study of the Spanish was not a benign curiosity for the past, but rather
history’s relevance for present: ‘the more we study the international law of the past, the
more we understand the international law of the present and, strange as it may seem, the
international law of the future.’6 The implication of this statement was that international law’s
past had normative implications for the present; however, the meaning of these implications
could only be drawn after conducting an archaeology of the normative propositions contained
in the works of the ‘founder of the modern school of international law,’ Francisco de Vitoria.7
Scott undertook this project in his 1934 monograph, The Spanish Origin of International
Law and his subsequent Law, the State, and the International Community published in 1939.8
By the time these two monographs were published, Scott himself was something like an
omnipresent figure in the early decades of American international law.9 Scott founded the
5 For a discussion of Le Fur’s life and ‘l’affaire Scelle’ see Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of
Nations: the Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),
pp. 317-327. Verdross held the position of general secretary of the Vitoria-Suarez society and would later
profess the influence of the Spanish Scholastics on his work in the first edition of the Spanish translation
of Völkerrecht. See Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, ‘Francisco De Vitoria’s Unexpected Transformations
and Reinterpretations for International Law,’ International Community Law Review 15(3) (2013), 287-318,
p. 289; Hans Wehberg, ‘James Brown Scott 70 Jahre Alt,’ Die Friedens-Warte 36(2) (1936), 72-75, p. 75.
James Brown Scott, ‘The Two Institutes of International Law,’ The American Journal of International Law
26(1) (1932), 87-102, p. 97.
6 Scott, ‘The Two Institutes of International Law,’ p. 97.
7 Scott, ‘The Two Institutes of International Law,’ p. 92.
8 An earlier version of this monograph was published in 1928, as McKenna cites it in an article dated in 1932,
prior to the official publication date. Charles McKenna, ‘Francisco De Vitoria: Father of International Law,’
An Irish Quarterly Review 21(84) (1932), 635-648, p. 647. Schmitt, however, cites the 1934 edition.
9 In some respects, the best overviews of Scott’s life were his obituaries. See the obituary written by Hans
Wehberg, ‘Zum Gedanken an James Brown Scott,’ Die Friedens-Warte 44(4) (1944), 169-174. Additionally,
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American Society for International Law (ASIL) in 1906, year before serving as a delegate
to the Second Hague Conference under Secretary of State and later President of the ASIL,
Elihu Root.10 Starting in 1911, Scott would oversee the Division of International Law at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a deeply internationalist organization that
played a central role in the formation of international law as a discipline in the United States
until the mid-1920s.11 In addition, he would serve as the president of the Institut de droit
international between 1925 and 1929, thereby attaining an almost hegemonic position within
the early period of American international law.12
Parallel to these professional achievements, Scott devoted over twenty-five years to
establishing Francisco de Vitoria as the foundational figure in the history of international law.
Already in 1927, he was awarded a doctor honoris causa by the University of Salamanca in
recognition of his work on Vitoria.13 By 1932, it was recognized that Scott – along with a
handful of other scholars such as Ernest Nys, Thomas Alfred Walker, Coleman Phillipson,
and Camilo Barcia Trelles – had successfully popularized Vitoria’s work ‘within recent years’
to the extent that it was now common to acknowledge Vitoria’s foundational role beyond
being merely a predecessor to Grotius.14
Scott’s grew interested in Vitoria during the deliberations leading to the United States’
declaration of war in April of 1917 and the search for a just cause of war. Scott parses
Wilson’s address before Congress in seeking a declaration of war as providing a just war
see the obituary written by Scott’s successor, Finch, ‘James Brown Scott, 1866-1943’ 183-217; Hepp, ‘James
Brown Scott and the Rise of Public International Law,’ 50-164. Although Finch never finished his planned
biography, the fragments were published posthumously as George Finch, Adventures in Internationalism: a
Biography of James Brown Scott (Clark: The Lawbook Exchange, 2012). For an intellectual biography, see
Christopher Rossi, Broken Chain of Being: James Brown Scott and the Origins of Modern International Law
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), pp. 1-37.
10 For an overview of the founding of the ASIL and Scott’s role as a foundational member, see Frederic Kirgis,
‘The Formative Years of the American Society of International Law,’ The American Journal of International
Law 90(4) (1996), 559-589, pp. 562-566. For Scott in the context of pan-Americanism, see Juan Pablo
Scarfi, The Hidden History of International Law in the Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
Frederic Kirgis, ‘Elihu Root, James Brown Scott and the Early Years of the ASIL,’ Proceedings of the
American Society of International Law 90 (1996),139-143, p. 139. It should be added that Scott wrote
effusive praise of Root and posthumously ascribed to Root Vitorian ideals. See James Brown Scott, ‘Elihu
Root – an Appreciation,’ Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 31 (1937), 1-33, p. 4.
11 Katharina Rietzler, ‘Fortunes of a Profession: American Foundations and International Law, 1910-1939,’
Global Society 28(1) (2014), 8-23, pp. 10, 22.
12 Finch, ‘James Brown Scott,’ p. 206. For a discussion of the founding of the Institut de droit international,
see Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, pp. 41-42, 47-48.
13 McKenna, ‘Francisco De Vitoria: Father of International Law,’ p. 647; Rossi, Broken Chain of Being, p. 7.
14 McKenna, ‘Francisco De Vitoria: Father of International Law,’ pp. 647-648. This interpretation is still to be
found in contemporary discussions of Vitoria in the history of international law. See, for example, Antony
Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), pp. 13n3, 14n5.
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argument: Wilson argued that the Zimmerman letter declaring unrestricted submarine warfare,
in combination with a series of previous acts, constituted a just cause. As a result, Scott
writes, ‘we believe that the reasons given are causes, not pretexts, that the motives and
purposes are sincere and sufficient.’ Thus, the United States’ entrance into the war was
declared just and the purpose – ‘to secure the repudiation of the Prussian conception of state
and government, which could force a people to commit such acts’ and, as a result, ‘to secure
some form of international organization calculated to guarantee peace among nations through
the administration of justice’ – was just as well.15 Scott ends his endorsement of Wilson’s
speech by endorsing the concept of a world court: writing in German, the only sentence in
German in the article, Scott quotes Friedrich Schiller by declaring ‘die Weltgeschichte ist
das Weltgericht [World history is the world court].’16 The message, ostensibly directed at
the Germans, was that history would ultimately vindicate the United States’ entry into the
war while condemning Prussian aggression and even ‘the Prussian concept of the state’ as a
whole.
After the war, Scott posited the creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice
– fulfilling the role of Schiller’s Weltgericht – as ensuring that international disputes of the
future would be settled by recourse to a universal conception of justice no different from that
which the Supreme Court of the United States exercises over disputes involving individual
states of the union.17 Such an international court ‘is not a dream, or something superimposed
upon nations, it is a matter of mere growth under well known lines.’ For the American
international lawyer, ‘history is with us, and we cannot fail, although realization of our hopes
and expectations may be slower than we may like.’18 In Scott’s view, this vision seems to
have been confirmed by the result of the success of the Alabama arbitration in avoiding
military confrontation.19 Scott took action to secure the existence of a world court in the
aftermath of the First World War, and was instrumental for the establishment of the Permanent
Court,20 which would be later dubbed the ‘Root Court’ in reference to his mentor, Elihu
Root.21 In Scott’s vision of a new international order, the Permanent Court, on the model of
the United States Supreme Court, would lead to the replacement of war by legal mechanisms.
15 James Brown Scott, ‘The United States at War with the Imperial German Government,’ The American
Journal of International Law 11(3) (1917), 617-627, p. 618.
16 Scott, ‘The United States at War,’ p. 627. The Schiller poem in question is ‘Resignation.’
17 James Brown Scott, Law, the State, and the International Community, Volume I (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1939), p. 36.
18 Quoted in Hepp, ‘James Brown Scott and the Rise of Public International Law,’ p. 161.
19 Kirgis, ‘The Formative Years of the American Society of International Law,’ p. 561.
20 Paolo Amorosa, ‘James Brown Scott’s International Adjudication Between Tradition and Progress in the
United States,’ Journal of the History of International Law 17 (2015), 15-46, p. 19.
21 Benjamin Allen Coates, Legalist Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 170. See also Kirgis,
‘Elihu Root, James Brown Scott and the Early Years of the ASIL,’ p. 142.
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Thus, Scott could declare ‘the judicial power of the United States . . . renders the use of force
against the States a stranger to the American system.’22 By exporting and universalizing the
same mechanism of judicial power over states, the use of force would be similarly removed
from the international sphere as well. Published in 1939, Scott ultimately failed to anticipate
both the war that would erupt that year and the extent to which international law would
be powerless to stop it; however, his text can be read as delivering a set arguments for the
establishment of an international court based on the belief that ‘justice is universal, whether
applied between individuals or between groups of individuals.’23
This universal concept of justice, which animates Scott’s understanding of the ‘interna-
tional community’ of the book’s title, is explicitly derived from his reading of Francisco de
Vitoria. Vitoria, as the founder of what Scott calls ‘modern international law,’ established the
principles of justice applicable to the problems of the present. Scott’s underlying methodolog-
ical assumption, then, is that it is possible to ascertain the true principles of international law
through an archaeology of the teachings of its founding author. Thus, the origins and history
of international legal thought – which Scott sought to recover, curate, and interpret through
the Carnegie Classics of International Law – would serve as the normative foundations for
his contemporary position.24
The aim of the Carnegie project, under which Scott published The Spanish Origin of
International Law in 1934, was to show that ‘international law is not a thing of treaties or
conventions, but the result of centuries and centuries of experience, and that it comes to
us from the Golden age of Spain as a result of the discovery of America.’ This meant, in
turn, that ‘to understand the law of nations as it exists and is applied today, it is necessary to
understand its past.’25 However, the goal of this project was not merely to show the Spanish
influence on contemporary international law; instead, Scott aimed to show that the Spanish
had uncovered a set of eternal moral principles for the law of nations to be recognized and
upheld in the 1930s. Here, a single sentence suffices to show the intent of Scott’s project:
The publicists of today . . . are leaving the paths marked out by false prophets of inter-
national law and turning to Vitoria’s law of nations and the Victorian principles which
for four hundred years have pointed the path to an international law still of the future,
in which law and morality shall be one and inseparable, in which states are created
by and for human beings, and every principle of international law and of international
conduct is to be tested by the good of the international community and not by the selfish
22 Amorosa, ‘James Brown Scott’s International Adjudication,’ p. 36.
23 Scott, Law, the State, and the International Community, p. 35.
24 Wehberg, ‘Zum Gedanken an James Brown Scott,’ p. 172.
25 James Brown Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law: Francisco De Vitoria and the Law of Nations
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), pp. 11a-12a.
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standards of its more powerful and erring members.26
By positing a return to Vitoria as both the founder of the modern law of nations – mediated
through Grotius’ subsequent works – and also as the author of eternally true and universalizing
propositions in the law of nations, Scott sought to align the development of international law
in the 1930s with the principles of liberal internationalism radiating from Vitoria’s work.
To be clear, Scott did not claim to find a concept of ‘liberty before liberalism’ in the
Spanish Scholastic; rather, he portrayed Vitoria himself as a liberal international lawyer. In
a chapter titled ‘The Liberalism of Vitoria,’ Scott reminisces, ‘for many years past I have
wondered why it is that Francisco de Vitoria was so liberal that even in our day his views seem
ahead of our time.’27 The answer to his musing was that Vitoria’s intellectual inspiration,
Aquinas, was himself a liberal and ‘international-minded.’ As a result, Scott concludes
that ‘Vitoria was a liberal. He could not help being a liberal. He was an internationalist by
inheritance. And because he was both, his international law is a liberal law of nations.’28
Concretely, Vitoria’s liberalism meant adherence to two propositions: first, that there was a
firm commitment to ‘the equality of states, applicable not merely to states of Christendom
but also do the barbarian principalities in the Western World of Columbus’; and second, that
‘force between states could only justly be used to redress a wrong’ and only if there is no
higher court to adjudicate disputes.29
To establish the first proposition regarding the equality of states, Scott claimed that
Vitoria’s De indis amounted a ‘proclamation of a new international law’ which would
‘[begin] with the individual [and] end with the international community.’30 Within the
international community, Scott maintained that there is a fundamental equality, as ‘it is
Vitoria’s judgment that the American principalities – as equals to the Christian states – should
not be excluded from this international community.’31 As a result of the equality between
the Americans and the Europeans, Scott claims ‘the international community, composed
of states without reference to geography, race, religion, replaced the large but still limited
international community coextensive with Christendom.’32 If it is true that all individuals
and nations were formally equal, then it follows for Scott that international law would have
26 Scott, The Spanish Origin, p. 11a. Emphasis added.
27 Scott, The Spanish Origin, p. 280.
28 Scott, The Spanish Origin, p. 280. Emphasis added.
29 Scott, The Spanish Origin, pp. 281-282.
30 Scott, The Spanish Origin, p. 95.
31 Scott, The Spanish Origin, p. 282. On Scott’s elevation of the Americas as a diplomatic maneuver, see Mark
Somos & Joshua Smeltzer, ‘Vitoria, Suárez, and Grotius: James Brown Scott’s Enduring Revival,’ Grotiana
(forthcoming).
32 Scott, The Spanish Origin, p. 283.
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to be governed by ‘universal principles’ or ‘generalities’ which did not take into account
their source or their object of application. Scott writes,
by treating a concrete question affecting in its different relations not merely Christendom
but the international community, [Vitoria] was not only furnishing an example of the
way in which an international situation should be treated but was showing that the rules
of law derived from universal justice – whether it be called natural law, divine law,
human law, or all three – were then as now an acceptable and adequate standard for the
affairs of nations.33
Thus, Scott conceives of the first proposition as positing a truth about the nature of interna-
tional affairs, extending from Vitoria’s teachings to the present day.
Scott’s second proposition deals with the revival of just war theory, particularly the
Vitorian question ‘What may be a reason and cause of just war?’34 to which he gives the
answer ‘[there is] a single and only just cause for commencing a war, namely a wrong
received.’35 According to Scott, Vitoria allows for punishment for wrongs ‘according to the
scale of their wrongdoing.’36 Scott locates the authority of this argument in Vitoria’s de jure
belli based solely on a quotation from Augustine: just wars are those ‘wars which are waged
in order to avenge a wrong done, as where punishment has to be meted out to a city or state’
due to the fact that ‘it has itself neglected to exact punishment for an offense committed
by its citizens or subjects or to return what has been wrongfully taken away.’37 According
to Vitoria’s seventh proof, the aim of offensive war was the ‘good of the whole world’ as
‘there would be no condition of happiness for the world, nay, its condition would be one of
utter misery, if oppressors and robbers and plunderers could with impunity commit their
crimes and oppress the good and innocent.’38 Thus it would be necessary for a state to seek
redress in the event of suffering a wrong at the hands of an opponent. This redress would be
justified under the Vitorian conception of just war, but only to the extent that the redress does
not exceed the initial wrong, as ‘no war is just . . . the conduct of which is manifestly more
harmful to the state than it is good and advantageous.’39 No Carthaginian peace could be
justified.
33 Scott, The Spanish Origin, p. 195. Emphasis added.
34 Scott, The Spanish Origin, p. 207.
35 Scott, The Spanish Origin, p. 208.
36 Scott, The Spanish Origin, p. 153.
37 In Scott, The Spanish Origin, p. 201. Francisco de Vitoria, Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2017 [1991]), p. 298.
38 Scott, The Spanish Origin, p. 201.
39 Scott, The Spanish Origin, p. 229. On the necessity of wars of sanction within pacifist theories of just war,
see the work of James Brown Scott’s collaborator, Hans Wehberg. Joshua Smeltzer, ‘’Hans Wehberg and the
jus belli ac pacis in Interwar International Law’, Global Intellectual History (2019).
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For Scott, Vitoria’s theory was only applicable in the absence of a world court such as the
Permanent Court of International Justice – it would be superseded by the establishment of a
court in which ‘[contending parties] would be obliged to refer the dispute.’40 This is because,
for Vitoria, the sovereign prince ‘engaged in a just war is to be regarded as a judge, with the
rights and duties of a judge in all matters . . . the prince is therefore in fact, if not in form, a
judge.’ Scott continues, noting ‘the doctrine of Francisco de Vitoria is in its entirety that of a
judicial system for the entire world,’ one that meant that ‘the princes or sovereign authorities
of the States’ would act as ‘as judges of the violation of rights under the law of nations until
there should be a court between, and therefore, above, the nations.’41 In the absence of such
a world court to adjudicate disputes between formally equal sovereigns, the individual prince
must decide when he has suffered wrong.42
Scott then derives the significance of Vitoria’s ‘liberal’ teaching on formal equality and
just war for their effect on state sovereignty: ‘The simple truth is that the Victorian conception
is entirely incompatible with the doctrine of sovereignty, by which, in its baldest form, each
so-called sovereign nation claims the absolute right to do as it pleases in so far as its strength
permits,’ and according to which each state has the right to do so ‘without reference to the
rights of any other nation or to the international community and its rules.’43 Instead, nations
were bound to respect the equality of nations and were bound by the principles of the law of
nations. This abrogation of absolute sovereignty nowhere more noticeable than subjecting the
nation to the jurisdiction of a world court, able to settle disputes through acts of arbitration
and punish acts of aggression.
Over the course of the interwar period, Vitoria came to be increasingly cited as the
inspiration for a number of international agreements. For example, the German international
lawyer and emigre Joachim von Elbe connects the reemergence of just war theories – and
therefore by necessity the work of Francisco de Vitoria – to the settlement arising out of
World War I. He writes
The Treaty of Versailles recognized the war guilt in its twofold form as entailing the
civil liability of the vanquished for damages and his punishment for international crimes
committed, although international law, as generally accepted in 1914, did not support the
idea that a state, by resorting to war, commits an international delinquency involving such
liability. Its revival by the Versailles Treaty became the starting-point for a movement
once more to distinguish between just and unjust wars.44
40 Scott, The Spanish Origin, p. 153.
41 Scott, The Spanish Origin, p. 221.
42 Compare with Scott, The Spanish Origin, p. 212.
43 Scott, The Spanish Origin, p. 212. This argument is echoed in B. Wortley, ‘Vitoria and International Law
Today,’ Blackfriars 27(319) (1946), 368-78, p. 370.
44 Joachim von Elbe, ‘The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law,’ The American
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Crucially, Scott himself had been sent to Versailles as legal counsel to the Secretary of State,
Robert Lansing. The two prepared The Report of the Commission on the Responsibility of
the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, with Memorandum of Reservations,
submitted as a part of their work in Versailles.45 At the time, Scott believed the Treaty of
Versailles would lead to a period of sustained peace, writing only later that ‘the statesmen
have . . . made a peace that renders another war inevitable.’46
Likewise, Scott came to see the League of Nations as embodying the ideals set forth by
the Spanish scholastics. Writing in 1931, he claims that the thought of the Spanish scholastics
acted like a germ and ‘little by little the germ, like the grain of mustard seed, has grown
until the nations of the world can rest themselves under its ample branches and we find
ourselves living under the covenant of the League of Nations.’47 In so doing, Scott draws a
direct line of historical, organic growth between the ideals of the equality of nations and ‘the
inherent right of protecting itself . . . and punishing violations of the law of nations’ and their
embodiment in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Thus, the teachings of the Spanish
scholastics acted as the historical basis upon which the new international order rested.
Nowhere did Vitoria’s thought on war play a larger role than in modern theorists’ inter-
pretation of the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928.48 Central to this connection was the first canon
of Vitoria’s de jure belli, which held that ‘Assuming the prince has authority to make war, he
should first of all not go seeking occasions and causes of war, but should if possible live in
peace with all men.’ Vitoria goes on to note that ‘But only under compulsion and reluctantly
should he come to the necessity of war.’49 As one contemporary argued, ‘Compare the
principle of Vitoria’s first canon with that of the General Pact for the Renunciation of War.’
Using the language of the Kellogg-Briand pact, he asks, ‘What can his [Vitoria’s] words
mean if not that war is renounced “as an instrument of national policy” and that the settlement
of disputes “shall never be sought except by pacific means?”’50
Furthermore, after the signing of the Nuremberg Charter in 1945, theorists once again
took to Vitoria as the source of their legal theory.51 Writing in 1946, Wortley cites Scott’s
interpretation of Vitoria as providing content for a moral theory of international justice to
Journal of International Law 33(4)(1939), 665-688, p. 687.
45 Rossi, Broken Chain of Being, pp. 29, 34.
46 In del Moral, ‘Francisco De Vitoria’s Unexpected Transformations,’ p. 298. This report earned Scott a
hostile reception in Heidelberg in 1928 – his hosts spent over three hours demanding Scott recant the report.
See Finch, ‘James Brown Scott, 1866-1943,’ p. 213.
47 In Finch, ‘James Brown Scott, 1866-1943,’ p. 202.
48 McKenna, ‘Francisco De Vitoria: Father of International Law,’ p. 646.
49 In McKenna, ‘Francisco De Vitoria: Father of International Law,’ p. 646. Emphasis in McKenna’s translation.
50 McKenna, ‘Francisco De Vitoria: Father of International Law,’ p. 646.
51 Wortley, ‘Vitoria and International Law Today,’ pp. 374, 371.
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Truman’s words that ‘the world has experienced a revival of an old faith in the everlasting
formal force of justice.’ As Wortley explains, ‘Vitoria made it clear then that the laws of a
sovereign are of no avail if they transgress the fundamental human rights protected by the
law of nations. This is brought out by article 6c of the Charter of the Military Tribunal for
the trial of major war criminals of the European Powers.’52 The text of that article provides
that there is individual responsibility for ‘murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation
and other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war
. . . whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.’53 In
this passage, the Charter made reference to a type of moral natural law that existed above and
regardless of the law enacted by the state. This, in turn, declared universal applicability of
the propositions of natural law that extended to humanity as a whole. Wortley then connects
Vitoria with the Nuremberg tribunal, writing ‘those Vitoria calls the “magnates who are
admitted to the council of the Prince” are those indictable at Nuremberg’ under article 6A for
‘planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression.’54
In the aftermath of World War II, it was precisely this interpretation of Vitoria as the
liberal internationalist founder of modern international law which had gained traction through
the work of James Brown Scott and the collections published by the Carnegie Endowment for
international peace.55 By the time Carl Schmitt would have published his anonymous essay
on Vitoria in 1949, the Spanish Scholastic would have been synonymous with the formal
equality of states, the outlawing of war, and the limitation of state sovereignty. And Scott, the
six-time nominee for a Nobel Peace Prize, would have been widely known to international
lawyers as Vitoria’s messenger.56
Given Scott’s historiographical turn to the foundations of international law, it is possible
to read him as a distinctly American variant of the German Historische Rechtsschule of
Savigny and his disciples with his emphasis on the ‘organic’ and ‘progressive growth’ of the
law.57 After having completed his doctoral studies in Heidelberg under Georg Jellinek,58
Scott sought to trace the ‘growth of law as an outcome of American national spirit.’59 He
52 Wortley, ‘Vitoria and International Law Today,’ pp. 370-371.
53 Wortley, ‘Vitoria and International Law Today,’ p. 371.
54 Wortley, ‘Vitoria and International Law Today,’ p. 373.
55 Wortley, ‘Vitoria and International Law Today,’ p. 369.
56 del Moral, ‘Francisco De Vitoria’s Unexpected Transformations,’ p. 293.
57 Amorosa, ‘James Brown Scott’s International Adjudication,’ p. 27. See also del Moral, ‘Francisco De
Vitoria’s Unexpected Transformations,’ pp. 298-300; Hepp, ‘James Brown Scott and the Rise of Public
International Law,’ p. 162.
58 Hepp, ‘James Brown Scott and the Rise of Public International Law,’ p. 155; Wehberg, ‘Zum Gedanken an
James Brown Scott,’ p. 170.
59 Amorosa, ‘James Brown Scott’s International Adjudication,’ p. 27.
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found principles of universalism in the thought of Grover Cleveland, Abraham Lincoln,
and Francis Lieber,60 thereby giving a historical grounding to the liberal internationalist
aspirations during the interwar years. Indeed, Scott articulated a belief in the ‘unfolding telos
of history’ which would ultimately lead to
a single law, with a single and impersonal application in every one and all of the states
forming the international community, and the citizens or subjects of these states will
be co-terminous and identical with humanity, which always has, which is and ever
should be above and beyond any nation or any group of nations, however great, however
powerful, however civilized.61
For Scott, it was ultimately the American Volksgeist, echoing the internationalist impulses he
found in the work of the Spanish Scholastics, that would come to furnish the principles of a
new international community.
4.2 Carl Schmitt Goes to Salamanca
Carl Schmitt and James Brown Scott – diametrically opposed in their conception of the
international order – find a moment of unexpected convergence in the figure of Savigny.
There is, however, a crucial difference in how the two thinkers appropriate Savigny’s thought:
while Scott saw a ‘progressive growth’ of international law whereby its true principles would
raise to consciousness through a study of its foundations, Schmitt saw Savigny as rejecting
a rationalist development of law in favor of its historical contingency. As I have argued in
Chapter 2, Schmitt’s foreword to Der Nomos der Erde claims that it is Savigny’s concept
of historicity [Geschichtlichkeit] which ‘concerns the existential question of jurisprudence,
which today is being crushed between theology and technology if it does not claim the
ground of its own existence [Dasein] in a correctly recognized and fertile historicity.’62 Thus,
Schmitt’s stated self-understanding of the monograph is of entering into a conversation on
the history of the law of nations, with the intention of using historicity as a mechanism for
ensuring the survival of jurisprudence from the onslaught of both theology and technology.63
To do this, he will wage a historicist polemic against the interpretation of Vitoria offered by
60 James Brown Scott, ‘The American Conception of International Law,’ Proceedings of the American Society
of International Law 33 (1939), 1-11, pp. 7, 9,10.
61 In Amorosa, ‘James Brown Scott’s International Adjudication,’ p. 42.
62 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 6: ‘Es betrifft die Existenzfrage der Rechtswissenschaft selbst, die heute
zwischen Technologie und Technik zerrieben wird, wenn sie nicht in einer richtig erkannten und fruchtbar
gewordenen Geschichtlichkeit den Boden ihres eigenen Daseins behauptet.’
63 Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law as Political Theology: How to Read Nomos Der Erde?,’
Constellations 11(4) (2004), 492-511. For a discussion of technology in Schmitt’s larger oeuvre, see John
McCormick, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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James Brown Scott, arguing that Vitoria cannot be read outside of the nomos formed by the
Respublica Christiana.
Although Schmitt first published his commentary on Vitoria anonymously in the Catholic
Journal Die Neue Ordnung in 1949, his journal entries from the period reveal that he was
working an interpretation of Vitoria’s work from at least 1947 and possibly earlier.64 In
winding passages alternating between self-pity and vitriolic criticism, Schmitt identifies
Scott as the leading representative of an entire movement in the interwar years to bring
back Vitoria and just war theories to the law of nations. On 29 June 1948, copying the text
of a letter he wrote to Günther Krauss, Schmitt writes ‘in accordance with my experience
up to now, nine-tenths of all of that which is today written about Vitoria is an unabashed
hoax.’65 Schmitt dismisses these writings, as, ‘seen from a scholarly viewpoint, it is pure
trash and only the most wretched conformism [Mitläufertum]. Precisely in the booming
environment [Konjunktur] that James Brown Scott created. It is a great disgrace.’66 Schmitt’s
journal from the period thereby reveals Scott as the ideological enemy, the leader of an entire
body of scholarship that Schmitt dismisses as ‘wretched conformism.’ This provides the
first interpretation of Schmitt’s analysis of Vitoria as a corrective to the narrative offered by
liberal international lawyers of the interwar period in their reading of Vitoria as represented
by Scott.
However, Schmitt’s journal entries from the period reveal a second and more expansive
intention of his writing on Vitoria: to discredit the ‘beginning of the epoch of the law of
nations which orchestrated its four-year epiphany in October 1945 in Nuremberg.’67 In other
words, Schmitt sought to attack the foundations of the Versailles legal order through the
resuscitation of Vitoria’s teachings of just war and, in concreto, the Nuremberg tribunals,
for which the ‘Crown Jurist of the Third Reich’ was identified as a potential defendant. For
Schmitt, the ‘the birthday of the modern just war and the connection its particular type of
justice with weapons of mass destruction, its place of birth (the modern Bethlehem), where
the storm of steel is prepared’ – all of this Schmitt claims to have found in a letter from
64 Carl Schmitt, Glossarium. Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947 bis 1958, eds. Gerd Giesler & Martin Tielke
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2015), p. 19. The index of Glossarium incorrectly dates Schmitt’s first
discussion of Vitoria as 5.10.47.
65 On Krauss and Schmitt, see Mehring, Carl Schmitt, pp. 229, 362-365; Neumann, Carl Schmitt als Jurist, pp.
402, 412; Günther Krauss, ‘Erinnerungen an Carl Schmitt,’ Schmittiana 2 (1991), 73-101.
66 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 173. ‘Nach meinen bisherigen Erfahrungen ist neun Zehntel alles dessen, was heute
über Vitoria geschrieben wird, ein unverschämter Schwindel, wissenschaftlich gesehen reiner Schund und
nur elendestes Mitläufertum. Gerade in der Konjunktur, die James Brown Scott geschaffen hat. Es ist eine
große Schande.’
67 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 140. ‘Der Beginn der Epoche des Völkerrechts, die ihre 4jährige Epiphanie im
Oktober 1945 in Nürnberg organisiert hat’.
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Andrew Carnegie in December of 1910 addressed to the Trustees of the Carnegie foundation.
In it, Carnegie is quoted as saying, with Schmitt’s sardonic interjections in parentheses,
war is in its essence criminal (la guerre est essentiellement criminelle, so not just a war
of aggression!). “Why is it essentiellement criminelle?” Answer: Because it ensures its
success not through the law but rather through power. It is a crime (yet again something
new!) when a people declines arbitration proceedings. (There also the sentence: le juge
qui siège dans une cause où il est intéressé est discrédité jusqu’à sa mort.)68
And at the heart of this movement towards the criminalization of war stood the father of
the Vitorian Renaissance: Schmitt exclaims ‘the general secretary of this foundation for the
criminalization of war was James Brown Scott!’69 Thus, by attacking Scott’s interpretation
of Vitoria, Schmitt was simultaneously attacking the intellectual foundations of what he
had previously labelled the ‘discriminatory concept of war.’70 Put differently, the history of
legal and political thought, and specifically the interpretation Vitoria, provided the tools with
which Schmitt sought to discredit liberal internationalism and the discriminating concept of
war.
Schmitt’s journal entry on Carnegie, Scott, and Vitoria is couched in the language of
biblical allegory: ‘Here is the cradle of Fr. de Vitoria’s new fame, here is the source of the
new, modern teaching of just war, here in the steel mills of Bethlehem. Here the shepherds
were not singing.’71 It is precisely through this parallel to the birth of Jesus that Schmitt
connects his discussion of the interwar years with what seems to be his much deeper aim in
writing about Vitoria, namely to explain why Germany was defeated in the Second World
War: ‘Destruction of the Justus hostis from both sides, from Bethlehem as from Moscow; in
between, a German baboon’ – here, Schmitt means Hitler – ‘with injections from the West,
who believed himself able to wage a two-front war and two-types of war, namely in the west
a non-discriminatory and in the east a discriminating war.’72 In the process, Schmitt reveals
the United States as the modern Bethlehem, the birthplace of a concept of war that would
68 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 141. Schmitt’s translation of the Carnegie letter into Ger-
man substantially changes the text, accessible online through the Carnegie foundation at
http://carnegieendowment.org/about/pdfs/CarnegieLetter.pdf
69 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 186. ‘Und der Generalsekretär dieser Foundation zur Kriminalisierung dies Krieges
war James Brown Scott!’ Emphasis added.
70 Carl Schmitt, Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2007 [1938]).
71 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 141. ‘Hier steht die Wiege des neuen Ruhmes von Fr. de Vitoria. Hier ist die Quelle
der neuen, modernen Lehre vom gerechten Krieg, hier in den Stahlwerken von Bethlehem. Hier sangen nicht
die Hirten.’
72 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 187. ‘Vernichtung des justu hostis von beiden Seiten, von Bethlehem wie von
Moskau her; dazwischen ein deutscher Tölpel mit Injektionen vom Westen her, der glaubte, einen Zwei-
Fronten- und einen Zwei-Arten-Krieg führen zu können, nämlich nach Westen einen nicht-diskriminierenden
und nach Osten einen diskriminierenden Krieg.’
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ultimately check Hitler’s ability to maintain the so-called ‘Großdeutsches Reich.’
However, Schmitt did not acknowledge the link between Vitoria, Hitler, and the discrimi-
nating concept of war in his published work in 1949/50: as he wrote in a later journal entry
immediately before turning to a discussion of Vitoria, ‘non possum directe scribere de eo qui
potest directe proscribere.’73 His interpretation remained coded out of fear of retribution.
Instead, Schmitt begins his interpretation of Vitoria by describing the ‘overpainting’ that he
seeks to correct: a modern reader finds in the theologian ‘the first impression . . . of an extreme
impartiality, objectivity, and neutrality,’ the first demonstration of a truly ‘modern’ approach
to the study of the law of nations.74 Echoing the first proposition maintained by Scott, this
interpretation of Vitoria is owed, in the first instance, to his statements on the treatment of
Native Americans. By emphasizing that Native Americans, despite being barbarians, are
still humans and therefore still have a soul, Vitoria is positioned as a progressive scholar
in relation to his contemporary, Juan Gines Sepulveda.75 Particularly on the question of
land ownership – seminal to Schmitt’s understanding of the law of nations and his concept
of nomos – Sepulveda and Vitoria held diametrically opposing views: Sepulveda held that
barbarians could not hold a legal title to land while Vitoria is positioned as positing the
Native Americans as still retaining a minimal set of rights including land ownership given to
humans as such. As a result, Vitoria extends set of rights to the native inhabitants, claiming
the rulers of barbaric, non-Christian territories have just as much authority [Herrschafts-
gewalt, jurisdictio], and the native inhabitants have just as much possession of the land
[Eigentum am Boden, dominium] as the rulers and peoples of Christian territories have
of their land.76
The resulting picture is of a theorist of humanity and of the formal equality of nations who
73 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 280. ‘It is not possible for me to write directly about those who are able to directly
proscribe [to dictate death].’ As Zeitlin has shown, Schmitt used a version of this motto in a conversation
with Ernst Jünger to describe his situation in 1941 in the context of writing his Land und Meer. Jünger
recalls Schmitt saying ‘non possum scriber contra eum, qui potest proscribere,’ ostensibly lamenting Hitler’s
violation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. See Samuel Zeitlin, ‘Propaganda and Critique,’ in Land and Sea
(Candor, NY: Telos Press, 2015), p. xxxvii. Schmitt echoes the same line once again in his Ex Captivitate
Salus, writing in the context of arguing that intellectuals have no absolute duty to ‘become martyrs’ by
opposing the terror of political regimes. Writing in 1946, Schmitt meant more specifically that he had no
duty to oppose the National Socialist regime, so long as ‘no one from outside would protect him from the
terror on the inside.’ Carl Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002), pp. 20-21.
74 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 71. ‘Der erste Eindruck . . . ist der einer ganz außerordentlichen Unvorein-
genommenheit, Objektivität und Neutralität.’
75 In a journal entry from October 3, 1947, Schmitt compares himself with Sepulveda, and praises them both
for following the ‘inner force of your thoughts’ as opposed to merely trying to ‘become popular.’ Schmitt,
Glossarium, p. 19.
76 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 74. ‘Die Fürsten jener barbarischen, nicht-christlichen Länder haben
ebenso Herrschaftsgewalt (jurisdictio), und die eingeborenen Bewohner haben ebenso Eigentum am Boden
(dominium) wie die Fürsten und Völker christlicher Länder an ihrem Boden.’
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opposed the exploitation and misery inflicted by the Spanish Conquista through extending
equal protection under the law.
For Schmitt, however, this interpretation of Vitoria’s thought is dismissed as arising
from ‘superficiality [Oberflächlichkeit]’ for two reasons.77 The first deals with Vitoria as a
historical individual and his position within society: such a reading fails to capture Vitoria’s
‘existential position’ as a Spanish Dominican theologian.78 For Schmitt, this is an inseparable
part of Vitoria’s identity, as ‘Vitoria is a theologian, he does not want to be a jurist and he
even less wants to deliver arguments in the inter-state dispute of state governments’; instead,
‘the Spanish Dominican speaks as a spiritual advisor [Gewissensberater] and a teacher, who
trains future theologians and above all theological spiritual advisors for politically active
persons.’79 As a theologian – and not as a legal advisor to a secular, state authority – Schmitt
argues ‘we must see the Spanish Dominican in his historical situation and in his entire
existence, in his entire concrete thinking as an organ of the Roman Catholic Church, that
is to say, as an organ of the concrete authority in the law of nations.’80 In other words, it
is impossible to separate Vitoria’s arguments from his vocation as a Catholic theologian,
as he is first and foremost a faithful servant of the Church. As such, any interpretation of
Vitoria which portrays him as a secular theorist of modern international law fundamentally
misunderstands Vitoria’s position in society and therefore the intention and meaning of his
argument as well.
Secondly, Schmitt argues this reading is superficial because it fails to take into account
the ‘concrete historical problem’ which Vitoria was addressing, namely ‘the European land-
appropriation of the non-European New World, as justified by papal Missionsaufträge.’81 For
Schmitt, depicting Vitoria as a liberal international lawyer is only possible when a modern
reader abstracts Vitoria from the epoch of the Respublica Christiana, of the period in which
papal authority and stately power were deeply intertwined.82 Key to his reading of Vitoria is
77 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 77.
78 For Schmitt, the profession, nationality, and religious affiliation of an author are all essential components of
interpreting their work. See his treatment of Jean Bodin in Carl Schmitt, ‘Die Formung des französischen
Geistes durch den Legisten,’ in Staat, Großraum, Nomos, ed. Günter Maschke (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot,
1995), 184-217.
79 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 79. ‘Vitoria ist Theologe, er will kein Jurist sein, und noch weniger
will er im zwischenstaatlichen Streit der staatlichen Regierungen Argumente liefern.’; ‘Der spanische
Dominikaner spricht als ein Gewissensberater und ein Lehrer, der künftige Theologen, vor allem theologische
Gewissensbetrater von politisch handelnden Personen, erzieht.’
80 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 80. ‘Wir müssen auch den spanischen Dominikaner in seiner
geschichtlichen Situation und in seiner ganzen Existenz, in seinem ganz konkreten Denken als ein Or-
gan der römisch-katholischen Kirche, d.h. als ein Organ der konkreten völkerrechtlichen Autorität sehen.’
81 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 85. ‘von der durch päpstliche Missionsaufträge gerechtfertigten europäis-
chen Landnahme einer nicht-europäischen Neuen Welt.’
82 In a short essay published four years after Der Nomos der Erde titled ‘Der neue Nomos der Erde,’ Schmitt
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that the latter was not opposed to the Spanish Conquista in itself, but rather that discovery
and occupation could not provide a legal justification for land appropriation and because they
were concepts ‘entirely foreign to the Christian Middle Ages.’83 Instead, legal justification
could only be found in a theory of just war based on the papal authority to issue Missions-
und Kreuzzugsmandate to the secular authorities of Christian peoples. For Schmitt, the
Respublica Christiana – or, alternatively, the Populus Christianus – is the first distinct nomos,
characterized by a fundamental division between Christian and non-Christian peoples: ‘the
land of non-Christian, heathen peoples is Christian missionary territory’ and as a result,
‘[this land] can be granted to Christian rulers through papal order [Auftrag] for Christian
missions.’84 Instead of recognizing the equality of states, as James Brown Scott reads Vitoria,
Schmitt insists the scholastic maintained a distinction between Christian and non-Christian
peoples. Thus, Schmitt argues that secular power to appropriate land in this period was
derived from papal authority and thus belonged to one and the same unity, in which the Kaiser
and Pope, the Imperium and Sacerdotium could be integrated in ‘diversi ordi.’ This unity
represents the fundamental ordering principle in which to understand Vitoria’s contribution to
the law of nations: the authority of the pope to issue Missionsaufträge to secular authorities
as the legal title for land appropriation and for the bracketing of war within the Respublica
Christiana both constitute the fundamental characteristics of a distinct historical and spatial
order within the law of nations.
Schmitt’s two historicizing arguments – that Vitoria can only be understood as a Spanish
Dominican theologian in the context of the Respublica Christiana – are related to one another:
as a Dominican, Vitoria was a ‘protector and executor of the spiritual Missionsauftrag’ which
operated alongside secular colonial authorities under the broader conceptual framework of
the Respublica Christiana. Indeed, during this epoch, Schmitt argues that the supposed
conceptual opposition between ‘Kaiser and Pope, Reich and Church formed an inseparable
unity,’ complementing one another. Vitoria, as a Dominican, was bound to uphold this spatial
ordering and therefore could not have posited a different source of the legal title for land
appropriation using modern concepts such as occupation and discovery. Thus, Vitoria’s
texts are inextricable from the ‘concepts of spatial order of the Respublica Christiana of
changes his periodization of the epochs of the law of nations: the Respublica Christiana is collapsed into the
second and ‘Eurocentric Nomos of the Earth,’ which began with the discovery with America and extended
until the outbreak of the First World War. Carl Schmitt, ‘Der neue Nomos der Erde (1954),’ in Staat,
Großraum, Nomos, ed. Günter Maschke (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995), 518-22, p. 519.
83 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 36. ‘dem christlichen Mittelalter aber völlig fremd waren.’
84 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 27. Schmitt believes the emergence of this new nomos is due to a mixing
of Germanic tribes as land appropriators with Roman landowners. ‘Der Boden nicht-christlicher, heidnischer
Völker ist christliches Missionsgebiet; er kann einem christlichen Fürsten durch den päpstlichen Auftrag zur
christlischen Mission zugewiesen werden.’
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the Christian Middle Ages,’ which would only be superseded by the coming Jus publicum
europaeum of territorially sovereign nation-states.85 As such, Vitoria’s work is deeply
imbricated in the nomos in which he was writing, and a fundamental aspect of that nomos
was the distinction between Christian and non-Christian peoples.
In the second half of his chapter on Vitoria, Schmitt pivots towards the reception history
of Vitoria’s thought – or, as Schmitt refers to it, ‘the jurisprudential exploitation of [Vitoria’s]
oft-cited Relecciones, the interpretation of which has its own history’86 – in two distinct
periods: on the one hand, in the 17th and 18th centuries as exemplified by Hugo Grotius and
Christian Wolff; and on the other, in the period after 1918, based on the earlier reception of
Vitoria by Ernest Nys and James Lorimer and epitomized by the work of the American lawyer
James Brown Scott.87 Tracing this reception history, Schmitt argues that Vitoria’s thought has
been decontextualized and stripped of its meaning within the frame of his historical concrete
situation, and thereby exploited in the Versailles legal order to justify the turn towards a
discriminatory concept of war in the name of abstract humanity.
The first phase of the Vitoria reception is identified with the work of Hugo Grotius, who
Schmitt claims ‘entirely appropriated Vitoria’s argumentation of the libercum commercium
and of the Missionsfreiheit.’88 Schmitt charges Grotius with appropriating Vitoria’s Catholic
thought for Protestant purposes: Grotius attempts to repurpose the argument for the sake
of confessional politics. ‘A line of thought,’ Schmitt laments, ‘which a Spanish theologian
delivered as an thoroughly internal, Spanish-Catholic matter in the fixed frame of his reli-
gious order and of the political unity of the Spanish-Catholic Empire’ – in short, an idea
bounded by its specific historical context – ‘was used by a jurist from a polemical jurist of a
hostile territory for the battle of propaganda in a European trade war against Spain.’89 By
appropriating Vitoria’s argument for a Protestant purpose, Grotius is guilty of ‘neutralizing
the specifically Catholic character of Vitoria’s intentions’ and thereby sending the reception
of Vitoria’s ideas thereafter down the false path.90
85 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 82. See also Schmitt’s more esoteric text on the birth of the territorially
sovereign state, Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes (Köln: Hohenheim Verlag, 1982).
‘Eine Fortsetzung der Raumordnungsbegriffe der Respublica Christiana der christlichen Mittelalters.’
86 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 70. ‘Die rechtswissenschaftliche Verwertungen seiner vielgenannten
Relecciones, deren Interpretation ihre eigene Geschichte hat.’
87 Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Empire and International Law: the Real Spanish Contribution,’ University of
Toronto Law Journal 61(1) (2011), 1-36, p. 4.
88 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 86. Nys offers a similar genealogy in Ernest Nys, ‘Introduction,’ in De
Indis De Jure Belli (New York: Wildy & Sons Ltd., 1917), p. 5. ‘[er hat] Vitorias Argumentation des liberum
commercium und der Missionsfreiheit vollständig übernommen.’
89 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 86. Cf. Johannes Thumfart, ‘On Grotius’s Mare Liberum and Vitoria’s De
Indis, Following Agamben and Schmitt,’ Grotiana 30(1) (2009), 65-87.
90 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 86. ‘Die Verwertung der Argumente durch Protestanten neutralisierte den
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However, Schmitt sees the second reception period – referred to as a ‘Renaissance’ of
Vitoria’s thought – as a ‘particularly interesting phenomenon in the history of the law of
nations,’ namely the sudden popularity of the Spanish thinker over 300 years after his death:
Vitoria went from being described as a ‘precursor of Grotius’ to being ‘world-famous’ in
his own right.91 Schmitt credits this resurgence to the work of Ernest Nys, the Belgian
historian of the law of nations who ‘often encountered Vitoria in his legal historical research
into the law of nations of the Middle Ages and the 16th century’ and who published an
influential translation of Vitoria’s ‘de Indis et de jure Belli’ in 1917.92 In the introduction to
this translation, Nys claims that in Vitoria’s thought ‘were united the spirit of research and
of innovation, the tendency toward progress, the love of his neighbour, and the sentiment
of solidarity’ and in so doing, it ‘bore the imprint of moderation and humanity.’93 In
Nys’ interpretation, ‘Vitoria repudiates all theories, based on the alleged superiority of the
Christians, or on their right to punish idolatry or on the mission which might have been given
them to propagate the true religion.’94
In presenting Vitoria as a humanitarian and seeking to resurrect his thought in the
modern context, Nys both systematically removes the distinction between Christian and
non-Christian peoples in his reconstruction of Vitoria and pivots towards what Schmitt labels
‘a discriminatory concept of war.’95 Here, Nys claims that for Vitoria, there is only one just
cause of war – that is, ‘the injury suffered . . . serious and atrocious ills, such as death, burning,
devastation, must have been inflicted.’ In other words, one can only wage a defensive war,
or retaliate for a wrong suffered. Once one has broken the peace, however, Nys’ version of
Vitoria holds that ‘it is lawful to go even further to bring about peace and security,’ and that
‘the victor may exact vengeance for the wrong done to him and may punish his enemy.’96 The
resulting vision is one in which war itself has been outlawed, as all transgressions, all acts of
aggression are causes of injury and thus give just cause of war to the victim. For Schmitt,
this interpretation of Vitoria is only possible when one replaces the division of Christian and
spezifisch katholischen Charakter der Intentionen Vitorias.’
91 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 87. Schmitt attributes this view to the ‘great authors of the 19th century,
such as Kaltenborn and Rivier’; however, it is still present in the last paragraph of Nys’ introduction to
‘De Indis et De Jure Belli’ where he writes ‘we have tried to relate the life and activity of one of the great
precursors of Hugo Grotius.’ See Nys, ‘Introduction,’ p. 27.
92 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, pp. 87-88.
93 Nys, ‘Introduction,’ p. 9.
94 Nys, ‘Introduction,’ p. 19.
95 In an earlier text, Schmitt argues that the theory of just war from the Scholastics had been employed by
Woodrow Wilson to justify a ‘crusade’ [Kreuzzug] against Germany. In the same text, Schmitt claims that
the National Socialist jurist Norbert Gürke has provided an acceptable interpretation of just war based on the
concept of ‘gerechter Lebensausgleich,’ which is in turn citing Schmitt’s Concept of the Political. Schmitt,
Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff, p. 8.
96 Nys, ‘Introduction,’ p. 24.
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non-Christian peoples with an abstract notion of humanity; in short, it is only possible when
one ignores the historical context of the Respublica Christiana.
From there, Schmitt argues that Nys’ misinterpretation of Vitoria – based on his faith in
‘humanitarian civilization and progress’ – is extended and popularized through the work of
James Brown Scott, whom he describes as a ‘Zealous Präkonisator’ of Vitoria’s thought.
Earlier in the text, Schmitt explicitly equates this ‘exploitation’ [Verwertung] of Vitoria with
‘the theorists of the Geneva League of Nations,’ which is in turn linked to a series of Scott’s
publications in the interwar years as well as the work of German pacifists such as Walther
Schücking and Hans Wehberg.97 In Vitoria, Scott claimed to find an antidote to catastrophic
spectre of war after 1919, namely through Vitoria’s doctrine of ‘free commerce (liberum
commercium), of free propaganda, and of just war.’98 In particular, Schmitt castigates Scott
for attempting to banish war as a legally recognized instrument and maintaining instead that
‘there should once again be just war, in which the attacker, the aggressor, is declared as such a
criminal [Verbrecher] in the full, criminal sense of the word.’99 As a result, Vitoria’s thought –
written in the context of the Respublica Christiana – is thus repackaged and deployed against
the concept of war established and stabilized under the jus publicum europeaum. In so doing,
Schmitt is engaged in challenging the second proposition found in the work of Vitoria, that
force could only be used to redress a wrong.
Schmitt once again criticizes James Brown Scott for his exploitation of Vitoria, as
Scott confuses the two epochs’ understanding of ‘just’ in the just war tradition, as ‘both
concepts of just have entirely different formal structures.’100 This criticism similarly turns
on historicizing Vitoria’s thought. Under the interpretation of the Respublica Christiana,
‘crusades and missionary wars were, without difference of attacking or defending, eo ipso
just wars.’ Furthermore, ‘rulers and peoples, which persistently removed themselves from
the authority of the church, such as Jews and Saracen were eo ipso hostes perpetui. This
all assumes the international legal authority of a potestas spiritualis.’101 Thus, a war is
97 Cf. Richard Tuck’s claim that ‘The scholars funded by the Carnegie endowment from the time of the First
World War onwards, working under the influence of James Brown Scott, left us with a very misleading
picture of the pre-Grotian ideas about the laws of war and peace.’ Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and
Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 11.
98 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 89. ‘Vom freien Verkehr, von der freien Propaganda und vom gerechten
Krieg.’
99 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 89. In the original text, ‘aggressor’ is not capitalized despite being a noun,
likely to indicate the Anglo-American use of this term in the Versailles order as opposed to the German word
‘Aggressor.’ ‘Es soll wieder ein gerechter Krieg werden, indem der Angreifer, der aggressor, als solcher zum
Verbrecher im vollen, kriminellen Sinn des Wortes erklärt wird.’
100Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 90. ‘Die beiden Gerechtigkeitsbegriffe haben demnach eine völlig
verschiedene formale Struktur.’ Emphasis in original.
101Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 90. ‘Fürsten und Völker, die sich der Autorität der Kirche hartnäckig
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considered justified if it has just cause, as determined by the spiritual authority of the Roman
Catholic Church; this theory has no role for concepts of aggression or hostility, as the justness
of a war can only be derived on the basis of papal declaration.
In contrast, Schmitt argues that the jus publicum europaeum ‘repressed’ the theory of
justa causa and its reliance on papal authority to reflect the changing role of the state as a
sovereign territorial unit. Rejecting the ultimate authority of the Roman Catholic Church,
the jus publicum europaeum instead posited the equal sovereignty of states and shifted from
justa causa to justis hostis: as the legalization of a non-discriminatory form of war between
equals.102 This transition is credited with ‘bracketing’ the effects of war, as well as a ‘doubled
separation’ between the law of nations in the Middle Ages and the Modern period: on the one
hand, ‘in the final removal of moral-theological-churchly argumentation from juridical-stately
argumentation,’ and, on the other hand, in the ‘separation of natural law and moral question
of the justa causa from the typically juridical-formal question of the justus hostis, which is
differentiated from the criminal, that is, from the object of punitive action.’103 It is precisely
this transition that allowed Alberico Gentili to declare ‘Silete theologi in munere alieno!’104
Despite the repression of the doctrine of justa causa and the separation of moral-
theological arguments for juridical-stately arguments, Schmitt argues that Scott resurrects
Vitoria’s teachings and presents them in a chimerical form. As a result of Scott’s exploitation
of the Spanish Scholastics, ‘the injustice of aggression and of the aggressor lies not in a
materially or neutrally identifiable guilt [Schuld] for war in the sense of the cause of war
[Kriegsursache]’ but instead ‘in the crime de l’attaque, in aggression as such.’105 What
Scott presents as a return to a previous position held in the history of political thought is in
fact a decontextualized and therefore fundamentally altered position; while maintaining the
same conceptual vocabulary of enemy, war, and justice, these terms have been given a new
meaning in the new spatial configuration of the earth. While Vitoria ‘never once . . . denied a
non-Christian opponent of a Christian the designation of justus hostis,’ the function of the
modern understanding of just and unjust war is precisely to discriminate against the enemy,
entzogen, wie Juden und Sarazenen, waren eo ipso hostes perpetui. Alles das setzte die völkerrechtliche
Autorität einer potestas spiritualis voraus.’ Emphasis in original.
102Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 91.
103Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 91. ‘in der endgültigen Ablösung der moraltheologisch-kirchlichen von
der juristisch-staatlichen Argumentation . . . Ablösung der naturrechtlichen und moralischen Frage der justus
hostis, der vom Verbrecher, d.h. von dem Objekt einer punitiven Aktion, unterschieden wird.’
104Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 92. Gentili’s quip is repeated again four pages later as marking ‘the
beginning of the new European law of nations.’
105Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 92. Emphasis in original. ‘Doch soll das Unrecht der Aggression
und des Aggressors nicht in einer materiell und sachlich festzustellenden Schuld am Kriege im Sinne der
Kriegsursache liegen, sondern im crime de l’attaque, in der Aggression als solcher.’
110 On the Use and Abuse of Francisco de Vitoria: James Brown Scott and Carl Schmitt
to declare him a ‘criminal’ and thus to justify using police-like measures against him.106
As a result, ‘war is eliminated, but only because enemies no longer mutually recognize one
another as on the same moral and juridical levels. This may be a return to an older position;
in some ways, it is also the return from a juridically thought concept of justus hostis to a
quasi-theological conception of the enemy.’ However, it is also ‘the opposite of that position,
which extended to the extreme, of a non-discriminating reciprocity, which emerged with
Vitoria in such a strong and Christian way.’107 Thus, for Schmitt, the Vitorian Renaissance
and the attempt to use his Catholic theological line of argumentation to resurrect the classical
justa causa in fact leads to a set of positions diametrically opposed to those actually held by
Vitoria.
In turning to the scholastic origins of the law of nations, Schmitt’s concern was not only
with the content of Vitoria’s arguments read in light of his historical (Spanish Conquista)
and discursive (debate with Sepulveda) context, but also to challenge the reception of these
ideas in fundamentally different epochs in the history of the law of nations. For Schmitt,
the stakes of challenging this interpretation is nothing less than combatting the justification
of the modern means to annihilation through the use of Vitoria’s teachings. For with the
discriminating concept of war came an answer to Vitoria’s question ‘how much is permitted in
just war?’ To this, jurists after Versailles can only give one answer: ‘Everything is permitted
in just war!’108 For Schmitt, what is at stake in the interpretation of Vitoria is more than
academic – it is about survival.
4.3 Writing the Origins of International Law
Near seventy years after the publication of James Brown Scott’s The Spanish Origin of
International Law, contemporary scholars are once again engaged in a debate over the origins
of international law as a discipline and the role ascribed to Vitoria within that narrative.109
106Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 95.
107Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 95. ‘Der Krieg ist abgeschafft, aber nur deshalb, weil die Feinde sich
gegenseitig nicht mehr auf der gleichen moralischen und juristischen Ebene anerkennen. Das mag eine
Rückkehr zu einem älteren Standpunkt sein; in mancher Hinsicht ist es auch die Rückkehr von einem
juristisch gedachten justus-hostis-Begriff zu einem quasi-theologischen Feindbegriff’; ‘[es ist] das Gegenteil
der bis zum äußersten gehenden Haltung einer nicht-diskriminierenden Reziprozität, die bei Vitoria so stark
und christlich hervortritt.’
108Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 299. ‘Tantum licet in bello justo!’
109See Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Vitoria
and Us,’ Rechtsgeschichte 22 (2014), 119-138; Martti Koskenniemi ‘Histories of International Law: Dealing
with Eurocentrism,’ Rechtsgeschichte 19 (2011), 152-176, p. 175. Most recently, Paolo Amorosa, Rewriting
the History of the Law of Nations: How James Brown Scott made Francisco de Vitoria the Founder of
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Echoing the debate between Scott and Schmitt, this contemporary iteration is as much
about the Spanish Scholastic himself as it is about methodology, context, and anachronism.
As Martti Koskenniemi framed the issue in an article on ‘Vitoria and Us,’ ‘How to write
(international) legal histories that would be true to their protagonists while simultaneously
relevant to present audiences?’110 For Anne Orford, the pursuit of contemporary relevance
means engaging in anachronism – or, at the very least, rejecting the ‘policing of anachronism’
– for the sake of postcolonial critique,111 while others such as Andrew Fitzmaurice and Lauren
Benton have defended a more historical approach.112 This debate forms the mirror image of
the debate between Scott and Schmitt: instead of asserting the timeless validity of Vitoria’s
teachings against historicism for the sake of uncovering the true principles of international
law, Orford and others have sought to deconstruct the bulwark of context in order to open an
avenue for critique.
At the centre of Schmitt’s polemic against James Brown Scott are two diametrically
opposed visions of how the history of the law of nations should be written, as well as
the purpose of such a history for the present. For Scott, a return to Francisco de Vitoria
meant a return to the true law of nations, unfiltered through centuries of interpretation
and commentary. Indeed, the Asociación Francisco de Vitoria established an international
community of scholars united in their belief that Vitoria’s work could illuminate the forgotten
foundations of the law of nations. In the face of the unprecedented destruction of the Great
War, Vitoria symbolized the ‘voice of humanity,’ an ideal to which James Brown Scott
and his contemporaries aspired.113 Instead of grounding international law on treaties or
conventions, Vitoria’s moral teachings would provide a set of objectively true principles
for international conduct.114 Thus, in this interwar vision of international law, its origins in
Spanish Scholasticism were to serve as its future.
In contrast, Carl Schmitt insisted on a radical historicity [Geschichtlichkeit] encapsulated
in his theory of the nomos – Vitoria’s contribution to the law of nations was only intel-
ligible within the context of the Respublica Christiana and its corresponding conception
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
110Koskenniemi, ‘Vitoria and Us,’ p. 118.
111Anne Orford, ‘On International Legal Method,’ London Review of International Law 1(1) (2013), 166-197,
pp. 170-177; Anne Orford, ‘International Law and the Limits of History,’ in The Law of International
Lawyers: Reading Martti Koskenniemi, eds. Wouter Werner, Marieke de Hoon, Alexis Galan (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 297-320, p. 301.
112Andrew Fitzmaurice, ‘Context in the History of International Law,’ Journal of the History of International
Law 20 (2018), 5-30; Lauren Benton, ‘Beyond Anachronism: Histories of International Law and Global
Legal Politics,’ Journal of the History of International Law 21 (2019), 1-34.
113Scott, ‘Asociación Francisco De Vitoria,’ p. 138.
114Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law, pp. 11a-12a.
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of a spatial ordering of the world. Schmitt’s historicism functioned both as a criticism of
previous attempts to construct a liberal history of the law of nations as well as a criticism of
contemporary doctrines of just war theory that relied on an ahistorical reading of the Spanish
Scholastic. James Brown Scott became the focus of Schmitt’s critique precisely because he,
more than any other theorist in the interwar period, mobilized a liberal history of the law
of nations to ground a corresponding liberal theory of just war, one which would animate
discussions pertaining to the Treaty of Versailles and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
Indeed, Schmitt’s intervention posits an explicit link between the methodology used in
writing a history of the law of nations and the political character of the lessons that result from
it. Schmitt’s method in analysing Vitoria demands that the historian of the law of nations
ask against whom legal concepts are targeted. In that sense, he carries forward his famous
dictum of The Concept of the Political, that ‘all political concepts, images, and terms have a
polemical meaning. They are focused on a specific antagonism [Gegensätzlichkeit] and are
bound to a concrete situation.’115 For Schmitt, the failure to identify the polemical target of a
concept is itself an ideological deception of liberalism. And James Brown Scott, precisely in
his invocation of Vitoria as the ‘voice of humanity,’ is revealed as a great deceiver: ‘he who
says humanity wants to deceive.’116
115Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen. Synoptische Darstellung der Texte, ed. Marco Walter (Berlin:
Duncker & Humblot, 2018), p. 92. ‘Erstens haben alle politischen Begriffe, Vorstellungen und Worte einen
polemischen Sinn; sie haben eine konkrete Gegensätzlichkeit im Auge, sind an eine konkrete Situation
gebunden.’ Emphasis in original.
116Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, p. 55. ‘Wer Menschheit sagt, will betrügen.’
Chapter 5
Schmitt’s Socialisms
Speaking shortly before the end of his life in 1987, Jacob Taubes, the West German philoso-
pher, rabbi, and scholar of Judaism, recounted discovering a letter from the late Walter
Benjamin addressed to Carl Schmitt. The letter from December 1930, which described
Benjamin’s intellectual ‘indebtedness’ to Schmitt’s early Weimar writings, particularly Die
Diktatur, was however nowhere to be found in the first edition of Benjamin’s published
correspondence, published under the editorship of Theodor Adorno and Gershom Sholem
in 1966. When Taubes confronted Adorno over the letter’s exclusion, the latter reportedly
responded ‘A letter like that doesn’t exist.’1 The omission was likely intended to limit Schmitt
– persona non grata and ‘dangerous mind’ of the Federal Republic – from contaminating
one of the seminal figures of the Frankfurt School at the very moment in which Adorno and
Sholem were trying to cement his legacy.2 As Taubes would phrase it, the letter was a ‘mine’
that could ‘disrupt our conception of the intellectual history of the Weimar Period’: the saga
perhaps says more about the insecurities of the post-war German left and Schmitt’s odious
reputation than it does to explain how Schmitt himself conceived of Marxist theory and his
intellectual relationship to it.3
Writing on the relationship between Carl Schmitt and Marxism could take one of two
1 Jacob Taubes, Die politische Theologie Paulus (Berlin: Wilhelm Fink, 2003), p. 98. See as well Marc de
Wilfe, ‘Meeting Opposites: The Political Theologies of Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt,’ Philosophy
& Rhetoric 44(4) (2011), 363-381; Samuel Weber, ‘Taking Exception to the Decision: Walter Benjamin
and Carl Schmitt,’ Diacritics 22(3/4) (1992), 5-18; Horst Bredekamp, ‘Walter Benjamin’s Esteem for Carl
Schmitt,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt, 678-704. On Schmitt and Taubes, see Samuel Garrett
Zeitlin, ‘Interpretation and Critique: Jacob Taubes, Julien Freund, and the Interpretation of Hobbes,’ in Telos
181 (2017), 9-39; Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, pp. 477, 555, 571-573; Jamie Martin, ‘Liberalism and History
after the Second World War: The Case of Jacob Taubes,’ Modern Intellectual History 14(1) (2014), 131-152.
2 Jan Werner Müller, A Dangerous Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).
3 Quoted in Bredekamp, ‘Walter Benjamin’s Esteem for Carl Schmitt,’ p. 682.
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approaches. The first would be biographical: a reconstruction of Schmitt’s decades-long
personal interactions and exchanges with a laundry list of eminent Marxist theorists such as
Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, Alexandre Kojeve, and Georg Lukacs.4 The nature of
these relationships could then reveal Schmitt’s broader attitude towards Marxism. As the
conservative German historian Ernst Nolte quipped, ‘if Schmitt saw in Marxism the enemy,
then this enmity must have been of a very special type if it did not exclude such personal
and business-like relationships with so many and such important Marxists.’5 It would thus
seem exceedingly odd that Schmitt would have taken on so many Marxist students in the
Weimar Republic and, decades later, would participate in a cordial radio interview with the
self-described West German Maoist Joachim Schickel in 1969.6 However, Nolte’s analysis
confuses hostis and inimicus within Schmitt’s Friend/Enemy distinction – personal relations
(inimicus) are not the subject of enmity as a specifically public category (hostis) but rather a
type of antagonism.7 The fact that Schmitt had such relationships with Marxists should not be
taken as a definitive indicator of his analysis of Marxist ideology itself as a theoretical body
of thought – merely that, excluding the period between 1933 and 1945, Schmitt maintained a
wide network of academic contacts that also included Marxists.
Instead, this chapter follows the historical approach outlined in chapter two of this
dissertation by focusing on what Schmitt actually wrote in published and unpublished texts.
More than his personal relationships, it is what Schmitt committed to paper that counts for
reconstructing his view of Marxism. To do so, I consider Marxism in the broadest sense:
not only Schmitt’s commentary on Marx and Engels, but also influential contemporaries
such Vladimir Lenin, as well as the manifestation of Marxism in the Soviet Union as a
political entity in international politics. While a contemporary historian would note there are
significant theoretical distinctions among the varieties of Marxist thought, this chapter follows
Schmitt’s own practice of considering these varieties as part of a coherent whole. Indeed, for
Schmitt, any internal Marxist debates over revolutionary strategy are subordinated to ‘the
social question,’ the defining feature of Marxist thought. Admittedly, Schmitt’s writings on
4 See for example Ellen Kennedy, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School,’ Telos 71 (1987), 37-66; Martin
Jay, ’Reconciling the Irreconcilable? Rejoinder to Kennedy,’ Telos 71(1987), 67-80; William Scheuerman,
Between the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1997); Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, pp. 197, 202, 222, 229, 271, 313-316, 380, 493, 514-515, 527.
5 Ernst Nolte, ‘Carl Schmitt und der Marxismus,’ Der Staat 44(2) (2005),187-211, p. 191. Nolte’s account of
Schmitt’s friendship with Marxists appears over-exaggerated, listing for example his relationship with Ernst
Bloch. However, in Glossarium, Schmitt describes Bloch representative of the ‘stultification of emigres’ and
the ‘poor Jews . . . who don’t want to be Zionists’ – hardly the description of a friend. See Glossarium, p.
234.
6 See Carl Schmitt and Joachim Schickel, ‘Dialogue on the Partisan, 1969’ in Carl Schmitt, The Tyranny of
Values and Other Texts, trans. Samuel Garrett Zeitlin (New York: Telos, 2018), p. 175.
7 Schmitt, Begriff des Politischen. Synoptische Darstellung, pp. 84-91.
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Marxism are rather scarce given the historical context of his writings: the Russian Revolution
of 1917, the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) in the Weimar Republic, the
Soviet Union, the Cold War, and the German Democratic Republic. However, part of this
relative neglect is itself a function to Schmitt’s biographical circumstances. The Treaty of
Versailles, the Rhineland Occupation, the Morgenthau Plan and the Nuremberg Tribunals – in
each of these cases, Schmitt felt himself (and the German state) to be the victim of Western
liberalism and not Eastern bolshevism.
Relative neglect towards Marxism, however, does not mean, as James Furner has claimed,
that after 1931, ‘Schmitt writes relatively little on Marxism until The Theory of the Partisan’
in 1963.8 Rather, many of Schmitt’s essays and journal entries from the period deal explicitly
with Marxist theory and Schmitt had a much more sustained commentary than has been
previously acknowledged. Focusing on this engagement yields three conclusions: first, using
Lenin as his primary example, Schmitt viewed Marxism as the ideology that most thoroughly
comprehended – and exploited – the bifurcation between legality and legitimacy, with the
Bolsheviks pursuing a two-track strategy in both parliamentary and revolutionary politics.
Lenin’s understanding of revolutionary legitimacy was based on the promise of a better
future, one that could only be achieved by using violence and revolution to remove any
obstacles to the progression towards a pre-established telos to history. Second, Marxism
can be articulated within the tripartite definition of nomos as seeking to find in division and
distribution [teilen] the answer to challenges of both appropriation [nehmen] and production
[weiden]. However, as Schmitt argues, a nomos free of appropriation is merely a mirage:
the necessity of ‘expropriating the expropriators’ reveals Marxism to be just as reliant upon
an originary act of appropriation as Western liberalism.9 The chapter concludes with a
discussion of Bolshevism as the intellectual successor to Western liberalism, showing that
Schmitt viewed both parties of the bi-polar world of the Cold War as in fact unified in their
approach towards the philosophy of history.
5.1 Legality and Legitimacy Redux: Marxist Revolution-
ary Strategy
During Schmitt’s incarceration at Nuremberg, the assistant US chief counsel and interrogator,
Robert Kempner, requested the former Prussian State Councillor provide a written answer
8 James Furner, ‘Carl Schmitt’s “Hegel and Marx,”’ Historical Materialism 22(3/4), 371-387, p. 373.
9 Karl Marx, Capital Vol. I (London: Penguin, 1990), Ch. 32: The Historical Tendencies of Capital
Accumulation.
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to the following question: ‘Why did the State Secretaries follow Hitler?’ In his response,
submitted to Kempner on 13. May, 1947 and republished with minor alterations in the
Catholic journal Die Neue Ordnung in 1950, Schmitt focused on ‘the problem of legality’ –
namely that ‘Hitler’s seizure of power was not illegal in the eyes of the German bureaucracy,’
as the Enabling Act [Ermächtigungsgesetz] of 24. March, 1933 had effectively given Hitler a
legal carte blanche: Article 1 allowed for laws to be enacted by the government as opposed to
the Reichstag.10 For Schmitt, the German bureaucracy followed Hitler after the Enabling Act
precisely because ‘Hitler’s power was, for every positivist conception of legality, more than
just itself legal, it was also the source of all positive legality [positiv-rechtlichen Legalität].’11
In effect, Hitler was able to come to power and command the state bureaucracy by maintaining
the appearance of acting in accordance with the procedural boundaries of the law, which
was why Hitler would ensure the Enabling Act was renewed in 1937 and 1941, well after
Hitler had consolidated power.12 Although the legal validity of the Enabling Act would be
subsequently challenged by figures such as Franz Neumann on the grounds that KDP deputies
were arbitrarily detained and thus could not oppose the bill, the act nevertheless offered the
pretense of legality.13 The acceptance of such a view was only possible, in Schmitt’s analysis,
as a result of the triumph of legal positivism, as ‘the transformation of right into legality is a
consequence of positivism.’14
While Schmitt did seek to pin the blame for Hitler’s rise to power on legal positivism and
its transformation of legality into the sole source of legitimacy, Schmitt indicted Marxism
as a precursor in the weaponization of legality for political ends, arguing that Hitler had
merely made use of the weapons crafted by Marxist revolutionaries.15 Schmitt places Lenin
at the center of his narrative, crediting him with ‘proclaiming with great pungency’ the
transformation of ‘legality into a weapon of civil war’: Lenin’s ‘Left Wing’ Communism:
10 Richard Evans, The Third Reich in Power, 1933-1939 (London: Penguin, 2006). On the Ermächtigungsgesetz,
see Michael Stolleis, Die Geschichte des Öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland, Bd. III (Munich: C.H. Beck,
2002), pp. 316-7, 320, 326; and Michael Stolleis, Recht im Unrecht (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1994), pp. 8, 19.
11 Schmitt, ‘Das Problem der Legalität,’ p. 442. Emphasis added. ‘Damit nämlich war Hitlers Macht für
jede positivistische Legalitätsvorstellung noch weit mehr als nur selber legal, sie war auch die Quelle aller
positiv-rechtlichen Legalität.’
12 Stolleis, Die Geschichte des Öffentlichen Rechts, p. 317.
13 Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2009),
pp. 51-54.
14 Schmitt, ‘Das Problem der Legalität,’ p. 447. See also Chapter 2 of this thesis on Schmitt’s account of
the historical rise of legal positivism. One ought to note as well that, in 1933, Schmitt himself thought the
Ermächtigungsgesetz had invalidated the Weimar Constitution. See Carl Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk
(Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1933), p. 5. ‘Diese Verwandlung des Rechts in Legalität ist eine
Konsequenz des Positivismus.’
15 Schmitt, ‘Das Problem der Legalität,’ p. 450. On Schmitt’s critique of Kelsenian legal formalism, see
McCormick, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, pp. 213-223.
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An Infantile Disorder (1920) had made ‘every consideration of the problem of legality
without awareness of this text seem anachronistic.’16 In this text, written after the Russian
Revolution, Lenin polemicized against the ‘Dutch-left’ arguments of Herman Gorter and
Antonie Pannekoek for refusing to participate in a ‘bourgeois’ parliament.17 For Lenin,
these theorists had mistaken their ‘desire’ to see parliaments become ‘politically obsolete’
with the ‘objective reality’ of the political situation: parliament still existed and could be
mobilized for counter-revolutionary purposes if revolutionaries did not challenge it from
within. Thus, Lenin argued for a two-fold strategy of a ‘combination of mass action outside a
reactionary parliament with an opposition sympathetic to (or, better still, directly supporting)
the revolution within it.’18 In other words, legal means should be used alongside illegal
means to further the cause of the revolution.
In terms of revolutionary tactics, Lenin dismissed the demands of the ‘infantile left’ as
akin to ‘any army which does not train to use all the weapons, all the means and methods of
warfare that the enemy possesses, or may possess,’ which would be either ‘an unwise or even
criminal manner’ of preparation for war. Moreover, ‘this applies to politics even more than it
does to the art of war,’ as the revolutionary cannot predict which form of resistance he will
encounter from reactionary forces. At the same time that Lenin criticized the ‘left-socialists’
for refusing to engage in parliamentary politics, he simultaneously objected to the social
democratic abstention from illegal means of obtaining power – faith in mass democracy alone
would not would not achieve socialist ends. Instead, revolutionary proletariat parties ought to
mimic the Bolscheviks’ strategy for success.19 Indeed, if one were to follow Georg Lukács,
it was Lenin’s willingness to compromise that formed a type of ’revolutionary realpolitik’
which sought the ‘final elimination of all utopianism’ in Marxist theory.20 Schmitt perceives
precisely this element of Lenin’s text as marking a transformation in the weaponization of
legality, quoting Lenin’s conclusion that ‘Revolutionaries who do not understand combining
illegal means of struggle with all (underlined by Lenin himself) legal forms are extremely
bad revolutionaries.’ 21 For Schmitt, the basic lesson of Lenin’s writings is that ‘the goal
16 Schmitt, ‘Das Problem der Legalität,’ p. 447. ‘Die Verwandlung der Legalität in eine Waffe des Bürg-
erkrieges’;‘Jede Erörterung des Legalitätsproblems ohne Kenntnis dieser Schrift [wirkt] anachronistisch.’
17 On Dutch left wing communism, and Lenin’s criticisms, see Philippe Bourrinet, The Dutch and the German
Communist Left, 1900-1968 (London: Brill, 2017), pp. 3-5.
18 Lenin, Infantile Disorder, Ch. 8.
19 Lenin, Infantile Disorder, ’Several Conclusions.’ See also Neil Harding, Lenin’s Political Thought Volume 2
(London: Macmillan Press, 1981), pp. 241-3; James White, Lenin: The Practice and Theory of Revolution
(London: Palgrave, 2001), p. 161.
20 Lukács, Lenin, pp. 74, 82. On Schmitt and Lukács, see John McCormick, ‘Transcending Weber’s Categories
of Modernity? The Early Lukács and Schmitt on the Rationalization Thesis,’ New German Critique 75
(1998), 133-77. See as well the following chapter of this thesis.
21 Schmitt, ‘Das Problem der Legalität,’ p. 447. Emphasis in original. ‘Revolutionäre, die es nicht verstehen,
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is a communist revolution in all the countries of the world; whatever serves this goal is
good and just.’22 As he had phrased it in Die Diktatur, it is clear from the answers to
Kautsky’s ‘Terrorism and Communism’ that Lenin and Trotsky both view democratic politics
‘as the relation between legality and illegality, that is they they must be answered differently
according to the specific country, and are only a moment in the strategic and tactical measures
of the communist plan.’23
Schmitt’s postwar discussion of ‘The Problem of Legality,’ which contains the above
analysis of Lenin, builds upon his Weimar text Legalität und Legitimität, written in 1932
in advance of the Preußenschlag.24 In this text, Schmitt set out legality and legitimacy as
two opposing categories, modifying Max Weber’s construction of legality as a sub-category
of legitimacy. As Weber had argued, ‘today, the most common form of legitimacy is the
faith in legality.’25 For Schmitt, the rise of parliamentarism coincided with the foreclosure of
extra-legal sources of legitimacy, intended to suppress ‘radical and revolutionary’ movements;
instead, there would be a ‘legal path and process’ for these movements to gain power paired
with a guarantee of political neutrality.26 In the Weimar Republic, this was manifested in
the ‘liberal principle of absolute non-intervention,’ of granting an ‘equal chance’ to political
parties to form a governing majority in the parliament even if these parties were openly
hostile to the constitution itself.27 Legal positivism in Weimar had, in Schmitt’s retrospective
afterword, ‘declined to inquire as to the friend and enemy of the constitution’ by granting all
parties an equal chance.28
Marxist revolutionaries, however, did not play by the rules of legal positivism. In Critique
of the Gotha Programme (1891), Marx had argued that ‘law can never be higher than the
die illegalen Kampfformen mit allen (von Lenin selbst unterstrichen) legal zu verbinden, sind äußerst
schlechte Revolutionäre.’
22 Carl Schmitt, Theorie des Partisanen (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963), pp. 54-55. Emphasis added.
23 Schmitt Die Diktatur, p. xiv. ‘Daß diese Frage, wie jede andere, namentlich auch die von Legalität und
Illegalität, nach den Verhältnissen des einzelnen Landes verschieden beantwortet werden muß und nur ein
Moment in den strategischen und taktischen Maßnahmen des kommunistischen Planes ist.’
24 McCormick, ‘Identifying or Exploiting the Paradoxes of Constitutional Democracy?’ p. xix. On Schmitt’s
role in the Preußenschlag, see Kennedy, Constitutional Failure, pp. 13, 165-166; David Dyzenhaus, ‘Legal
theory in the Collapse of Weimar: Contemporary Lessons?,’ American Political Science Review 91(1) (1997),
121-134; Mehring, Carl Schmitt, pp. 289-290, 320-321.
25 Max Weber, quoted in Schmitt, Legalität und Legitimität, p. 269; McCormick, ‘Identifying or Exploiting the
Paradoxes of Constitutional Democracy?’ p. xxvii. Duncan Kelly, The State of the Political, pp. 20, 242-245;
Kennedy, Constitutional Failure, pp. 164. ‘Die heute geläufigste Legitimitätsform ist der Legalitätsglaube.’
26 Schmitt, Legalität und Legitimität, pp. 270, 283-4. On parliamentarism and the right of resistance, see
Chapter 3, section 3, ‘Natural Law, the Right of Resistance, and Collaboration.’
27 Kennedy, Constitutional Failure, p. 7; Schmitt, ‘Das Problem der innerpolitischen Neutraliät des Staates,’ in
Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze, p 41; Schmitt, Legalität und Legitimität. p. 285.
28 Schmitt, Legalität und Legitimität, p. 345; see also Neumann, Carl Schmitt als Jurist, pp. 242-245. ‘die es
ablehnte, nach Freund oder Feind der Verfassung zu fragen.’
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economic structure of society.’29 Lenin then took up this view in State and Revolution (1918),
arguing that the state as such was ‘the product and the manifestation of the irreconcilability
of class antagonisms . . . an organ of class domination, an organ of oppression; its aim is the
creation of ‘order’ which legalises and perpetuates this oppression.’30 As a result, the existing
state and the legal system were themselves ‘reactionary’ tools in class conflict, wielded by
the bourgeoisie. Thus, the laws of a bourgeois state would merely reflect bourgeois class
dominance and lack legitimacy in the eyes of the revolutionaries, who demanded nothing
less than the ‘smashing’ of the (currently existing) ‘state machine’ through an extra-legal
revolution31 As such, while liberal state theorists and legal positivists systematically asserted
legality as the sole form of legitimacy, Marxist theorists cut in the opposite direction, positing
a form of revolutionary legitimacy standing above legality.
In Schmitt’s postwar writings, he characterized Lenin as the apotheosis of the historical
bifurcation of legitimacy into two distinct forms: dynastic and revolutionary. Dynastic
legitimacy was coupled with the tradition notion of a monarch as the subject of constituent
power – the monarch acts as the author of the constitution on whose authority it ultimately
rests.32 This distinction represents a slight modification from the terminology used In his
Weimar texts, in which he split legitimacy into dynastic and democratic forms, the latter
according to which the people themselves decide the basis of their constitution or the ‘type
and form of their political existence.’33 In 1932, Schmitt maintained that same distinction,
arguing that the Reichswehr and the Reichsbeamtentum replaced dynastic legitimacy with the
‘plebiscitary legitimacy of the Reichspräsident elected by the German people.’34 However,
Lenin’s theory problematizes this dichotomy, as it operates according to a different principle
than dynastic or democratic/plebiscitary legitimacy: the basis for Soviet legitimacy cannot
be ascribed to either a monarch or popular, democratic consent. This interpretation is hinted
at in Verfassungslehre, when Schmitt claims that “‘Soviets” in Russia’ are an example of a
‘minority’ as the subject of constituent power: while claiming to act in the interests of the
29 In Robert Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader (New York: Norton, 1978).
30 Vladimir Lenin, State and Revolution (New York: International Publishers, 1943), p. 9.
31 Lenin, State and Revolution, p. 96. Although Schmitt does not cite this text specifically, the archives show
that he owned a copy of a 1919 edition with handwritten annotations, indicating that Schmitt would have
been familiar with Lenin’s arguments. See NRW 265-25952.
32 Kelly, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Political Theory of Representation,’ p. 122; Martin Loughlin, ‘On Constituent
Power,’ in eds. Michael Dowdle and Michael Wilkinson, Constitutionalism beyond Liberalism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 151-175, p. 162. For an analysis of the different subjects of constituent
power, see Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, pp. 77-82, 90-91.
33 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, p. 78. ‘Art und Form seiner politischen Existenz.’
34 Schmitt, Legalität und Legitimität, p. 273. ‘in der plebiszitären Legitimität des vom deutschen Volk
gewählten Reichspräsident.’
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people, the people have no vote over constitutional arrangements.35
In the postwar period, however, what was first classified as a form of minority constituent
power is now taken as representative of a revolutionary form of legitimacy. At first glance,
this may appear as a simple semantic shift: the Russian Revolution was led by a party
vanguard, a small minority of the population, thus combining both descriptions. However, the
terminological shift indicates a move away from an Aristotelian regime analysis – focusing
on the number of actors – to an analysis of the basis of its legitimacy. As Schmitt explains,
‘The great manifesto of this victory is Lenin’s text on legality and illegality as mere
methods . . . the authentic legal philosophy. Now there is only one revolutionary legit-
imacy. This may justify every cruelty, and may bestow upon every inhumanity the
character of a measure in the service of a higher humanity, and guarantee the absolution
of the world spirit for everything, for wars and civil wars, for liquidation of entire classes
and peoples.’36
Thus, for Schmitt, the revolutionary form of legitimacy had proven itself ‘victorious’ over
dynastic or even democratic forms: This victory of revolutionary legitimacy was made
possible by Marxism’s appeal to a better future, whereas dynastic legitimacy was based on
the past in the form of a hereditary succession, and democratic legitimacy based on a majority
vote in the present. Neither of these alternative forms of legitimacy based on past and present,
monarchy and democracy, however, could stop the Marxist assertion of a utopian future.
Thus, Schmitt ominously concludes that ‘this legitimacy is today monopolized in the East;
The West has yet to notice the splitting of legality and legitimacy.’37
For Schmitt, Lenin’s mobilization of legality as a mere tool of the revolution followed
from the original division between legality and legitimacy in the wake of Napoleon’s abdica-
tion in 1815. After his abdication, restoration of the monarchy was coded as the restoration
of a form of historical dynastic legitimacy, whereas the continuation of the Napoleonic code
a form of legality. The debate that followed showed two competing views of the monarchy:
‘The liberals wanted constitutional monarchy as a legal form of rule, the royalists wanted it
as a legitimate form.’ Indeed, in Schmitt’s characterization, the liberals wanted to subject
35 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, p. 82. In this text, Schmitt does not consider a type of revolutionary legitimacy,
but rather only contrasts dynastic and democratic forms. See Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, p. 90.
36 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 139. ‘Das große Manifest dieses Sieges ist Lenins Schrift über Legalität und
Illegalität als bloße Methoden (Der Radikalismus, die Kinderkrankheit der Revolution), die authentische
Rechtsphilosophie . . . Jetzt gibt es nur noch eine revolutionäre Legitimität. Diese vermag jede Grausamkeit
zu rechtfertigen, jedem Imperialismus den Charakter einer Befreiungsaktion, jeder Unmenschlichkeit den
Charakter einer Maßnahme im Dienste einer höheren Menschlichkeit zu verleihen und für alles, für Kriege
und Bürgerkriege, Liquidierung ganzer Schichten und Völker die Absolution des Weltgeistes zu garantieren.’
37 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 139. ‘Diese Legitimität ist heute im Osten monopolisiert; der Westen hat noch nicht
einmal die Aufspaltung von Legalität und Legitimität bemerkt.’
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the monarchy to the law, elevating the status of legality and denying any form of dynastic
legitimacy that existed outside of or above the law. Schmitt saw in the French historian Jules
Michelet evidence of ‘celebrating the law . . . as an expression of civilization in compari-
son with (Russian) barbarism,’ in so far as rule by law ended the ‘age of rule by paternity
[Vaterherrschaft].’38 In contrast, the law was an expression of ‘the government of man by
himself.’39 In Schmitt’s commentary on Michelet in Glossarium, he exploits the etymology
of Vaterherrschaft – in French, paternité – to argue that Michelet demonstrated that ‘Human-
ity no longer has a father as the source of authority; in his place is the law. Therefore, the
crisis of legality is more than an arbitrary difficulty.’40 In Michelet’s narrative, the end of
rule by paternity was meant to apply only up until the Vistula river, the nineteenth century
dividing line between the Russian Empire and the Habsburg East Galicia. Later, quoting
the legal historian Henry Maine, he writes in English, ‘The philosophers of France, in their
eagerness to escape from what they deemed a superstition of the priests, flung themselves
headlong into a superstition of the lawyers.’41
Nearly ten years later, Schmitt returns to Michelet’s argument in Glossarium to connect
his commentary on the replacement of the father with law to socialism: ‘Socialism is the
opposite to paternalism,’ or put more bluntly, ‘socialism thus = negation of the law of
inheritance/succession; property without inheritance law; I merely inherit my own body.’42
Although the next section of this chapter deals with the division of private property under
Schmitt’s conception of socialism, it suffices here to note that, once again, Schmitt’s rhetorical
strategy is to link liberalism with socialism, and to show that they both operate on shared
propositions – in this case, that both oppose a form of rule by (the) father.
In addition to showing the conceptual linkages between liberalism and socialism, Schmitt’s
argument asserts a historical continuity as well. He argues that socialist theory in the Rev-
olution of 1848 appropriated this fracturing of legality and legitimacy, first established
after Napoleon’s abdication, with ‘full momentum and full consciousness informed by the
philosophy of history.’43 As a result, ‘according to the Communist Manifesto, the law of
38 Schmitt, ‘Das Problem der Legalität,’ p. 449. ‘Die Liberalen wollen die konstitutionelle Monarchie als eine
legale, die Royalisten wollen sie als eine legitime Herrschaftsform . . . Michelet feiert das Gesetz . . . als den
Ausdruck der Zivilisation gegenüber der (russischen) Barbarei.’
39 Schmitt, ‘Das Problem der Legalität,’ p. 449 ‘Die Regierung des Menschen durch sich selbst.’
40 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 20. ‘Die Menschheit hat keinen Vater mehr als Quelle der Autorität; an seine
Stelle (patriarchalisch) ist das Gesetz getreten. Daher ist die Krise der Legalität mehr als eine beliebige
Schwierigkeit.’
41 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 151. From Henry Maine, Ancient Law (London: Dent, 1917).
42 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 345. ‘Sozialismus ist der Gegensatz zu Paternalismus . . . Sozialismus also =
Verneinung des Erbrechts; Eigentum ohne Erbrecht, Einzig erbt [sic] ich den eigenen Leib.’
43 Schmitt, ‘Das Problem der Legalität,’ p. 450. On this point, see Jeffrey Seitzer, ‘Schmitt’s Critique of Liberal
Constitutionalism,’ p. 285. ‘mit voller Wucht und vollem geschichtsphilosophischem Bewußtsein hinein.’
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the bourgeois class-state is the enemy of the proletariat,’ and could be done away with by
appeal to a higher source of legitimacy. For Schmitt, this represented an intensification of an
economic grouping – the class – into one that was political: class conflict.44 That Marxism
presented an intellectual continuity with liberalism was no historical accident: Marxists
‘followed their liberal-bourgeois opponents into the sphere of the economic, and caught him
here in his own land with his own weapons.’45 At the same time, however, Lenin intensified
this relationship by ‘transforming legality into a poisoned weapon, with which one stabs the
political opponent in the back.’46 Instead, Schmitt lamented the appropriation of Hegel in the
East, where his work had become a ‘monopoly weapon of Moscow Marxism.’47 As Schmitt
claims ‘the two socialist sacraments! Hegel: The State is the present God. Marx: The state
must be butchered for the banquet of the Leviathan. That is the great sacrament of Marxist
Socialism; is it already long since been realized, over there in Russia.’48
For Schmitt, the Marxist appropriation of the concept of dictatorship in the dictatorship
of the proletariat reflected an injection of historicity into the term. Thus, he argues that, in
the original, pre-Bolshevik Marxist conception,
The development towards the communist end-state must proceed according to the Marx-
ist “organic” (in the Hegelian sense) economic conception of history, economic relations
must be ripe for their transformation, the development is (also in the Hegelian sense)
“immanent,” the conditions cannot be “made” ripe through force, an artificial, mechanis-
tic intervention in this organic development would be for every Marxist meaningless.49
However, this conception underwent a mutation in Bolshevism, according to which the
counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie acts as a ‘mechanical obstacle, through which the path
to organic development becomes blocked and must be cleared with equally mechanical and
44 See Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen. Synoptische Darstellung, p. 116.
45 Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen. Synoptische Darstellung, p. 224. ‘Daß sie ihrem liberal-bürgerlichen
Gegner auf das Gebiet des Ökonomischen gefolgt war und ihn hier sozusagen in seinem eigenen Land mit
seinen eigenen Waffen stellte.’
46 Schmitt, ‘Das Problem der Legalität,’ p. 450 ‘Nach dem Kommunistischen Manifest ist das Gesetz des
bürgerlichen Klassenstaates der Feind des Proletariats’; ‘Die Legalität wird zur vergifteten Waffe, die man
dem politischen Gegner in den Rücken stößt.’
47 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 63. ‘Eine Monopolwaffe des Moskauer Marxismus.’
48 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 305. ‘Die zwei sozialistischen Sakramente! Hegel: Der Staat ist der präsente Gott;
Marx: Der Staat muß geschlachtet werden, zum Gastmahl des Leviathan. Das ist das große Sakrament des
marxistischen Sozialismus; es ist schon längst vollgezogen, drüben in Russland.’
49 Schmitt Die Diktatur, pp. xv-xvi. ‘Die Entwicklung zum kommunistischen Endzustand muß nach der
ökonomischen Geschichtsauffassung des Marxismus “organisch” (im Hegelschen Sinne) vor sich gehen,
die wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse müssen reif sein für die Umwälzung, die Entwicklung ist (ebenfalls
im Hegelschen Sinne) “immanent”, die Zustände können nicht gewaltsam reif “gemacht” werden, ein
künstliches, mechanisches Eingreifen in diese organische Entwicklung wäre für jeden Marxisten sinnlos.’
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extreme methods.’50 Although the association of Marxism and mechanical rationality is
the subject of the following chapter, it suffices here to note that this is an application of the
future-oriented revolution legitimacy of the proletariat: in locating itself as the teleological
end-point of the organic unfolding of history, revolutionary action is legitimated as a means of
clearing any inorganic obstacles. For Schmitt, revolutionary intervention is equally inorganic
as he does not share a Marxist conception of history; rather, his argument is that Bolsheviks
see revolutionary violence as justified as a means of accelerating ‘historical development’
towards a utopian future, and against whatever illegitimate barriers stand against the direction
of history. As he puts it, ‘He who stands on the side of coming things is allowed to topple that
which is already falling.’51 In Der Begriff des Politischen, Schmitt noted that ‘the antithesis
of proletariat and bourgeoisie, formulated by Marx, which south to concentrate all conflicts
of world history into a single, last conflict against the last enemy of humanity.’52 Against this
last enemy of humanity, all types of violence become justified.
For Schmitt, a central aspect of Marxist ideology was its mobilization and weaponization
of historical narratives to depict its success as inevitable, guaranteed by the laws of history. As
he argued, ‘Marxism – and with it, the entire official credo of Communism – is a philosophy
of history at the highest level; to such an extent that every opponent sees himself compelled
to reflect on his own historical situation and his own concept of history.’53 Particularly in
relation to the Revolutions of 1848, Schmitt saw that ‘in the consciousness of continuity
there is a significant superiority and even a monopoly of communist authors above other
historians, who fail to find their way with the events of 1848 and through this incompetency
lose their right to create a picture of the contemporary moment.’54 A monopoly on historical
interpretation bestowed upon Marxism a type of secularized, ‘historical legitimacy’ and a
‘right to violence’ for the furthering of their own cause.55 Indeed, for Schmitt, ‘all communist
50 Schmitt Die Diktatur, p. xvi. See Volker Neumann, Carl Schmitt als Jurist, p. 37. ‘Ein mechanisches
Hindernis, durch das der organischen Entwicklung der Weg verbaut wird und mit ebenso mechanischen und
äußerlichen Mitteln beseitigt werden muss.’
51 Schmitt Die Diktatur, p. xvi. ‘Wer auf der Seite der kommenden Dinge steht, darf das, was fällt, auch noch
stoßen.’
52 Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen: Synoptische Darstellung, p. 224. ‘Die durch Karl Marx formulierte
Antithese von Bourgeois und Proletarier, die alle Kämpfe der Weltgeschichte in einem einzigen, letzten
Kampf gegen den letzten Feind der Menschheit zu konzentrieren sucht.’ Emphasis added.
53 Carl Schmitt ‘Die Einheit der Welt,’ in Schmitt, Frieden oder Pazifismus, 841-871, p. 846. ‘Der Marxismus –
und mit ihm das ganze offizielle Credo des Kommunismus – ist Geschichtsphilosophie im höchsten Grade;
zu einem solchen Grade, daß jeder Gegner sich gezwungen sieht, sich auf seine eigene geschichtliche
Situation und sein eigenes Geschichtsbild zu besinnen.’
54 Carl Schmitt, Donoso Cortés in gesamteuropäischer Interpretation, p. 86. ‘In dem Bewußtsein der
Kontinuität steckt eine bedeutende Überlegenheit und sogar ein Monopol der kommunistischen Autoren
über die andern Geschichtsschreiber, die sich mit den Ereignissen von 1848 nicht zurechtfinden und durch
diese Unfähigkeit das Recht verliergen, ein Bild der Gegenwart zu geben.’ Repeated on p. 108.
55 Schmitt, Donoso Cortés, p. 112. ‘die geschichtliche Legitimität’; ‘das Recht zur Gewalt.’
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plans, beginning with the five year plan’ presented a vision of a better future and pointed
toward a ’dialectical path of history’ that would ’lead to the unity of the world.’56 Although
it had its roots in 1848, this process was intensified during the Revolution of 1917: ‘Since
the Russian Revolution of 1917, Soviet state power has stood in the service of a universal
convergence of the political unity of the world and of human kind.’57 As such, Marxism in
its various ideological articulations pointed to a different form of world de-politicization than
their Western counterparts, but nevertheless a type of de-politicization. This construction
of a historical narrative was, in a parallel to Schmitt’s commentary on Vitoria, a type of
‘over-painting [Übermalungen]’ which ’must be cleared away.’58 Instead, Schmitt sought a
‘true’ diagnosis of the events of 1848 and their meaning for the contemporary moment, an
interpretation he found in Donoso Cortés:
Against the reigning optimism, [Cortés] saw that train lines and the telegraph entail
a centralizing and leveling dictatorship . . . The optimistic illusion consists in the con-
nection between the progress of technology and the progress of freedom and the moral
perfection of mankind, which are connected into a unified concept of progress.59
The optimistic illusions – and delusions – of socialism and liberalism saw a future state
complete with the perfection of man, if only every last barrier to progress could be removed;
for Schmitt, this faith in progress, Fortschrittsglaube, was nothing other than a justification
for violence and a confused description of technology as an emancipatory force.
Writing in a retrospective 1978 publication ‘The Legal World Revolution,’ Schmitt noted,
following the Spanish communist partisan and later party leader, Santiago Carrillo, that
‘Lenin and Trotsky’s more violent methods of illegal revolution of October 1917 are today
out-dated.’60 Instead, one should practice a form of legal revolution, working through the
mechanisms of the state to achieve the same purposes.61 Indeed, this was the point, Schmitt
claimed, of the underworld criminal Mackie Messer in Bertolt Brecht’s Die Dreigroschenro-
56 Schmitt ‘Die Einheit der Welt,’ p. 848.
57 Carl Schmitt, ‘Die legale Weltrevolution,’ p. 925. ‘Seit der russischen Revolution vom Oktober 1917 steht
die sowjetstaatliche Macht im Dienst einer universalen Annäherung an die politische Einheit der Wekt und
des Menschengeschlechts.’
58 Schmitt, Donoso Cortés, p. 102. ‘
59 Schmitt, Donoso Cortés, p. 104. ‘Daß Eisenbahn und Telegraph eine zentralisierende, alles applanierende
Diktatur mit sich bringen, hat er im Gegensatz zu dem herrschenden Optimismus mit aller Klarheit sofort
gesehen . . . Die optimistische Illusion beruhte darauf, daß sie den Fortschritt der Technik mit dem Fortschritt
der Freiheit und der moralischen Vervollkommnung der Menschheit du einem einheitlichen Fortschrittsbegriff
verband.’ Schmitt repeats verbatim sections of this argument in ‘Die Einheit der Welt,’ p. 847.
60 On Santiago Carrillo, see Paul Preston, The Last Stalinist: The Life of Santiago Carrillo (London: William
Collins, 2014). Schmitt owned a copy of Carrillo’s 1977 monograph, ‘Eurocomunismo’ y estado. See NRW
265-28801 with marginalia.
61 Schmitt, Frieden oder Pazifismus, p. 920. ‘Daß die gewaltsameren Methoden der illegalen Revolution Lenins
und Trotzkis vom Oktober 1917 heute veraltet sind.’
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man: ‘Work must be legal. Here ends legality as a gangster parole.’62 The life of a gangster:
this was the ultimate conclusion of Lenin’s two-fold revolutionary strategy.
5.2 Socialism as a ‘Nomos’?
Schmitt’s Der Nomos der Erde (1950), concerned primarily with the historical development
of the law of nations, concludes with a section provocatively titled ‘The Question of a New
Nomos of the Earth.’ The question remains effectively unanswered: although Schmitt is clear
that the League of Nations failed to establish a new nomos, his historical narrative effectively
ends – with some minor exceptions – before the outbreak of World War II. However, writing
in Glossarium on August 20, 1948, Schmitt negated the question, explaining that ‘Berlin
lies, as the bird flies, between New York and Moscow. On this path, West meets East at
that point. But these paths do not result in localization and order, and to demonstrate this
is precisely the meaning of my Nomos of the Earth.’ 63 In denying the existence of a new
‘localization and order,’ Schmitt was denying the existence of a new nomos. As he explained,
‘this word [nomos] . . . is most suitable to raise the fundamental process of unifying order
and localization to consciousness.’64 This journal entry is significant for four reasons: first,
while the published text of Der Nomos der Erde focuses on the interwar period, it shows
that the object of his analysis extended into the postwar period; second, this entry effectively
denies that the postwar period had established a new nomos of the earth, but was rather a
continuation of ‘nihilism’ in international law following the dissolution of the jus publicum
europaeum; third, in so far as Schmitt directly and explicitly stated the meaning of his own
text, this claim ought to be taken seriously as an interpretive framework; and fourth, it
places Eastern Marxism on par with Western Liberalism, embodied in Moscow and New
York respectively, as a potential contender of the new Nomos of the Earth, challenging the
almost exclusive focus on Schmitt’s commentary on the Western hemisphere in secondary
literature.65 This in turn raises a series of further questions: first, to what extent does Marxism
62 Schmitt, ‘Das Problem der Legalität,’ p. 450. Compare his use of the text in chapter 3 on natural law. ‘Die
Arbeit muß legal sein. Hier endet die Legalität als Gangsterparole.’ This is a slight misquotation: Brecht’s
original text was ‘Man muss legal arbeiten.’
63 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 145. Emphasis added. ‘Also Berlin liegt in der Luftlinie zwischen New York und
Moskau; auf dieser Luftlinie treffen sich dort der Westen und der Osten. Aber diese Linien ergeben keine
Ortung und keine Ordnung, und das zu zeigen ist ja gerade der Sinn meines Nomos der Erde.’
64 Schmitt, Nomos der Erde, pp. 13, 36. Cf. Hooker, Carl Schmitt’s International Thought, p. 22. ‘Dieses
Wort . . . ist am besten geeignet, den grundlegenden, Ortung und Ordnung in sich vereinigenden Vorgang
zum Bewußtsein zu bringen.’
65 See Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito, ‘Introducing the International Theory of Carl Schmitt: International
Law, International Relations, and the Present Global Predicament(s),’ Leiden Journal of International Law
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qualify as a unique ‘nomos’ according to Schmitt’s use of the concept? Second, why would
neither East nor West form a ‘localization and order,’ and what significance would this carry
with it within Schmitt’s broader conceptual framework?
Schmitt’s consideration of Marxism as a nomos begins not at the international level but
rather at the domestic. In secondary literature, Schmitt’s concept of ‘nomos’ has almost
exclusively been treated as relating to international law and politics. For example, Gary
Ulmen has argued that nomos ‘was grounded in European public law, as distinguished from
domestic or constitutional law,’66 and William Hooker characterized ‘nomos [as describing]
the fundamental territorial ordering of the world.’67 Likewise, Oliver Simons read nomos
as providing ‘an apt tool for comprehending the changing international system.’68 Such
interpretations run contrary to Schmitt’s own stated understand, however, as he himself makes
clear that there is a ‘constitutional-theoretical side of the Nomos-Problem’ which is revealed
when ‘the most important function of the state consists in the distribution or the redistribution
of the social product [Sozialprodukt].’69 Already in Nomos der Erde, Schmitt had hinted
at the domestic side of the equation, noting that ‘land appropriation is for us towards the
exterior (in relation to other peoples) and the interior (for the land and property order within
a state) the original type [Ur-Typus] of a constitutive legal process.’70 Thus, not only is
there a second component to the concept of nomos which has been frequently overlooked
in scholarly literature, but it is this very component which would be central for Schmitt’s
interpretation of socialism. Moreover, the domestic constitutional side of the nomos question
could be articulated in relation to the social state. ‘Before the social product can be divided,
it [the state] must “take,”’ and it is in precisely the relation between taking and dividing that
Schmitt sees the Marxist concept of the state. As he explains, ‘the state as the great distributor
is simultaneously the great taker. It takes that which is to be distributed, in part through
taxation and revenue collection, part through confiscation through the disenfranchisement of
certain inhabitants of his territory, or certain men, whom he declares outside of the law or is
19 (2006), 1-7, p. 2.; Thalin Zarmanian, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Problem of Legal Order: From Domestic to
International,’ Leiden Journal of International Law 19 (2006), 41-67.
66 Gary Ulmen, ‘Translator’s Introduction,’ in Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, p. 10.
67 Hooker, Carl Schmitt’s International Thought, p. 22.
68 Oliver Simons, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Spatial Rhetoric,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmtt, p. 777.
69 Carl Schmitt, ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ in Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot,
2003 [1958]), p. 503. ‘Sozialprodukt’ is generally translated as the ‘national product,’ but I have chosen the
more literal translation, as this maintains the wordplay in Schmitt’s analysis. ‘Eine verfassungstheoretische
Seite des Nomos-Problems . . . die wichtigste Funktion des Staates in der Verteilung oder Umverteilung des
Sozialprodukts besteht.’
70 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, pp. 17-18. ‘So ist die Landnahme für uns nach Außen (gegenüber anderen
Völkern) und nach Innen (für die Boden- und Eigentumsordnung innerhalb eines landes) der Ur-Typus eines
konstituierenden Rechtsvorganges.’
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secretly treated as such.’71
The state as a ‘taker’ and a ‘distributor’ fits within Schmitt’s tripartite definition of his
concept of nomos as taking, dividing, and using [Nutzen], three categories which Schmitt
asserts are present in ‘all stadiums of human co-existence,’ and form, in some combination,
the core of all political ideologies.72 The form of taking [Nehmen] is typically an act of
land-appropriation such as the discovery of America as a ‘constitutive process in the law
of nations’ lasting from 1492 to 1890.73 For Schmitt, this act of original appropriation is
always a concrete, historical instance and not a hypothetical or thought construct, thereby
asserting the fundamentally political origins of the legal order.74 On the basis of this first
appropriation, ‘the continuity of a constitution is recognizable as long as recourse to this
first appropriation is apparent and recognized.’75 This discussion of land appropriation most
closely mirrors the discussion of nomos presented in Der Nomos der Erde, though as shown
above, taxation and expropriation are equally forms of ’taking.’ In its second definition,
nomos means the process of ‘dividing and distributing [Teilen und Verteilen].’76 Schmitt
is here referring to the distribution of private property, whether that is physical land or
commodities, like ‘the car, that a worker in the United States of America has standing outside
his door.’77 The third meaning, Weiden, or producing, is a form of ‘productive labor’ both
in an agricultural sense of pasturing land, as well as an industrial, capitalist sense. Taken
together, Schmitt’s introduction of these three elements shifts the focus of his concept of
nomos from the bracketing of war and the historical development of the law of nations to
domestic, social, and economic questions. Furthermore, it is precisely the combination of
these three definitions that Schmitt uses to characterize both liberalism and Marxism.
In addition to the conceptual division of nomos, Schmitt constructs a historical narrative
71 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 313. ‘Der Staat als der große Verteiler ist zugleich der große Nehmer. Er nimmt das
zu Verteilende teils im Wege der Besteuerung und Abgabenerhebung, teils durch Konfiskationen im Wege
der Entrechtung bestimmter Einwohner seines Gebietes oder bestimmter Menschen, die er für hors la loi
erklärt oder unter den Händen einfach so behandelt.’
72 Schmitt, ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ p. 492. ‘In jedem Stadium menschlichen Zusammenlebens.’ On this
text, see Minca and Rowan, On Schmitt and Space, pp. 218-221; and Reinhard Mehring, ‘Macht im Recht:
Carl Schmitts Rechtsbegriff in seiner Entwicklung,’ Der Staat 43(1) (2004), 1-22, p. 18.
73 See Schmitt, Nomos der Erde, pp. 48-52, 120. On the narrative of dissolution following the Berlin Conference
of 1885, see pp. 200-212.
74 Schmitt, Nomos der Erde, p. 17.
75 Schmitt, ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ p. 502. ‘Die Kontinuität einer Verfassung ist so lange erkennbar, wie
der Regreß auf diese erste Nahme erkennbar und anerkannt ist.’
76 Schmitt, ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ p. 491. Schmitt uses ‘Distribution’ as his own translation for Verteilung.
In German these two terms – dividing and distributing – are etymologically linked with the same root, which
unfortunately cannot be precisely mirrored in English.
77 Schmitt, ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ p. 491. ‘Das Auto, das ein Arbeiter in den Vereinigten Staaten von
Amerika vor seiner Tür stehen hat.’
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of the shifting relation between these three elements. ‘Up until the Industrial Revolution of
the 18th century in Europe,’ he claims, ‘the order and sequence was clearly based on some
appropriation as an obvious precondition and basis for further dividing and producing.’78
Thus, land appropriation provided the ‘radical title,’ both establishing an ‘inside’ and ‘outside’
to the political unit, as well as establishing private property – a right to ‘mine and thine.’79
Thus, for Schmitt, from the biblical narrative of the conquest and annexation of Canaan,
through to Hobbes, Locke and Kant, the sequence had always remained the same, even if
the original act of ‘appropriation’ was at times forgotten in popular memory: first take, then
divide, and then produce.
The historical sequence of Nehmen, Teilen and Weiden changed with the rise of liberal-
ism, occurring concurrently with the Industrial Revolution: distribution [Teilen] was only
considered after production [Weiden]. Echoing his invocation of Donoso Cortés discussed
in the previous section, Schmitt notes that for liberalism, ‘progress and economic freedom
consist in the forces of production becoming free and thereby ushering in such an increase in
production and mass of consumption goods that appropriation ceases and even division no
longer forms a problem.’80 Further appropriation would seem ‘in a economic sense irrational,’
as the high level of production and economic activity would raise the standard of living
‘by itself,’ obviating the need to consider questions of just distribution of property. In turn,
technological advancement would act as an accelerant, leading to ‘immeasurable increases in
production.’81 Thus, liberalism represented an inversion of the typical sequence of nomos
as nehmen, teilen, weiden as it is fundamentally a question of ‘weiden,’ of production, and
subordinates both appropriation and division.
Socialism is thus the reaction to liberalism’s attempt to pursue a higher standard of living
through production while simultaneously ignoring questions of distribution: socialism ‘is at
its core a question of the correct division and distribution, and socialism is therefore above
all a doctrine of re-distribution [Neu-Verteilen].’82 The emphasis on re-distribution can take
78 Schmitt, ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ pp. 492-3. ‘Bis zur industriellen Revolution des europäischen 18.
Jahrhunderts beruhte die Ordnung und Reihenfolge eindeutig darauf, daß irgendein Nehmen als selbtver-
ständliche Voraussetzung und Grundlage für das weitere Teilen und Produzieren anerkannt war.’
79 Schmitt, Nomos der Erde, p. 17; Schmitt, ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ p. 493.
80 Schmitt, ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ pp. 495-496. ‘Fortschritt und wirtschaftliche Freiheit bestehen darin,
daß die Produktionskräfte frei werden und daß dadurch von selbst eine solche Steigerung der Produktion
und der Masse der Konsumgüter eintritt, daß das Nehmen aufhört und sogar das Teilen kein selbstständiges
Problem mehr bedeutet.’
81 Schmitt, ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ p. 496. See as well section two, ‘Technology, Utopia and Annihilation’
of the following chapter. ‘Zu einer unabsehbaren Steigerung der Produktion.’
82 Schmitt, ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ p. 496. The exception to this the utopian socialist Chales Fourier, who
still believes in the liberating potential of technology, as discussed in the following chapter. ‘Sie ist in ihrem
Kern eine Frage der richtigen Teilung und Verteilung, und der Sozialismus ist dementsprechend vor allem
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on two separate forms, with the ‘moralists’ such as Proudhon on the one hand, and the
dialectical materialists on the other. For Proudhon, the ‘elevation of the producer over the
consumer’ justifies the act of appropriation of the ‘mere consumer.’ Thus, ‘appropriation
is a consequence and corollary of just division and distribution.’83 In contrast, Marx’s
dialectical materialism mobilizes a historical argument that the ‘bourgeois social order [is]
a situationally repugnant distribution . . . which in the end sublates and destroys itself.’ 84
For Schmitt, however, appropriation still takes on a central role within Marxist theory in the
concept of the ‘expropriation of the expropriator.’85 Despite any protestations to the contrary,
‘appropriation as the precondition for a new division does not cease. If the essence consists in
the precedence of taking before dividing and producing, then such a doctrine of expropriating
of the expropriator is a manifestly strongest imperialism, because it is the most modern.’86
If liberalism could be characterized as the fantasy of ever greater production solving issues
of distribution and the necessity of further appropriation, then Marxism equally presented
the fantasy of redistribution rendering appropriation obsolete. For Schmitt, both ideologies
had failed to acknowledge the fundamental role of appropriation as an originary act: whether
land appropriation or the ‘expropriation of the expropriators,’ neither ideology could escape
the primacy of appropriation. Indeed, appropriation was a historical and constitutive act that
grounded the subsequent legal order – both liberalism and socialism, in denying the fact of
appropriation, attempted to cut off or eliminate these very historical roots.
In the postwar years, Schmitt became increasingly fixated on a conception of the state,
according to which ‘the most important function of the state consists in the distribution and
redistribution of the social product [Sozialprodukt].’87 Indeed, for Schmitt, he who distributes
and redistributes occupies a position of ‘genuine political power.’88 As he would rephrase the
problematic in Glossarium, ‘the basic evil according to Marx, the cause of all ‘self-alienation,’
is the division of labor. Socialism does not sublate this; it only organizes the divided [die
Geteilten] into a social unity of distribution [Verteilung]. That is much more horrific. Who
eine Lehre vom Neu-Verteilen.’
83 Schmitt, ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ p. 498.
84 Schmitt, ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ p. 498. ‘[die] bürgerliche[] Gesllschaftsordnung als eine
. . . Situationswidrigkeit der Verteilung . . . die sich schließlich selber aufhebt und zerstört.’ Emphasis added.
85 Schmitt, ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ p. 499.
86 Schmitt, ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ p. 500. ‘Das Nehmen als Voraussetzung des neuen Teilens hört eben
doch nicht auf. Wenn das Wesen des Imperialismus im Vorrang des Nehmens vor dem Teilen und dem
Produzieren liegt, dann ist eine solche Doktrin der Expropriation der Expropriateure offenbar stärkster, weil
modernster Imperialismus.
87 Schmitt, ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ p. 503. ‘sobald die wichtigste Funktion des Staates in der Verteilung
oder Umverteilung des Sozialprodukts besteht.’
88 Schmitt, ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ p. 503.
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protects us from the distributors [Verteilern]?’89 For Schmitt, although this problem was
perhaps most clearly articulated in Marxist theory of expropriation, it was common to all
political parties that appeal to the ‘concept of the social.’90 Further, ‘Lenin and his Russian
comrades were already great valorizers, and with valorization begins the surplus value, and
with the surplus value [begins] high politics and everything else is only a result of time.’91
Describing Marxism as a ‘manifestly strongest imperialism’ and ‘its most modern form’
represents a reformulation of the critique of capitalism as the highest form of imperialism,
as articulated by Lenin and his contemporaries.92 Indeed, if Lenin had posited monopoly
capitalism as the highest form of imperialism, Schmitt argued that socialism was its strongest.
Thus, he points to Marx’s citation of Goethe’s Lehrgespräch in Das Kapital on ‘the so-called
primitive accumulation’:
Teacher: Remember, o Child, where these gifts are from. They cannot be from you
alone.
Child: Oy, I have everything from Papa!
Teacher: And where does he have it from?
Child: From Grandpa.
Teacher: No, come on! Where did your grandpa get it from?
Child: He took it.93
This anecdote takes on a double function in Schmitt’s narrative. In Marx’s theory, it char-
acterizes the act of primitive accumulation [ursprüngliche Akkumulation], an original act
of appropriating public property to account for the origins of capitalism. This is, in Marx’s
characterization, a violent affair: ‘and the history of this, their expropriation, is written in the
annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire.’94 This originary act of appropriation is what
would have allowed for the accumulation of capital and and increased levels of production,
thereby insisting that nehmen was ‘the point of departure the capitalist mode of production’95
89 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 48. ‘Das Grundübel nach Marx, Ursache aller ‘Selbstentfremdung,’ ist die
Arbeitsteliung. Der Sozialismus hebt sie nicht auf; er organisiert nur die Geteilten zu einer sozialen Einheit
der Verteilung. Das ist noch viel schauerlicher. Wer schützt uns dann vor den Verteilern?’
90 Schmitt, ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ p. 496.
91 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 350. ‘Lenin und seine russische Genossen waren schon Verwerter und mit der
Verwertung beginnt der Mehrwert, und mit dem Mehrwert die hohe Politik und alles Weitere ist nur noch
Folge der Zeit.’
92 Vladimir Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (London: Penguin, 2010.
93 Quoted in Schmitt, ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ p. 503. Original in J. W. von Goethe, Gedichte Bd. II, ed.
Curt Nuch; in Friedrich Engels, ‘Deutscher Sozialismus in Versen und Prosa,’ in Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels, Werke Bd. IV (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1990), pp. 233-234. ‘Lehrer: Bedenk, o Kind, woher sind diese
Gaben? Kind: Ei, alles hab’ ich vom Papa. L: Und der, woher hat’s der? K: Vom Großpapa. L: Nicht doch!
Woher hat’s denn der Großpapa bekommen? K: Der hat’s genommen.’
94 Karl Marx, Das Kapital Bd. I, pp. 743, 770. ‘Und die Geschichte dieser ihrer Expropriation ist in die
Annalen der Menschheit eingeschrieben mit Zügen von Blut und Feuer.’
95 Karl Marx, Das Kapital Bd. I, p. 741.
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On this point, Schmitt’s characterization of the liberal nomos agrees with agrees with Marx’s
characterization of capitalism. However, Schmitt simultaneously holds that the exact same
argument can be made in regards to the preliminary stage of socialization, the ‘expropriation
of the expropriators’ – this expropriation would likewise be a type of taking that would
allow for re-distribution of property. In both cases, an originary act of appropriation was
unavoidable, and yet both sought to diminish its significance or conceal it entirely.
By obscuring the foundational act of appropriation, Schmitt argues that both liberalism
and Marxism represent forms of political utopianism. As he explains it, ‘the utopian society
– that of the liberal free market, as well as of the Marxist future state,’ yet another linkage
of the two ideologies, in both forms the utopian society ‘allegedly no longer takes, but
rather only produces, and this in infinite quantities, such that dividing and distributing are no
longer a problem. There ceases therefore not only appropriating [Nehmen], but also dividing
and distributing [Teilen und Verteilen], and there will only be production [produziert], only
creation.’ Such faith in production as a means of overcoming any necessity of redistribution,
and of creating without an originary act of appropriation represents the equivalent to divine
creation: ‘the great God-appropriation is then complete. Human society is thus God, who
only gives and does not need to take, because he can create everything from nothing.’96 In
this sense, Schmitt returns once again to Jules Michelet and Vaterherrschaft, arguing that
liberalism and marxism had displaced God as father, instead imbuing humans with the act of
creation – and to an infinite degree.
Schmitt’s attack against Marxism in the postwar period therefore forms a parallel to the
rhetorical strategy he adopted against liberalism in The Concept of the Political: liberalism,
through its ‘neutralizations and its depoliticizations,’ attempted to negate the friend/enemy
distinction and replace it with economic competition.97 However, in claiming to transcend
the political, Schmitt argued that economic competition can become intensified to the point
that it triggers political conflict, thus leading back to a friend/enemy distinction. Furthermore,
neutralizations were themselves political and in fact escalated the intensity of conflict because
the enemy was now considered a ‘disturber of the peace hors-la-loi,’ and as such, deserved
96 Schmitt, Glossarium p. 313, additional commentary p. 366. See the exchange between Schmitt and Kojève
in Schmittiana VI, pp. 100-101. In the afterword to ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ Schmitt repeats this argument
as a response to Alexandre Kojève: ‘No man can give without having taken. Only a God, who created
the world out of nothing, can give without taking, and even he in the frame of the world he created out of
nothing.’ In Glossarium, Schmitt claims that only a Jewish author can recognize this, citing both Kojève and
Taubes. ‘Dann ist der große Gott-Nahme vollendet. Dann ist nämlich die menschliche Gesellschaft der Gott,
der nur gibt und nichts zu nehmen braucht, weil er alles aus dem Nichts erschafft.’
97 Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, Synoptische Ausgabe, pp. 82, 188. See Heiner Bielefeldt, ‘Carl
Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism: Systematic Reconstruction and Counter-Criticism,’ in Carl Schmitt’s
Critique of Liberalism, 23-26, p. 25.
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the fate of a crusade against him.98 Thus, in the last analysis, ‘this supposedly non-political
and apparently anti-political system serves either the existing friend/enemy distinction, or it
leads to a new one, and thus it does not escape the consequence of the political.’99 In the
same way, Marxism attempted to circumvent the original aspect of appropriation through a
just division of goods. However, Schmitt’s argument remained that in so doing, Marxism
merely denied that the expropriation had occurred; it was equally trapped into the sequential
order of taking, dividing, and producing. As a result, Marxism could not offer a new nomos
of the earth.
5.3 Electrifying the Earth
In one of the many diary entries defending his decision to refuse de-Nazification, dated 1.
October, 1949, Schmitt closed the entry with a sudden turn to Lenin, writing that
Lenin’s ideal was the electrified earth. Our superiority to Lenin and Leninism consists in:
1. We really do not have any ideals (he believed that he had none and that was his superi-
ority).
2. If we had ideals, our ideal would rather be a de-electrified earth rather than an
electrified one. Because we love our earth.100
Schmitt does not define this ‘we’ in the same passage; however, over the course of the
previous week, Schmitt identifies and discusses in the first person plural as ‘we poor jurists’
[wir armen Juristen], noting that ‘it is now on us to ensure that jurisprudence does not die a
common death with the myth of the legislator.’101 Schmitt’s identification as a jurist trying to
prevent the death of jurisprudence corresponds to the opening warning in Der Nomos der Erde
of an existential question facing the discipline of law, the discipline to which he dedicates his
98 Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, Synoptische Ausgabe, p. 240. Cf. Schmitt, Die Wendung zum
diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff.
99 Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, Synoptische Ausgabe, pp. 240-242. See Ellen Kennedy, ‘Hostis
not Inimicus,’ in Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, 92-108, p. 95. ‘Dieses angeblich unpolitische
und scheinbar sogar antipolitische System dient entweder bestehenden oder führt zu neuen Freund- und
Feindgruppierungen und vermag der Konsequenz des Politischen nicht zu entrinnen’
100Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 207. The same identification is in Schmitt ‘Nehmen, Teilen, Weiden,’ p. 495.
Underline in the original. ‘Lenins Ideal war die elektrifizierte Erde. Unsere Überlegenheit über Lenin und
den Leninismus beruht darauf, daß 1. wir wirklich keine Ideale haben (er behaupte nämlich, er selber hätte
keine und das sei seine Überlegenheit.) 2. Wenn wir Ideale hätten, unser Ideal eher eine entelektrifizierte
Erde wäre als eine elektrifizierte. Denn wir lieben unsere Erde.’
101Schmitt, Glossarium, pp. 205-6. ‘An uns ist es jetzt, dafür zu sorgen, daß die Rechtswissenschaft nicht mit
dem Mythos vom Legislateur zusammen eines gemeinsamen Todes stirbt.’
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text.102 It would seem, then, that the future of jurisprudence depended upon a rejection of
the electrified earth, a reference to the incursion of the corrupting influence of technology,
machines, and industrialization. The phrase ‘electrified earth’ has telling roots in Schmitt’s
earlier work. The first time that Schmitt used the phrase ‘electrified earth’ to describe Lenin’s
thought came 26 years earlier in his Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form (1923),
in which he argues that ‘the world view of the modern industrialist resembles that of the
industrial proletariat like one twin resembles the other.’ The argument is simply that both
liberalism and socialism ascribe to the same ideal of a mechanical, technological progress.
For Schmitt, the two ideologies ‘fight merely over the correct method of electrification.
The American financier and the Russian Bolshevist find themselves together in the fight for
economic thought, that is, in the fight against politicians and jurists.’103 As such, Schmitt had
already characterized Bolshevism as a challenge to jurists and jurisprudence more broadly
using the metaphor of electrification to represent technical rationality.
As Günter Maschke, Schmitt’s editor, has shown, Schmitt’s attribution to Lenin of the
phrase ‘electrified earth’ is a paraphrase of the latter’s speech before the 8th Soviet Congress,
22-29. December, 1920: ‘Communism – that is Soviet power plus electrification for the
whole country!’ For Maschke, Schmitt’s mis-quotation was in fact intentional, as it reflected
Lenin’s true aim of, in Maschke’s words, ‘a de-politicized, peaceful world unity’ beyond the
current territorial borders of the Soviet Union.104 The accuracy of the quotation, however,
is less significant than the point Schmitt intended for it to reveal: that despite all of the
ideological differences between Marxism and Western liberalism,
‘Eastern and Western faith meet on this point [of electrification]. That’s not remarkable
as they both arise from the same source, the philosophy of history of the 18th and 19th
centuries. East and West are today separated through an iron curtain, but the waves and
corpuscles of a common philosophy of history penetrate the curtain and establish a form
of invisible, and exceedingly dangerous communication.’105
Indeed, that there was a unified position between liberalism and socialism had been Schmitt’s
position since the proclamation of the Weimar Republic and Hugo Preuß’ explanation that
Germany was faced with a choice between ‘either Wilson or Lenin, either the democracy
that developed out of the French and American revolutions or the brutal form of Russian
102Schmitt, der Nomos der Erde, pp. 5-6.
103Carl Schmitt, Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2016 [1923]), p. 22.
104Günter Maschke, ‘Notize zu “Die Einheit der Welt,”’ in Schmitt, Frieden oder Pazifismus, p. 861.
105Carl Schmitt, ‘Die Einheit der Welt,’ in Schmitt, Frieden oder Pazifismus, p. 847. ‘Ostlicher und westlicher
Glaube treffen sich in diesem Punkt. Das ist nicht erstaunlich, entstammen sie doch beide der gleichen Quelle,
der Geschichtsphilosophie des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts. Ost und West sind heute getrennt durch einen
Eisernen Vorhang, aber die Wellen und Korpuskeln einer gemeinsamen Geschichtsphilosophie durchdringen
den Vorhang und begründen eine Art unsichtbare, äußerst gefährliche Kommunikation.’
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fanaticism. One must choose.’106 While Preuß had opted for Western liberalism, for Schmitt,
the decision was itself a false one: Wilson and Lenin presented two sides of the same coin,
with more in common than what separated them.107 Nearly thirty years later and Schmitt
held the same view – the binary choice between the two powers of the Cold War was equally
false.
This chapter has contributed a new perspective on Schmitt’s mobilization of Lenin’s
political thought as evidence of broad shifts in political and legal concepts, particularly within
the categories of legality and legitimacy. As such, it sought to move beyond the content
offered in Der Begriff des Politischen and Theorie des Partisanen,108 as well as in a possible
overlap with Bolshevism in a ‘theory of acts of sovereignty,’ an overlap that allowed for
Schmitt’s thought to be labeled by one scholar as ‘a right-wing Leninism.’109 Furthermore,
this chapter has also pointed to another direction of Schmitt’s radical critique of technology
as expounded by John McCormick’s Carl Schmitt‘s Critique of Liberalism. For McCormick,
‘Socialism, domestically manifested in revolutionary and reformist parties and externally
manifested in the Soviet Union, is the political ideology that clearly most rouses Schmitt’s
ire.’ And yet, he justifies his book’s focus on liberalism by arguing that ‘the fact that to
Schmitt’s mind liberalism as a hegemonic political theory . . . weakened Germany’s position
vis-à-vis socialism internally and internationally indeed made liberalism an unavoidable
object of his critical attention.’ Indeed, for McCormick, ‘Schmitt explicitly equates liberalism
. . . with this neutralizing technological force.’110 While Schmitt does view liberalism as a
form of technology, the preceding sections of this chapter have shown that Schmitt applies
the same critique to Marxist theory, what he describes as a ‘religion of technical progress.’111
Indeed, the electrification of Marxism extends further in Schmitt’s analysis: it was Karl Marx
106Quoted in Kennedy, Constitutional Failure, p. 111. See also Martin Loughlin, ‘Editorial Introduction to
Carl Schmitt, “Hugo Preuss": His Concept of the State and His Position in German State Theory,”’ History
of Political Thought 38(3) (2017), 345-370; Peter Stirk, ‘Hugo Preuss, German Political Thought and the
Weimar Constitution,’ History of Political Thought 13(3) (2002), 497-516.
107See Heinrich Meier, Die Lehre Carl Schmitts, p. 226. On this point, Schmitt was joined by many members
of the ‘conservative revolution.’ See Joshua Smeltzer, “‘Germany’s Salvation”: Carl Schmitt’s Teleological
History of the Second Reich,’ History of European Ideas (2018), 1-16. See as well Carl Schmitt, ‘Der
bürgerliche Rechtsstaat,’ in Staat, Großraum, Nomos, 44-54, p. 44.
108Gabriella Slomp, ‘The Theory of the Partisan: Carl Schmitt’s Neglected Legacy,’ History of Political Thought
26(3) (2005), 502-519; Peter Uwe Hohendahl, Perilous Futures (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018),
117-142.
109See Tracy Strong, Politics without Vision (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2012), pp. 218, 242. Strong
emphasizes Lenin’s theory of the party at the expense of what Schmitt himself actually picked up on: the
weaponization of legality.
110McCormick, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, pp. 5-6.
111Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen: Synoptische Darstellung, p. 249. See Neumann, Carl Schmitt als Jurist,
pp. 93-94. ‘Religion des technischen Fortschritts.’
5.3 Electrifying the Earth 135
‘who realized, that technology was the true revolutionary principle.’112 As a result, Schmitt’s
critique of technological rationality was not a means to the end of attacking liberalism, but
rather itself a principle focus of his critique – liberalism, to use a clinical metaphor, is a
symptom, not the disease itself. In the following chapter, I will solidify this interpretation
by turning to another angle of Schmitt’s critique of technology and its manifestation in both
liberalism and Marxism – his critique of utopia and utopianism as a form of annihilation.
112Schmitt, Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form, p. 57.

Chapter 6
Technology, Law, and Annihilation: Carl
Schmitt’s Critique of Utopianism
In the foreword to his postwar history of the law of nations, The Nomos of the Earth, Carl
Schmitt warned of an ‘existential question confronting jurisprudence itself, which today
is being crushed between theology and technology, if it does not assert the ground of its
own existence in a correctly recognized and fruitful historicity.’1 On the one hand, the
resurgence of just war theories from the Spanish Scholastics through contemporaries such as
James Brown Scott threatened to breach the cordon sanitaire established by Alberico Gentili’s
famous dictum, ‘Silete, theologi, in munere alieno!’2 On the other, in his Ex Captivitate Salus,
Schmitt’s reflections from captivity in the period of 1945-47 and published concurrently with
The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt lamented the emergence of yet another command to silence,
that of a ‘completely profane technicity’ aimed at jurists themselves: ‘Silete jurisconsulti!’3
While the period of the jus publicum Europaeum had begun by creating a space for the law
of nations without recourse to theology as its basis, technicity now threatened to erode its
defining principles. Indeed, as Schmitt insisted, ‘I am the last, deliberate representative of
the jus publicum Europaeum . . . and I experience its end like Benito Cereno experienced the
1 Carl Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum (Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot, 2011 [1950]), p. 6: ‘Es betrifft die Existenzfrage der Rechtswissenschaft selbst, die heute zwischen
Theologie und Technik zerrieben wird, wenn sie nicht in einer richtig erkannten und fruchtbar gewordenen
Geschichtlichkeit den Boden ihres eigenen Daseins behauptet.’
2 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, repeated on pp. 92, 96, 212; repeated in Carl Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002 [1950]), pp. 70, 75.
3 Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 75. Schmitt makes a permutation of the same claim in Der Nomos der
Erde, writing in regards to jurists at the end of the 19th century, ‘sileamus in munere alieno,’ p. 212. Use of
the first person plural would suggest that Schmitt feels that, in addition to the jurists at the end of the 19th
century, he himself has received a command to silence.‘restlos profanen Technizität.’
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journey of the pirate ship.’4
This chapter focuses on the existential threat posed by technicity for jurisprudence
according to Schmitt by reconstructing his esoteric warning in light of his notebook entries
from the period in Glossarium. Going further than The Nomos of the Earth, Glossarium
establishes utopianism as deeply imbricated in his broader critique of technicity. Indeed, over
the course of three years, Schmitt would return time and time again to the writings of Thomas
More, Aldous Huxley, Samuel Butler, and even Thomas Hobbes to elucidate his unique
concept of utopia. The first section of this paper excavates Schmit’s theory of the origins and
conceptual history of utopia within the context of two ‘de-localizations [Ent-Ortungen]’5 in
space and human nature; the paper then moves to establish the neglected links in Schmitt’s
work between history, technology, and utopia to reveal Schmitt’s understanding of utopia as
the annihilation and the negation of law. In so doing, this chapter reconstructs a conservative
critique of utopian thought independent of liberal critics,6 and provides a new prism through
which to view Schmitt’s postwar writings on the law of nations and international politics.
6.1 Two Phases of De-Localization
First published posthumously in 1991, Schmitt’s Glossarium contains unmediated and often
unrevised insight into his postwar thought in the form of notebook entries.7 These entries are
composed as fragments, brief reflections on topics ranging from his criticism of denazification
to the law of armed occupation following World War II. Controversial in its publication for
exposing Schmitt’s unmitigated anti-Semitism even after the collapse of the ‘Third Reich,’8 it
4 Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, p. 75. For Schmitt’s identification with Melville’s Benito Cereno, see Reinhard
Mehring, Carl Schmitt: Aufstieg und Fall (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2009), pp. 408-410; William Scheuermann,
Carl Schmitt: The End of Law (Oxford: Rowman, 1999), pp. 177-178; Thomas Beebee, ‘Carl Schmitt’s
Myth of Benito Cereno,’ Seminar: A Journal of Germanic Studies 42(2) (2006), 114-134; Nicolaus Sombart,
Jugend in Berlin (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1994), pp. 268-270. ‘Ich bin der letzte, bewusste Vertreter des jus
publicum Europaeum . . . und erfahre sein Ende so, wie Benito Cereno die Fahrt des Piratenschiffs erfuhr.’
5 This chapter retains Schmitt’s idiosyncratic orthography of ‘Ent-Ortung’ in ‘de-localization’ to mimic his
emphasis on the negation of localization, the significance of which is central to the following section.
6 For example, Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (London: Routledge, 2011).
7 This dissertation uses the 2015 expanded, corrected, and commentated edition produced under the editorship
of Gerd Giesler and Martin Tilke. The 1991 edition under Eberhard von Medem only published the first three
books of Glossarium, stopping in 1951, and a list of discrepancies and errors compiled by Piet Tommissen
ran twenty pages. See Gerd Giesler and Martin Tilke, ‘Einleitung’ in Glossarium. Aufzeichnungen aus den
Jahren 1947 bis 1958 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2015), p. vii.
8 Raphael Gross, ‘The “True Enemy”: Antisemitism in Carl Schmitt’s Life and Work,’ in The Oxford Handbook
of Carl Schmitt, eds. Jens Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p.
106; Richard Faber, ‘Es Gibt einen antijüdischen Affekt! Über Carl Schmitts “Glossarium,”’ Zeitschrift für
Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 46(1) (1994), 70-73.
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is within Glossarium that Schmitt develops his understanding of utopia, a concept important
enough for him to include in the index he kept of his own notebooks.9
In Schmitt’s first entry discussing utopia, dated November 11, 1947, he asks ‘What is
specific about utopia (in comparison to all possible types of ideal constructions, pipe dreams,
and fanciful programs)?’ The answer he provides is simply that ‘Thomas More, who invented
the word, stood in the great spatial revolution of his age and from there found the leap
into the non-space, the u-topos, of which a Greek of antiquity would not at all have been
capable.’10 Thus, for Schmitt, the first step to understanding utopian thought is to historicize
its conceptual origins and place it within the context of a ‘great spatial revolution’ taking
place in England at the time of More’s writing.
Schmitt had already posited the existence of a world-historical spatial revolution in Land
and Sea, posing the question, ‘A spatial revolution – what is this?’ before answering that it
occurs whenever ‘the structure of the concept of space itself is altered.’11 A result of this
revolution is that it affects ‘a change in the concepts of space encompassing all the levels and
domains of human existence.’12 The central historical process playing out during More’s
lifetime was, according to Schmitt, the discovery of the Americas.13 It was only as a result of
this discovery that the ability to conceive of nothing or nothingness became possible. Here,
Schmitt takes the publication of More’s Utopia as reflecting this historical development, in
the very fact that both ‘a fantastically new and negative spatial conception and a word like
“utopia” were possible,’ thereby ‘[announcing] already the abysmal spatial revolution.’14
In Schmitt’s world history, it was the British who first made the transition to a maritime
existence: ‘Only in first becoming an island in a new, heretofore unknown sense did England
9 Carl Schmitt, Glossarium. Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1947 bis 1958 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot,
2015), p. 398.
10 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 35: ‘Was ist das Spezifische der Utopie (gegenüber allen möglichen Arten von
Idealkonstruktionen, Wunschträumen und phantastischen Programmen? Es liegt daran, daß Thomas Morus,
der das Wort Utopia erfunden hat, in der großen Raumrevolution seines Zeitalters stand und von dort den
Absprung in den Nicht-Raum, den U-topos fand, dessen ein Grieche der Antike gar nicht fähig gewesen
wäre.’
11 Carl Schmitt, Land und Meer: Eine weltgeschichtliche Betrachtung (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2018 [1942]), pp.
55, 57. ‘Was ist das, eine Raumrevolution? . . . Die Struktur des Raumbegriffes selber ändert.’ Carl Schmitt,
Land and Sea, trans. Samuel Garrett Zeitlin (Candor: Telos Press, 2015), pp. 47, 49; see also Claudio Minca
and Rory Rowan, On Schmitt and Space (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 189-192.
12 Schmitt, Land und Meer, p. 68. ‘Eine alle Stufen und Gebiete menschlichen Daseins erfassende Veränderung
der Raumbegriffe.’
13 Carl Schmitt, ‘Die Raumrevolution. Durch den totalen Krieg zu einem totalen Frieden (1940),’ in Staat,
Großraum, Nomos, ed. Günter Maschke (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995), 388-391, p. 388.
14 Carl Schmitt, ‘Staatliche Souveränität und freies Meer (1941),’ in Staat, Großraum, Nomos, 401-429, p. 410:
‘eine phantastisch neue, negative Raumvorstellung und ein Wort wie ‘Utopie’ möglich war, kündete sich
schon die abgründige Raumrevolution an.’
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complete the British maritime appropriation of the world oceans and complete the first phase
of the planetary spatial revolution.’15 The British transition into a maritime existence was,
‘at its core, something special and singular,’ and the ‘process cannot be compared with any
previous event in world history.’16 This unique spatial revolution was epitomized by the later
Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli’s suggestion in Tancred: Or, the New Crusade (1847) to
move the Queen and her court from London to Delhi, a proposal that Schmitt claims could
only be taken seriously by a fully ‘uprooted and de-territorialized’ people.17 Through this
vision of a de-territorialized state, ‘the great fish, the Leviathan, could set itself in motion
and seek out other oceans.’18
This narrative locates the concept of utopia as emerging in England at the same moment
that England itself transitions into the maritime existence of ‘an island,’ unbound to any
concrete location. The emergence of utopia as a concept is inseparable from this spatial
revolution, and it is no coincidence that an Englishman, Thomas More, coined the concept,
just as it is no coincidence that the Leviathan – the ‘great whale’ – emerges in the same
period.19 Thus, an initial way to frame the conceptual origins utopian thought would be as the
epiphenomenal representation of spatial changes occurring in England – More’s turning away
from the topos to a u-topos is representative of a broader world-historical spatial revolution
which allowed for ‘humans . . . [to] conceive of an empty space.’20
However, Schmitt immediately cautions against a straightforward reading of More’s
15 Schmitt, Land und Meer, p. 90. ‘Erst indem es in einem neuen, bisher unbekannten Sinne zur Insel
wurde, hat es die britische Seenahme der Weltozeane vollendet und den damaligen ersten Abschnitt der
planetarischen Raumrevolution gewonnen.’ See also Oliver Simons, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Spatial Rhetoric,’ in
The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt, p. 780. Schmitt uses Britain and England interchangeably in his text.
16 Carl Schmitt, ‘Das Meer gegen das Land (1941),’ in Staat, Großraum, Nomos, 395-400, pp. 395-396.
Schmitt’s insistence on the singularity and uniqueness of this development directly contradicts William
Hooker’s repeated assertion of a spatial revolution occurring in both England and the Netherlands concur-
rently. This position is further rebuked in Schmitt’s claim that ‘Not France and not Holland . . . achieved
the great and planetary decision for the world ocean, but rather England.’ See Carl Schmitt, ‘Staatliche
Souveränität und freies Meer,’ in Staat, Großraum, Nomos, ed. Günter Maschke (Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot, 1995), 401-422, p. 409; Carl Schmitt, Dialogues on Space and Power, trans. Samuel Garrett
Zeitlin (Cambridge: Polity), p. 71; William Hooker, Carl Schmitt’s International Thought (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 70, 89, 90.
17 On Schmitt and Disraeli, particularly as an anti-Semitic trope, see Samuel Garrett Zeitlin, ‘Propaganda and
Critique: An Introduction to Land and Sea,’ in Schmitt, Land and Sea, pp. xliv, xlviii; Schmitt, Land and
Sea, p. 82n129. See also Schmitt, ‘Das Meer gegen das Land,’ p. 397; Reinhard Mehring, Carl Schmitt:
Aufstieg und Fall (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2009), p. 427.
18 Schmitt, Land und Meer, 95. ‘Der große Fisch, der Leviathan, konnte sich in Bewegung setzen und andere
Ozeane aufsuchen.’ Of course, over forty years before Tancred’s publication, the Portuguese court had
moved to Brazil; however, Schmitt glosses over this challenge to his narrative.
19 Carl Schmitt, Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes (Cologne: Hohenheim Verlag, 1982 [1938]),
p. 34.
20 Schmitt, Land und Meer, p. 66. ‘Die Menschen können sich . . . einen leeren Raum vorstellen.’
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‘abstention from topos’ as ‘only the first, superficial negative aspect of the matter.’21 Instead,
the concept of utopia transcends its historical origins and negates the core of Schmitt’s
understanding of law and its relationship to space: ‘this abstention from space and place,
this de-localization, is an abstraction from the relationship – eternal for a man of antiquity –
of localization and order.’ As Schmitt summarizes his position, ‘every order is a concretely
localized law. Law is law only at the right location, on this side of the “line”!’22 Utopian
‘de-localization’ thereby functions as the negation of law by denying law’s connection to
the earth – to follow Schmitt’s logic, there can be no concrete law without a corresponding
localization,23 and because utopianism de-localizes, it is therefore not possible for there to
be law in a utopia.24
From this interpretation of utopia as the negation of law, Schmitt proceeds to reject
depictions of ‘utopia as any desired fantasy or ideal construction,’ as the term was used by
contemporaries such as Ernst Bloch.25 Instead, utopia is a ‘system of thought based on the
premise of sublating space and of delocalization, on the no-longer-spatially-boundedness
of human coexistence.’26 In attempting to sublate spatial distinctions, utopianism ‘makes
man master over nature’ and is characterized by ‘the “receding of natural barriers.”’27 This
last line is a direct reference to the work of Georg Lukács and his reading of capitalism in
History and Class Consciousness, cited in Glossarium just three days later.28 As Lukács
notes, ‘the uniqueness of capitalism is that it sublates all “natural barriers” and transforms the
21 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 35; cf. Schmitt, ‘Staatliche Souveränität und freies Meer,’ p. 410. ‘das Absehen von
topos . . . das ist nur das erste, oberflächliche Negative der Sache.’
22 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 35. The last sentence is a play on the word ‘Recht’ as both law and right. For the
significance of ‘the line’ in Schmitt’s history of the law of nations, see Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, pp.
54-69; and Carl Schmitt, ‘Die letzte globale Linie (1943),’ in Staat, Großraum, Nomos, pp. 440-448. ‘Dieses
Absehen von Raum und Ort, diese Ent-Ortung, ist ein Abstrahieren von dem (für einen antiken Menschen
ewigen) Zusammenhang von Ortung und Ordnung. Jede Ordnung ist konkret geortetes Recht. Recht ist
Recht nur am rechten Ort, diesseits der “Linie”!’
23 Carl Schmitt, Über die drei Arten rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2006
[1934]), pp. 13n3, 19-20.
24 Cf. Lyman Tower Sargent, ‘Authority & Utopia: Utopianism in Political Thought,’ Polity 14 (1982), 565-84,
p. 582; Lyman Tower Sargent, “A Note on the Other Side of Human Nature,” Political Theory 3 (1975),
88-97, pp. 91-92. For Schmitt, the mere presence of judges and a legal code does not constitute law as a
concrete order.
25 For a highly influential contemporary use of utopianism as ‘social dreaming’ and ‘fantasy,’ see Ernst Bloch,
Das Prinzip Hoffnung (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1955), pp. 13-27.
26 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 35: ‘Ich sehe also in der Utopie nicht eine beliebige Phantastik oder Idealkon-
struktion, sondern ein auf der Voraussetzung der Raumaufhebung und Entortung, auf der Nicht-mehr-
Raumgebundenheit menschlichen Zusammenlebens errichtetes Gedankensystem.’
27 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 35: ‘das “Zurückweichen der Naturschranke”’; ‘den Menschen zum Herrn der
Natur macht.’
28 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 37. Schmitt had previously used this quotation from Lukács in Schmitt, ‘Das
Zeitalter der Neutralisierungen und Entpolitisierungen,’ in Der Begriff des Politischen. Synoptische Ausgabe,
p. 257.
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totality of human relations to one another into purely social ones.’29 For Schmitt, however, it
is not capitalism as such that operates as the motor of this recession, but rather the process
– initiated in England and reflected in More’s Utopia – of rationalization and technicity
that he asserts would still exist under socialism.30 As Schmitt writes immediately after
quoting Lukács, ‘Man creates for itself its own world according to rational considerations.
With increasing technology, utopia escalates in this sense to ever increasingly audacious
dimensions.’31 Indeed, at the margins of his notebook, Schmitt wrote ‘There is only utopian
socialism (everything else is National-Socialism); the scientificity of Socialism is precisely
that which is utopian.’32 Utopian thought in this first sense is the human attempt to displace
natural barriers and transform itself through de-territorialization into an abstract humanity
encompassing the entire world, a process which Schmitt had already vehemently rejected as
a form of deception.33
However, the impulse to overcome natural barriers in a spatial sense represents only
the first phase of utopian thought in Schmitt’s history. The second phase, in contrast, is
characterized by the attempt to overcome the final natural barrier: utopian displacement
turns its gaze inwards to human nature.34 This second phase is the construction of ‘a
community made out of systematically standardized humans.’35 While the first phase was
captured in More’s Utopia, the second phase was encapsulated in Aldous Huxley’s Brave
New World, ‘the great significance of which is based on the systematically altered nature
of man by man.’36 In Schmitt’s characterization, Brave New World represents the ’total
planning, which also brings in the natural characteristics of human Physis and Psyche into its
de-localization.’37 Indeed, Huxley and More are the representatives of two distinct phases
29 Georg Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1968), p. 166.
The exact phrase is repeated twice at pp. 409, 413: ‘Die Einzigartigkeit des Kapitalismus besteht gerade
darin, daß er alle “Naturschranken” aufhebt und die Gesamtheit der Beziehungen der Menschen zueinander
in rein gesellschaftliche verwandelt.’
30 Cf. John McCormick, ‘Transcending Weber’s Categories of Modernity? The Early Lukács and Schmitt on
the Rationalization Thesis,’ New German Critique 75 (1998), 133-77, pp. 139, 151.
31 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 35: ‘Der Mensch schafft sich nach rationale Gesichtspunkten seine eigene Welt.
Mit steigender Technik steigt daher die Utopie in diesem Sinne in immer kühnere Dimensionen.’
32 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 35: ‘Es gibt nur utopischen Sozialismus (jeder andere ist National-Sozialismus); die
Wissenschaftlichkeit des Sozialismus ist gerade das Utopische).’ Emphasis added.
33 Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963 [1932]), pp. 36-37, 55.
34 In contrast, see Sargent’s reading of More that ‘More argued that a much better life could be developed
without changing the basic nature of the people’ in Lyman Tower Sargent, ‘A Note on the Other Side of
Human Nature in the Utopian Novel,’ Political Theory 3:1 (1975), 88-97, p. 91.
35 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 35: ‘ein aus dem planmäßig genormten Menschen zusammengesetztes Gemeinwe-
sen.’ A variation of the same claim is made on page 89.
36 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 35: ‘dessen große Bedeutung auf dieser von Menschen planmäßig veränderten
Natur des Menschen beruht.’
37 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 36: ‘die totale Planung, die auch die natürlichen Gegebenheiten der menschlichen
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in the development of utopian thought: ‘It is the monstrous, oppressive, practically and
theoretically overwhelmingly logical New World of Aldous Huxley, which today defines the
concept of utopia and, at the same time, that of the New World.’ Thus, Huxley can be seen as
the culmination of the process unleashed by More: ‘Thomas More brings the de-localization,
at the start of the geographical spatial revolution; Huxley the de-humanization, at the start of
the technical spatial revolution.’38 As Schmitt would rephrase it less than a month later, ‘An
end to utopia! Aldous Huxley closes the epoch of utopia, Thomas More opened it. He can
now be canonized, while Huxley (a nation) can only be condemned out of her own mouth.’ 39
Schmitt’s characterization of Brave New World as the culmination of utopian thought
is crucial in three ways. First, it collapses the supposed distinction between utopian and
dystopian texts by placing Huxley’s novel within the same historical process as More’s
Utopia – de-localization turned from the external world to ‘the last natural barrier, human
nature itself.’40 Schmitt’s point in doing so is that, far from producing ideal states, all utopias
are in fact horrifying.41 It is not that utopian projects devolved and became dystopian, but
rather that all utopias – in so far as they contain the essential element of de-localization – are
representative of that ‘bad place.’ Nor is it, following Lyman Sargent’s recent scholarship,
‘this desire to bring reality into accord with unrealistic goals that gives utopians a bad name,’
but rather the act of displacement inherent in utopia itself.42 Second, by identifying this
second phase with Huxley, and including ‘(a nation)’ beside his name, Schmitt reinforces
his association of the decisive moments in the history of utopian thought with the English, a
supposedly de-territorialized people. In Schmitt’s world historical narrative, these two phases
are in fact connected, as ‘the industrial revolution transformed the children of the sea born
from the element of the sea into machine builders and machine operators.’43 Third, and most
Physis und Psyche in ihre Ent-Ortung einbezieht.’ The same description is in Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus,
p. 86.
38 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 36: ‘[es ist] die ungeheuerliche, erdrückende, praktisch und theoretisch über-
wältigend folgerichtige Neue Welt von Aldous Huxley, die heute den Begriff der Utopie und zugleich
den der Neuen Welt bestimmt. Thomas Morus bringt die Ent-Ortung, bei Beginn der geographischen
Raumrevolution; Huxley die Ent-Menschung, bei Beginn der technischen Raumrevolution.’
39 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 45. The italicized portions are written in English in Schmitt’s text. In addition, over
the word ‘nation’ he has written ‘people’ and over ‘her’ he has written ‘its’: ‘Schluß mit der Utopie! Aldous
Huxley schließt die Epoche der Utopie ab, Thomas Morus hat sie eröffnet. Er kann jetzt heilig gesprochen
werden, während Huxley (A nation), can only be condemned out of her own mouth.’
40 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 35: ‘Die letzte Naturschranke, die Natur des Menschen selbst.’
41 While Schmitt appears in Gregory Claeys’ recent work on the concept of dystopia, he is not considered as
having commented at any length on the concept. Gregory Claeys, Dystopia: A Natural History (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 18, 29, 121, 261, 497-498; for the definition of dystopia as ‘bad place,’
see Sargent, ‘The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited,’ p. 5; Sargent, ‘Authority and Utopia,’ p. 565.
42 Sargent, ‘Authority and Utopia,’ p. 583.
43 Schmitt, Land und Meer, p. 99; Carl Schmitt, Dialogues on Power and Space, trans. Samuel Garrett Zeitlin
(Cambridge: Polity, 2015), pp. 67-68, 72. ‘Die industrielle Revolution verwandelte die aus dem Element des
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significantly, utopian thought in this second phase is linked to technology as its means of
realization. Technology is what allows man to change his own nature and plan a world made
out of ‘systematically standardized humans.’ Indeed, Huxley’s Brave New World represents
the moment in which ‘the factory’ – the embodiment of rationality and technicity – can be
re-imagined as producing not just commodities but humans themselves as a standardized
commodity.44 Utopian thought therefore reaches is culmination in the exact moment that
humans are stripped of their humanity.
6.2 Technology, Utopia, and Annihilation
Beyond presenting a conceptual history of utopia in the form of the dual de-localization of
space and human nature, Glossarium contains a vehement rejection of utopian thought in all
of its contemporary iterations. This rejection is based on Schmitt’s broader understanding
of utopia as synonymous with annihilation [Vernichtung] literally read as the act of trans-
forming something into nothing. Using the work of both Karl Marx and Samuel Butler,
Schmitt grounds his polemic against utopian thought in a broader criticism of technology and
rationalization prevalent in German conservatism since the Weimar Republic.45 Technology,
utopia and annihilation thus form the key conceptual framework for Schmitt’s criticism.
The relationship between technology, utopia, and annihilation is best articulated in
Schmitt’s understanding of Marxism and its conception of history. It is perhaps surprising,
however, that Schmitt turned to the German-Jewish literary modernist, Alfred Döblin, for
his understanding of the relationship between history and utopia before turning to their
role in Marxism. Schmitt quotes Döblin’s text of 1948, titled ‘The German Utopia of 1933
and Literature,’ in which he characterizes utopia as ‘a human plan to suspend history, in
order to jump out of history and to achieve a stable perfection.’46 Of course, in referencing
Meeres geborenen Kinder der See in Maschinenbauer und Maschinenbediener.’
44 Carl Schmitt, Theodor Däublers ‘Nordlicht’ (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991 [1916]), pp. 59, 66; on
technology in Schmitt’s earlier works, see Duncan Kelly, The State of the Political: Conceptions of Politics
and the State in the Thought of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Franz Neumann (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), pp. 212-215; McCormick, ‘Transcending Weber’s Categories of Modernity?’, p. 142.
45 Peter Fritzsche, ‘Nazi Modernism,’ Modernism/Modernity 3(1) (1996), 1-22, pp. 13-4. Herf dates technolog-
ical pessimism to the period following the defeat of National Socialism, but this largely ignores Schmitt’s
texts prior to 1933, cited above. See Jeffrey Herf, ‘Belated Pessimism: Technology and Twentieth-Century
German Conservative Intellectuals,’ in Technology, Pessimism, and Postmodernism, eds. Yaron Ezrahi et al.
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993).
46 Quoted in Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 63. Original text in Alfred Döblin, ‘Die deutsche Utopie von 1933 und die
deutsche Literatur,’ in Schriften zu Ästhetik, Poetik und Literatur (Olten: Walter-Verlag, 1989), 367-403, p.
368: ‘Es ist ein menschlicher Plan, die Geschichte zu unterbrechen, um aus der Geschichte herauszuspringen
und zu einer stabilen Vollkommenheit zu gelangen.’
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‘The German Utopia of 1933,’ Döblin was not writing about Marxism but rather National
Socialism. For Döblin, National Socialism constituted a utopian ideology and maintained
a ‘utopian core’ in so far as ‘a fantasy is conjured up, which ought to triumph over this
confused, historical reality. One constructs a condition that should build the culmination, the
height, the conclusion of this historical process.’47 After 1933, this fantasy took the form of
a biological utopia – the ‘Third Reich’ – as the supposedly stable, teleological endpoint to
German history.48 But in so doing, National Socialist ideology was in fact trying to escape –
or ‘jump out of,’ as Döblin phrases it – ‘historical reality’ through the assertion of a völkisch
‘fantasy.’
Schmitt takes Döblin’s interpretation of National Socialism as attempting to jump out of
history and turns it on its head as it applies to Marxism. Echoing Marx’s famous eleventh
thesis on Feuerbach – ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways;
the point, however, is to change it’49 – Schmitt claims that Marx’s ‘scientific nature signifies
the pretense of changing the world without leaping out of history.’50 Instead, Marx’s vision
relies on machines for its enactment within the confines of a materialist conception of history:
‘the machine is the tool dedicated to utopia, the weapon of plan fulfillment.’51 Thus, in
contrast to Döblin’s interpretation of National Socialism, it was not necessary to suspend
history to bring about a utopia in Marx’s understanding, since machines themselves posed
the promise of overcoming mankind: ‘the machine differentiates itself from the tool in the
sense that it in itself transcends the human who holds a tool, the manual laborer. Therein, in
this transcendence, lies already utopia.’52
Furthermore, Schmitt’s characterization of Marx as a utopian theorist mobilizes Marx’s
own objections to utopian socialism in order to convict him of being a utopian theorist
himself. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels label Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles
47 Döblin, ‘Die deutsche Utopie von 1933,’ p. 368: ‘Und da wird . . . ein Traumbild hineingezaubert, das über
diese konfuse, geschichtliche Realität triumphieren soll. Man konstruiert einen Zustand, der die Kulmination,
die Blüte, den Abschluß des historischen Prozesses bilden soll.’
48 Frank-Lothar Kroll, Utopie als Ideologie. Geschichtsdenken und politisches Handeln im Dritten Reich (Pader-
born: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1998); Joshua Smeltzer, “‘Germany’s Salvation”: Carl Schmitt’s Teleological
History of the Second Reich,’ History of European Ideas 44, no. 5 (2018): 590-604.
49 Karl Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach,’ The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton,
1978), p. 145. Emphasis in original.
50 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 63: “‘Wissenschaftlichkeit” [bedeutet] den Anspruch, die Welt zu verändern, ohne
aus der Geschichte herauszuspringen.’ Emphasis added.
51 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 63: ‘Die Maschine ist das der Utopie zugeordnete Werkzeug, die Waffe der
Planverwirklichung.’ For Schmitt’s previous equation of technology as ‘always only an instrument and a
weapon,’ see Schmitt, ‘Das Zeitalter der Neutralisierungen,’ p. 254.
52 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 63: ‘Die Maschine unterscheidet sich vom Werkzeug dadurch, daß sie in sich selbst
den das Werkzeug handhabenden Menschen, den Handwerker, transzendiert. Darin, in dieser Transzendenz,
liegt schon die Utopie.’
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Fourier, and Robert Owen as utopian socialists and castigate them for attempting to ‘deaden
the class struggle and to reconcile the class antagonisms.’53 As Engels developed the line
of attack in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, utopian socialists attempted to solve social
problems by recourse to reason – for them, ‘socialism is the expression of the absolute truth,
reason and justice, and has only to be discovered to conquer all the world by virtue of its own
power.’54 In Engels’ eyes, however, this was nothing more than ‘pure fantasy.’55 In contrast
to the naiveté of their utopian predecessors, Marx is hailed as being the first to deliver a
‘scientific’ socialism through ‘two great discoveries’: the theory of surplus value and the
materialist conception of history.56 Indeed, utopian socialist planning is rendered useless
once one accepts a scientific view of history.57 However, Schmitt weaponizes and deploys
the claim to work within a materialist telos of history – articulated as a form of scientific
socialism – against Marx as evidence of his own utopianism. As Schmitt would rephrase
his critique in The Tyranny of Values (1960) – with a direct citation of Engels’ text – ‘today,
science and utopia have long been reciprocally coordinated [gleichgeschaltet].’58 The two
concepts are in fact interlocked in Schmitt’s critique of utopianism.
Schmitt extends his critique by arguing that annihilation functions as the hidden concep-
tual mechanism underlying utopian thought. While Marx hoped to change the world and
usher in a utopian age through machines, Schmitt counters that machines can only change
the world by first destroying it. This destruction takes the form of spatial de-localization,
of removing spatial specificity and replacing it with abstract nothingness – annihilation.
In the sentence immediately following his criticism of Marx, Schmitt pivots to the book
of Revelations, asking ‘what does Rev 21:1 mean: new earth; without sea? A utopia?’59
Revelations 21:1 presents a description of the transformation of the world at the end of times:
‘And I saw a new heaven and a new earth: for the first heaven and the first earth were passed
away; and there was no more sea.’ Only then is the Holy City, new Jerusalem, said to descend
from heaven.
The annihilation intrinsic to utopian thought plays a pivotal role in Revelations as the
53 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, ‘The Manifest of the Communist Party,’ in The Marx-Engels Reader, p.
499.
54 Friedrich Engels, ‘Socialism: Utopian and Scientific,’ in The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 693.
55 Engels, ‘Socialism: Utopian and Scientific,’ p. 687.
56 Engels, ‘Socialism: Utopian and Scientific,’ p. 700.
57 David Leopold, ‘Socialism and (the Rejection of) Utopia,’ Journal of Political Ideologies 12 (2007), 219-237,
p. 233.
58 Carl Schmitt, Die Tyrannei der Werte (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2011 [1960/1967]), p. 20: ‘Heute haben
Wissenschaft und Utopie sich längst gegenseitig gleichgeschaltet.’
59 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 64. Schmitt uses the abbreviation for ‘Apocalypse’ instead of ‘Revelations’ in his
text, following die Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Giesler and Tielke, ‘Einleitung,’ p. ix. The same verse is
cited in Schmitt, Dialogues, p. 56: ‘Was bedeutet Apk 21,1: neue Erde; ohne Meer? Eine Utopie?’
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establishment of the Holy City only occurs after judgment, when disbelievers are said to
be cast into lakes of fire. That pools of fire precede the Holy City is essential in Schmitt’s
reading, as fire is the element related to ‘explosions’ and ‘the modern means of annihilation’
in his theory of the four basic elements.60 Indeed, Schmitt turns to a secularized version
of Revelations 21:1 in his description of the detonation of explosives on Helgoland after
World War II: ‘What does the destruction of the island of Helgoland in 1947/48 signify? A
piece of land was leveled to the sea, sunk into the sea . . . The first time in history. U-topia;
transformation of a very strong localization into nothing. Annihilation.’61 For Schmitt, the
bombing of Helgoland demonstrated an interplay between annihilation as the end of history
and technology as its means of fulfillment: technology was employed to bring about the end
of history for the island. Furthermore, it was the British – the nation linked to both phases
of de-localization in utopian thought in Schmitt’s conceptual history – who engineered one
of the largest non-nuclear explosions in history. Thus, Schmitt’s reference to the bombing
of Helgoland as creating a ‘U-topia’ establishes utopia and annihilation as two sides of the
same coin: the bombing transformed Helgoland into a utopia, a no-place.
6.3 Enmity and Utopia
When Schmitt returns to the concept of utopia less than a month later, he begins once again
with the interplay of utopia and the fantasy of stability found in Alfred Döblin’s work: ‘What
is a utopia? The sublation of the infinite possibilities of mankind in a final realization; at first
only thought, then realized. Because every thought of man is fulfilled.’62 This time, however,
Schmitt emphasizes a temporal aspect of utopia, claiming that utopianism closes off the
potential for future change. This closing off is articulated in the opposition between the finite
and the infinite in the temporal horizon of the future: ‘The sin of utopia lies in the fact that
the realization in the finite should sublate angst, which lies in the possibility of the infinite.’63
Here, Schmitt turns to a central theme in the conceptual history of utopia, one that Reinhart
Koselleck would echo in his analysis of Mercier and the ‘temporalization of utopia’ decades
60 Carl Schmitt, ‘Maritime Weltpolitik,’ in Staat, Großraum, Nomos, 478-480, p. 479; Schmitt, Land and Sea,
p. 91; Zeitlin, ‘Propaganda and Critique,’ p. lxviii.
61 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 64: ‘Was bedeutet die Vernichtung der Insel Helgoland 1947/48? Ein Stück Land
wird dem Meer gleich gemacht, ins Meer versenkt . . . Erstmalig in der Geschichte. U-topie; Verwandlung
einer sehr starken Ortung ins Nichts. Vernichtung.’
62 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 71: ‘Was ist eine Utopie? Die Aufhebung der unendlichen Möglichkeiten des
Menschen in einer endlichen Realisierung; Erst nur gedacht, dann verwirklicht. Denn jeder Gedanke des
Menschen geht in Erfüllung.’
63 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 71: ‘Die Sünde der Utopie liegt darin, daß die Realisierung im Endlichen die Angst
aufheben soll, die in der Möglichkeit des Unendlichen liegt.’
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later,64 writing ‘utopia is the paradise that lies in the distant but still attainable future.’65
However, unlike Koselleck’s work, Schmitt’s interpretation emphasizes the negating and
destructive capacity of utopian thought. He writes,
The capability to think of what is distant is becoming ever more slight. Therefore, the
utopian of the nineteenth century must transition into positive scientificity and assert
that paradise can already dawn tomorrow if we only quickly and radically eliminate
and annihilate, completely eradicate the last barrier: capitalists, Jews, Jesuits or Hitler.
Unfortunately, some always remain leftover.66
Schmitt statement is remarkable for two reasons. First, it insists on the negative element of
utopian thought, on annihilation as its means of fulfillment. Schmitt’s argument is that the
promise of a utopian future can be used to justify the annihilation of any barrier preventing
its fulfillment, including the annihilation of human life. Second, in placing both Jews
and Hitler within the same list, Schmitt asserts an equivalence between the Holocaust and
Stauffenberg’s assassination attempt on Hitler, both of which Schmitt interprets as acts aimed
at the realization of utopias.67
Crucially, Schmitt’s interpretation of the utopian drive to annihilation extends beyond
the annihilation of space, elucidated in his example of the bombing of Helgoland, to the
annihilation of humans as the final barrier to utopian realization. As such, his theory of
utopian annihilation corresponds to the two phases of de-localization given in his conceptual
history. Indeed, it is only in the second phase that the increasing power of science, technology,
and machines could be utilized in the present for the establishment of an imminent utopia
through the elimination of enmity. But as Schmitt himself noted, the utopian impulse towards
the complete annihilation of the enemy is impossible to fulfill, as new enemies and new
wars will inevitably emerge. Quoting from Virgil, Schmitt notes ‘erunt etiam altera bella’
– there will be other wars. As early as The Concept of the Political, Schmitt held that the
complete neutralization of enmity was in fact a liberal deception; instead, there will always
64 Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Die Verzeitlichung der Utopie,’ in Zeitschichten (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2000), 131-149.
That there would be similarities is not surprising. See Niklas Olsen, History in the Plural (New York:
Berghahn, 2014).
65 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 71: ‘Die Utopie ist das in der fernen, aber doch erreichbaren Zukunft liegende
Paradies.’
66 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 71. That Schmitt wished to eliminate the influence of Jewish thought in jurisprudence
and held a conference on ‘Das Judentum in der Rechtswissenschaft’ on October 3 & 4, 1936 remains unsaid.
See Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, pp. 372-378. ‘Die Fähigkeit, in die Ferne zu denken, wird immer geringer.
Deshalb muß der Utopist des 19. Jahrhunderts von der Utopie zur positive Wissenschaftlichkeit übergehen
und behaupten, daß das Paradies morgen schon anbrechen kann, wenn wir nur schnell und radikal das letzte
Hindernis – die Kapitalisten, die Juden, die Jesuiten oder Hitler – beseitigen und vernichten, restlos ausrotten.
Leider bleiben immer einige Reste.’
67 For Schmitt’s criticism of Stauffenberg, see Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 178: ‘So bleibt nur der a deo excitatus.
Das war Stauffenberg nicht.’
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be a new enemy once the previous enemy has been eradicated.68 Complete security could
only come after the elimination of enmity, but this is a conceptual impossibility in Schmitt’s
understanding, as it would mean a neutralization of the concept of the political.69 Here,
he asks ‘what does Hobbes want: public tranquility and stability. However, he still knows:
complete security is not to be expected in this life; therefore, we will try what is possible;
these are the modest, not yet intoxicated utopians.’70 Hobbes knows that complete security is
impossible while nevertheless still desiring it.71 Likewise, Thomas More is also revealed as
a ‘modest utopian,’ in so far as he and Hobbes ‘do not yet believe in global world peace.’72
Indeed, Schmitt claims that Thomas More’s Utopia is in fact not utopian despite lending
its name to the concept; instead, the text presents a eutopia, a claim Schmitt repeats in two
consecutive entries. The conceptual distinction between eutopia and utopia turns on the role
of machines in the construction of utopias: ‘The machine is not a means of happiness, but
rather of utopia. But with More, there appear no machines.’73 Indeed, he continues by noting
‘The Utopia of Thomas More is not yet a scientific Utopia; it is rather a Eutopia: “More’s
Gay Genius” was not capable of a Machine-Utopia.’74 Without the presence of machines,
More’s text presents a eutopia; machines, in their destructive capacity, are thus the necessary
means for the annihilation of space and enmity inherent in a u-topia.
Due to the destructive capacity of machines, Schmitt posits a fundamental tension between
68 In his highly influential translation of The Concept of the Political, George Schwab has inserted the word
‘utopian,’ although Schmitt himself did not use the term. See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political,
trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 55.
69 See Stephen Legg, ‘Interwar Spatial Chaos: Imperialism, Internationalism and the League of Nations,’ in
Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos, ed. Stephen Legg (London: Rutledge,
2011), 114.
70 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 71. The italicized text is in Latin in the original and ‘plena’ is underlined. Here,
Schmitt is quoting from Augustine; he has previously used this line in the third edition of the Concept of the
Political after Leo Strauss’ criticism, indicating that he accepted Strauss’ position. See Heinrich Meier, Carl
Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995), pp. 44-46. Also
quoted in Heinrich Meier, The Lesson of Carl Schmitt (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998), p. 165.
Additionally, while Jens Meierhenrich discusses this quote, he fails to locate it within Schmitt’s criticism of
utopianism. See Jens Meierhenrich, ‘Fearing the Disorder of Things: The Development of Carl Schmitt’s
Institutional Theory, 1919-1942,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt, eds. Jens Meierhenrich and
Oliver Simons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 197. ‘Was will Hobbes: Öffentliche Ruhe und
Sicherheit; doch er weiß noch: plena securitas in hac vita non expectanda; versuchen wir also das Mögliche;
das sind die bescheidenen, noch nicht berauschten Utopisten.’
71 See Heinrich Meier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1995), pp. 44-46.
72 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 71: ‘Sie glauben noch nicht an den globalen Weltfrieden.’ Emphasis added.
73 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 71: ‘Die Maschine ist nicht das Mittel des Glücks, sondern der Utopie. Aber bei
Morus kommen doch noch keine Maschinen vor.’
74 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 72: ‘Die Utopie des Thomas Morus ist noch keine wissenschaftliche Utopia; sie ist
eher eine Eutopie: “More’s gay genius” war keiner Maschinen-Utopie fähig.’
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freedom and technology: ‘The escape from freedom is in concreto nothing other than the
escape into technology . . . The way towards this freedom would be therefore the way out
of technology.’75 Schmitt identifies the path into this freedom as none other than Samuel
Butler’s Erewhon, a utopian novel set in a land where all machines invented in the previous
271 years were destroyed. Schmitt himself is struck by the significance of Butler’s analysis,
writing ‘time and again the paramount position of Samuel Butler; how should one write the
intellectual history of the 19th century without knowing him?’ Indeed, Schmitt wonders,
‘How could Ernst Jünger write Der Arbeiter without knowing him? The most superior
treatment of the topic: technology and technocracy.’76 The significance of Butler’s critique
for Schmitt’s understanding is in questioning the relationship between man and machine:
‘The servant glides by imperceptible approaches into the master. Is not machinery linked with
animal life in an infinite variety of ways? Belongs to the Lev.[iathan] as great machine.’77
Butler earns such high praise from Schmitt specifically for chapters 23-25 on ‘The Book
of the Machines,’ originally published in three parts as ‘Darwin among the Machines,’ ‘The
Mechanical Creation,’ and ‘Lucubratio Ebria.’ As Schmitt wrote to Ernst Jünger on May 5,
1948, ‘Butler’s letter of 1863 on “Darwin among the Machines” . . . contains the essential
concept.’78 In these chapters, the narrator of Erewhon finally learns the reasoning behind
the destruction of all machines in the land, namely that ‘there is no security . . . against
the ultimate development of mechanical consciousness, in the fact of machines possessing
little consciousness now.’79 Indeed, central to the argument presented is that machines and
humanity have become so intertwined that it is impossible to conceive of one without the
other. As Butler writes in ‘The Book of Machines’:
If all machines were to be annihilated at one moment . . . and if all knowledge of
mechanical laws were taken from him so that he could make no more machines . . . we
should become extinct in six weeks . . . Man’s very soul is due to the machines; it is a
machine-made thing: he thinks as he thinks, and feels as he feels, through the work that
machines have wrought upon him, and their existence is quite as much as sine qua non
75 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 101. On this theme in Schmitt’s earlier thought, see John McCormick, ‘Fear,
Technology, and the State: Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss, and the Revival of Hobbes in Weimar and National
Socialist Germany,’ Political Theory 22, no. 4 (1994), 619-652; John McCormick, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of
Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology (Cambridge University Press, 1997): ’Die Flucht vor der Freiheit
ist in concreto nichts anderes als die Flucht in die Technik . . . Der Weg in diese Freiheit wäre demnach der
Weg aus der Technik.’
76 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 62. ‘Wie konnte Ernst Jünger den “Arbeiter” schreiben ohne ihn zu kennen? Die
überlegenste Behandlung des Themas: Technik und Technokratie.’
77 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 62. The italicized text is in English in the original. Cf. Schmitt, Der Leviathan in
der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes; McCormick, ‘Fear, Technology, and the State,’ pp. 637, 639. ‘Gehört
zum Lev.[iathan] als große Maschine.’
78 Ernst Jünger and Carl Schmitt, Briefe 1930-1983, ed. Helmuth Kiesel (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1999), p. 227.
79 Samuel Butler, Erewhon (London: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 199.
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for his, as his for theirs.80
In other words, the typical relationship between man and machine has been reversed – instead
of machines being dependent on man, it is now man who is dependent on machines for his
reproduction and sustenance. Indeed, the omnipresence of machines has annihilated human
nature, transforming it into a ‘machine-made thing’ in the promise of establishing a scientific
utopia. This was the utopian promise of technicity: the annihilation of human nature.
Moreover, Schmitt sees in the nineteenth century author an early prognosis of ‘new
criminalizations (elimination of enmity through the elimination of the distinction between
enemy and criminal).’ He writes, ‘Samuel Butler Erewhon (1872, Ch XI on Some Erewhonian
Trials): Misfortune is considered more or less criminal . . . The judge says then: it is not my
business to justify the law. To be born to sick parents is an exceedingly peculiar crime for
the Erewhonians.’81 In this passage, Schmitt references the words of a system of justice that
explicitly bases itself on an understanding of natural law. The same judge declares during
sentencing, ‘nature attaches a severe penalty to such offences, and human law must emphasize
the decrees of nature’ – thus being sick must be considered a crime.82 As I have argued in
the previous chapters, Schmitt would have been sympathetic to the critique of natural law;
however, he is using the utopian text as a satire of a wider process of criminalization extending
into the biological, ‘about which we seldomly still dare to laugh after our experiences.’83
Butler’s depiction of the criminalization of sickness is merely the absurd endpoint to an
impulse towards criminalization as another means of ‘the elimination of enmity.’
In a letter to Wilhelm Grewe, the German international lawyer and diplomat, dated April 3,
1948, Schmitt explicitly links Butler’s criminalization of illness to the criminalization of wars
of aggression.84 Schmitt’s letter is framed as a commentary on Grewe’s Nuremberg as a Legal
Question (1947), which Schmitt lauded for performing a ‘great, decisive methodological
service’ in maintaining a distinction between the criminalization of wars of aggression and
other ‘crimes of war’ and ‘crimes against humanity.’85 For Schmitt, ‘the problem of new
80 Butler, Erewhon, p. 207.
81 Schmitt, Glossarium, pp. 57-58: ‘Neue Kriminalisierungen (Abschaffung der Feindschaft durch Abschaffung
der Unterscheidung von Feind und Verbrecher ... Von kranken Eltern geboren zu werden, ist ein ganz
besonderes Verbrechen bei den Erewhonianern.’
82 Butler, Erewhon, p. 113.
83 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 90: ‘über die wir nach unseren Erfahrungen kaum noch zu lachen wagen.’
84 Copied into Schmitt, Glossarium, pp. 89-91. On Grewe, see Bardo Fassbender, ‘Stories of War and
Peace: On Writing the History of International Law in the “Third Reich” and After,”’ European Journal of
International Law 13 (2002), 479-512; Jochen Frowein, ‘Wilhelm G. Grewe’ in Staatsrechtlehrer des 20.
Jahrhunderts eds. Peter Häberle, Michael Kilian, & Heinrich Wolff (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 790-797;
Stephen Neff, ‘Wilhelm Grewe. The Epochs of International Law,’ Journal of the History of International
Law 3(2) (2001), 252-254.
85 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 90. ‘ein großes, entscheidendes methodologisches Verdienst.’
152 Technology, Law, and Annihilation: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Utopianism
criminalizations and penalizations’ had extended from ‘the modern dissolution of criminal
law into the annihilation of pests and those who disturb the peace, all the way to the biological
criminalization of sickness in Samuel Butler’s Erewhon.’86 This letter to Grewe establishes
Butler’s Erewhon as both representing the endpoint of a process of criminalization as well as
confirming Schmitt’s claim that criminalization justifies the annihilation of those who break
the law; in the law of nations, this meant that war was no longer fought between two enemies
on the same level, but rather a discriminating war fought against an international criminal.87
6.4 Utopia, Nihilism, and the New Nomos of the Earth
The previous sections of this chapter have dealt with Schmitt as a private intellectual, writing
within the confines of his ‘asylum’ in Plettenberg after his release from Nuremberg.88 At the
same time as he recorded his private reflections in Glossarium, Schmitt was also revising and
expanding what would become his post-war magnum opus, The Nomos of the Earth, a project
which he had started during the last years of the war.89 While much of Schmitt’s analysis
of utopia and utopianism fell away in this public manuscript, traces of his characterization
of utopia and its relation to technology and annihilation remained. However, in this text,
Schmitt’s commentary would turn on the relationship between utopia, nihilism, and the new
nomos of the earth.
The work begins with five introductory corollaries, the third of which, titled ‘Notes on the
Law of Nations of the Christian Middle Ages,’ discusses the concrete order of the Respublica
Christiana with its basic dualism of Imperium and Sacerdotium, emperor and Pope.90 This
epoch was defined by a basic distinction between Christian and non-Christian states for the
differentiation of types of war, meaning that just war theory was circumscribed by a historical
and spatial division of peoples.91 However, this period gave way to ‘an entirely different
spatial order,’ the birth of the modern jus publicum Europaeum characterized by the legal
titles of occupation and discovery. This new epoch saw the rise of ‘the centralized, spatially
86 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 90. ‘Schädlinge’ is a play on words as both pests, ie. as carriers of disease, as well
as someone who damages, derived from the verb ‘schaden.’ Schmitt would have been well aware of the use
of the term ‘Volksschädling’ as a National Socialist legal concept. ‘Das Problem der Neu-Kriminalisierungen
und Poenalisierungen . . . den modernen Auflösungen des Strafrechts in Vernichtung der Schädlinge und
Störenfriede, bis zu den biologistischen Kriminalisierungen der Krankheit in Samuel Butlers Erewhon.’
87 Carl Schmitt, Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2007 [1938]),
p. 8.
88 Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, p. 452; Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, pp. 96-99.
89 Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, pp. 430-431.
90 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 28.
91 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 35.
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self-contained, European territorial state, sovereign with respect to the emperor and pope,
but also with respect to each of its neighbors.’92
For Schmitt, the historical transformation of the Respublica Christiana into the jus
publicum Europaeum brought with it ‘tumultuous situations of the worst kind,’ namely
the introduction of anarchy into the international system, the result of the formation of
competing sovereign states. Central to Schmitt’s history of the European law of nations is
that anarchy does not imply absolute lawlessness; rather, echoing Schmitt’s letter to Grewe on
new criminalizations in Butler’s Erewhon, it allowed for ‘the opponent to be recognized as an
enemy on the same level, as justus hostis.’93 In other words, in the jus publicum Europaeum
enmity was not criminalized but was still a legal institution. Schmitt emphasizes this point
once more: ‘Anarchy and law need not exclude one another.’94
Schmitt draws on the concept of utopia to drive a wedge between anarchy and nihilism
on the possibility of the continued presence of law. In the case of nihilism, ‘the specific
negativity must be made conscious, through which nihilism receives its historical place, its
topos . . . It becomes apparent namely in the connection between utopia and nihilism, that
only a final and categorical separation of order and localization in an historically specific
sense can be named nihilism.’95 Schmitt’s statement here can only be read in light of his
definition of utopia as a form of de-localization through annihilation. Nihilism and utopia
are therefore conceptually linked: both concepts posit a break with space and instead replace
it with an abstract nothingness.96 This abstract nothingness is the ‘specific negativity’ of
nihilism as a historical movement, the very same abstract nothingness found in the u-topos.
Schmitt draws on this distinction once again to attack a variation of pacifism associated
with his repeated target of polemics, the international lawyer and editor of Friedens-Warte
Hans Wehberg: ‘the great problems of the law of nations are not as easy as that League of
Nations pacifism characterizes it with its catchword of anarchy.’97 Instead, he insists that
92 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 36: ‘Sie entsteht mit dem zentralisierten, gegenüber Kaiser und Papst, aber
auch gegenüber jedem Nachbarn souveränen, räumlich in sich geschlossenen, europäischen Flächenstaat.’
93 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 159. ‘Daß der Gegner als Feind auf gleicher Ebene, als justis hostis
anerkannt wird.’
94 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 159. ‘Anarchie und Recht brauchen sich nicht auszuschließen.’
95 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 36. ‘Die spezifische Negativität [muß] bewußt werden, durch die der
Nihilismus seinen geschichtlichen Platz, seinen Topos erhält . . . In dem Zusammenhang von Utopie und
Nihilismus wird nämlich sichtbar, daß erst eine endgültige und grundsätzliche Trennung von Ordnung und
Ortung in einem geschichtlich-spezifischen Sinne Nihilismus genannt werden kann.’
96 See Minca and Rowan, On Schmitt and Space, pp. 193-194.
97 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 159. Schmitt uses the present tense indicating that this particular brand
of pacifism lived on after the dissolution of the League of Nations itself in 1946, The particular target
Schmitt’s polemic would have been Hans Wehberg, cited on the previous page, and one of Schmitt’s
recurring targets. On ‘League of Nations Pacifism,’ see Monica Garcia-Salmones, ‘Walther Schücking
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the ‘anarchical methods’ of the Middle Ages were not a form of nihilism, as ‘they knew
and defended . . . true law, which consists in secure localizations and orders.’98 For Schmitt,
‘this alone is decisive, because there is the possibility of differentiating sensible wars from
wars of annihilation and, in contrast with the tabula rasa of nihilist legalizations, to save
the possibilities of concrete orders.’99 The connection between nihilism and tabula rasa is
significant, as it implies that nihilism wants to cut off history, to cut off the very foundation
for Schmitt’s attempted rescue of jurisprudence in historicity.
For Schmitt, the radical negativity of nihilism is derived from its origins in utopian thought.
Schmitt once again contextualizes the emergence of utopian thought within England’s world-
historical shift to a ‘maritime existence.’100 Using almost identical language to that in his
first entry on utopia in Glossarium, he maintains that ‘the island became the bearer of the
spatial transformation to a new nomos of the earth, potentially even already the jumping-off
point for the later leap into the complete delocalization of modern technology.’101 All of this
is represented in the word utopia, which Schmitt claims ‘could only emerge in that period
and on the English island in order . . . to become the signature of an entire era.’102 This forms
a central moment in Schmitt’s history, as it posits the rise of utopianism with an epochal shift
in the law of nations. Indeed, Schmitt writes ‘I therefore did not want to leave unmentioned
such a significant work and word as this Utopia by Thomas More before I began with the
controversies in the law of nations on the freedom of the seas.’103
Schmitt then imports his argument from Glossarium that the word utopia contains within
it a radically negative element, pointing to the content of the work and the very title itself as
and the Pacifist Traditions of International Law,’ The European Journal of International Law 22(3) 2011,
755-782; Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001), pp. 213-222; Joshua Smeltzer, ‘Hans Wehberg and the jus belli ac pacis in Interwar International
Law,’ Global Intellectual History (Online First). ‘So einfach, wie es jener Völkerbunds-Pazifismus mit
seinem Schlagwort Anarchie hinstellt, sind die großen Probleme des Völkerrechts nicht.’
98 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 159: ‘Sie kannten und wahrten . . . echtes Recht, das in sicheren Ortungen
und Ordnungen bestand.’
99 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 159: ‘Das allein ist entscheidend, weil es die Möglichkeit gibt, sin-
nvolle Kriege von Vernichtungskriegen zu unterscheiden und gegenüber der tabula rasa nihilistischer
Vergesetzlichungen die Möglichkeiten konkreter Ordnungen zu retten.’
100Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 149.
101Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 149. ‘Die Insel wurde der Träger des Raumwandels zu einem neuen
Nomos der Erde, potenziell sogar schon zum Absprungfeld für den späteren Sprung in die totale Entortung
der modernen Technik.’
102Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 149. ‘Daß sie nur damals und nur auf der englischen Insel entstehen
konnte, um . . . zur Signatur eines ganzen Zeitalters zu werden.’
103Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 150. This sentence is entirely omitted in the English edition. See
Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, p. 178. ‘Ich wollte deshalb, bevor ich mit der völkerrechtlichen
Kontroverse über die Freiheit der Meere beginne, ein so bedeutungsvolles Werk und Wort wie diese Utopie
des Thomas Mores nicht unerwähnt lassen.’
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‘manifesting a monstrous sublation of all localizations, on which the old Nomos of the Earth
was based.’104 While Schmitt maintains that ‘all law is law only at the correct location,’105
utopianism negated the localization that Schmitt held essential for the validity of law. The
etymology of utopia itself to shows that it ‘means not simply a Nowhere generally (or a
Erewhon), but rather the U-Topos, in contrast to the negation of which even the A-Topos
has still a stronger, negative connection to the topos.’106 This negation of space explains
yet another reason why, for Schmitt, Hobbes’ state of nature could not be considered a
utopia: ‘Hobbes’ state of nature is a no man’s land, therefore not at all a nowhere.’107
Instead, the Hobbesian state of nature was to be found in America, a consequence of the ‘land
appropriation of the new world.’108 Furthermore, Schmitt’s reference to Butler’s Erewhon
underscores the significance of the work for his understanding of utopia, even though Schmitt
provides no citation and excludes Butler from the index of the book – it is only by reference
to Schmitt’s notebook entries that the centrality of the work in explicating the relationship
between criminalization of war and utopianism becomes clear.
In The Nomos of the Earth, the concept of utopia contains within it both the initial spatial
revolution that culminated in the English transition into a maritime existence, as well as the
logic of its further development into an ‘industrial-technical existence.’109 This narrative
follows Schmitt’s theory of the two stages of de-localization in utopian thought, though
he omits referencing Huxley entirely. While Schmitt claims that Thomas More could be
considered as having written more of an Eutopia than an Utopia, ‘the fatal shadow had fallen,
and behind the new worldview of a world ordered from the sea, there dawned the further
future of the industrial age, which emerged from the island in the 18th century.’110 Thus,
utopia – both the word and the content of More’s novel – is not only a concept that could
have only emerged in England, but it also tracks England’s transformation from a maritime
existence into an industrial-technical existence. It is this industrial-technical existence that
is at the core of the de-localization of human nature found in Brave New World. Here,
104Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 149. ‘Utopia bekundet sich die Möglichkeit einer ungeheuerlichen
Aufhebung aller Ortungen, auf denen der alte Nomos der Erde beruhte.’
105Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 67. Repeated in Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 35.
106Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 149. ‘Utopia bedeutet ja nicht einfach allgemein ein Nirgendwo, ein
Nowhere (oder Erewhon), sondern den U-Topos, im Vergleich zu dessen Negation sogar der A-Topos noch
eine stärkere, negative Beziehung zum Topos hat.’
107Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 64. ‘Der Naturzustand von Hobbes ist ein Niemandsland, aber deshalb bei
weitem noch kein Nirgendwo.’ Emphasis in original.
108Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 53. ‘Landnahme einer neuen Welt.’
109Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 150. ‘die industriell-technische Existenz.’ See also Minca and Rowan, On
Schmitt and Space, pp. 189-191.
110Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 150: ‘Aber der verhängnisvolle Schatten war gefallen, und hinter dem
neuen Weltbild einer vom Meere aus geordneten Welt dämmerte bereits die weitere Zukunft des industriellen
Zeitalters, das im 18. Jahrhundert von der Insel seinen Ausgang nahm.’
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Schmitt’s etymological analysis turns simply on his understanding of topos: to be without
a topos means being ‘without localization [Ortung] and therefore not a concrete order.’111
Thus, a utopia is by definition the negation of a concrete order, the negation of a topos, its
annihilation. For that reason, it violates Schmitt’s very definition of law provided in this
work as the ‘unity of order and localization.’112
6.5 The New Crusaders
Writing in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Schmitt, like many German
intellectuals,113 was deeply unsettled by the advent of the atomic bomb, as the utopian
promises of ‘contemporary natural science’ had finally culminated in a new, ‘modern means
of annihilation’ with planetary consequences.114 Coupled with the criminalization of war and
the rise of a ‘completely profane technicity’ replacing the jus publicum Europaeum, Schmitt
warned of righteous wars of annihilation approaching in the horizon: ‘the bomber or the
strafer pilot uses his weapon against the population of an inimical country vertically, like St.
George used his lance against the dragon.’115 Schmitt’s reference to St. George, the patron
saint of England, was no accident – from its origins in the ‘British maritime appropriation
of the world oceans,’ to the bombing of Helgoland and technological advances in aerial
warfare, the concept of utopia and its drive to annihilation was thoroughly British.116 Far
from ushering in a golden age of peace and stability, utopianism had delivered the means
making the earth ‘entirely empty, into a tabula rasa.’117
This chapter establishes utopia as a central concept to Schmitt’s immediate postwar legal
thought, part of the dual forces threatening the very existence of jurisprudence. Over the
course of three years, Schmitt returned time and time again to the concept in his private
journal entries, connecting his critique of utopianism to a broader critique of technicity.
111Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 20: ‘Ohne Ortung und deshalb keine konkrete Ordnung.’
112Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 13: ‘Das Recht als Einheit von Ordnung und Ortung.’
113See Cara O’Connor, ‘Arendt, Jaspers, and the Politicized Physicists,’ Constellations 20(1) (2013), 102-120;
Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt: Surhkamp, 1966).
114Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, p. 285. On Schmitt’s later writings and the atomic bomb, see Gabriella Slomp,
‘The Theory of the Partisan: Carl Schmitt’s Neglected Legacy,’ History of Political Thought 26 (2005),
502-519, 516; Gabriella Slomp, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Five Arguments against the Idea of Just War,’ Cambridge
Review of International Affairs 19 (2006), 435-447, p. 443: ‘Die heutige Naturwissenschaft’; ‘der modernen
Vernichtungsmittel.’
115Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, pp. 92, 299: ‘Der Bomben- oder Tiefflieger gebraucht seine Waffe gegen die
Bevölkerung des feindlichen Landes vertikal wie der heilige Georg seine Lanze gegen Drachen gebrauchte.’
116Schmitt, Land und Meer, p. 90. ‘die britische Seenahme der Weltozeane.’
117Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 136. ‘völlig leer, zur tabula rasa gemacht.’
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In the first instance, Schmitt constructed a conceptual history focused on two utopian de-
localizations: the de-localization of space in Thomas More and the de-localization of human
nature in Aldous Huxley. However, these entries have a broader significance in revealing
utopianism as synonymous with modern means of annihilation. Rather than presenting a
brilliant future to be realized, utopia represented the negation of law and the ‘abstention from
topos.’ In the years after Germany had faced complete destruction – and indeed territorial
dismemberment by the occupying forces – utopianism would not point to the way forward;
instead, Schmitt insisted that its various manifestations in Marxism and pacifism could only
deepen the crisis. By reconstructing Schmitt’s criticism of utopianism in the fragments of
Glossarium, this chapter gives a new prism for interpreting the aim of Schmitt’s post-war
writings: to demonstrate a form of historicity that could challenge the threat of utopianism
and technology for jurisprudence. Indeed, for Schmitt, nothing less than total annihilation
was at stake.

Conclusion: The State of Historicity
There is a well established approach to the history of political thought which holds that
historical texts – for example, Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan or John Locke’s Two Treatises
of Government – ought to be read as ‘[expressing] the Question-Answer structure of all
historical situations and events. Every historical human action and deed is the answer to a
question, which itself is raised out of history.’ These questions are in turn posed by individual
authors writing within a specific historical context: ‘a historical situation is unintelligible, so
long as it is not understood as a call by humans and at the same time as the human answer
to this call. Every human word is an answer.’ According to this approach, it is the task of
the historian to first situate texts within their historical contexts, discursive paradigms, or
linguistic fields in order to identify their function as a specific, historical answer to a unique,
historical question. Indeed, such an approach holds that ‘every answer receives its meaning
through the question, which it answers, and remains meaningless for those who do not know
the question.’
This approach to the history of political thought, the tracing of a ‘Question-Answer logic,’
has its origins in the work of the British historian and philosopher R.G. Collingwood. In his
An Autobiography (1939), Collingwood asserted that intellectual historians must ‘reconstruct
the problem; or, never think you understand any statement made by a philosopher until you
have decided, with the utmost possible accuracy, what the question is to which he means
it for an answer.’1 Collingwood’s Question-Answer logic in history profoundly influenced
the first generation of contextualists and the so-called ‘Cambridge School of the History of
Political Thought’ in the work of Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock.2 Skinner, for his part,
1 R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 74. On Collingwood’s
philosophy of history, see Markku Hyrkkänen, ‘All History is, More or Less, Intellectual History: R.G.
Collingwood’s Contribution to the Theory and Methodology of Intellectual History,’ Intellectual History
Review 19(2) (2009), 251-263, pp. 253-255; James Somerville, ‘Collingwood’s Logic of Question and
Answer,’ The Monist 72(4) (1989), 526-541.
2 On Collingwood’s influence on the Cambridge School, see Kenneth McIntyre, ‘Historicity as Methodology
or Hermeneutics: Collingwood’s Influence on Skinner and Gadamer,’ Journal of the History of Philosophy
2(2) (2008), 138-166; Richard Bourke, ‘The Cambridge School,’ unpublished manuscript, pp. 2, 4; Holly
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still recalls being ‘fascinated’ by Collingwood’s The Idea of History (1946) and notes that
Collingwood’s work had ‘the most immediate and powerful influence on the direction’ of
his own scholarly project.3 Such is the foundational significance ascribed to Collingwood’s
work, and the Question-Answer logic in particular, for laying the groundwork of one of the
dominant approaches to the contemporary study of the history of political thought.
However, the quotations with which this conclusion began were first published in 1955,
not in 1939; they were composed in German, not in English; and they were written by a
jurist, not a historian. The author of the above quotations was none other than Carl Schmitt,
and the occasion for his writing was the Festschrift published to celebrate Ernst Jünger’s
sixtieth birthday.4 As the title of his essay – ‘The Historical Structure of the Contemporary
World-Opposition between East and West’ – already indicates, the larger question posed by
Schmitt’s text is how to understand the Cold War and the formation of a supposed ‘world
opposition’ between East and West. It is precisely within this context that Schmitt deals
with the methods of two English historians – R.G. Collingwood and Arnold Toynbee – in
formulating his own vision for the study and purpose of the history of political and legal
thought. To be clear, it is not the case that the above quotations were Schmitt paraphrasing
Collingwood’s method; rather, they were Schmitt describing his own method, which he
acknowledges ‘has much to do’ with Collingwood’s own Question-Answer logic. Indeed, if
the reception of Collingwood was an essential moment in the foundations of the so-called
‘Cambridge School,’ that School has an unacknowledged sibling in the jurist from Plettenberg.
Schmitt’s reflection on Collingwood, Toynbee, and the philosophy of history came as a
response to, and criticism of, Ernst Jünger’s 1953 publication, Der Gordische Knoten [‘The
Gordian Knot’].5 In this text, Jünger posits that the opposition between‘East and West’ is
Hamilton-Bleakley, ‘Linguistic Philosophy and The Foundations,’ in eds. Annabel Brett and James Tully,
Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010),
20-34, pp. 20, 22-23; Quentin Skinner, ‘Surveying the Foundations: A Retrospect and a Reassessment,’
in Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 236-261, p. 241; David Boucher, ‘Language,
Politics and Paradigms: Pocock and the Study of Political Thought,’ Polity 17(4) (1985), 761-776; Richard
Whatmore, ‘Intellectual History and the History of Political Thought,’ in eds. Richard Whatmore and Brian
Young, Advances in Intellectual History (London: Palgrave, 2006), 109-129.
3 Petri Koikkalainen and Sami Syrjänmäki, ‘On Encountering the Past - Interview with Quentin Skinner.’
4 Carl Schmitt, ‘Die geschichtliche Struktur des heutigen Welt-Gegensatzes von Ost und West,’ in Fre-
undschaftliche Begegnungen, ed. Armin Mohler (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1955), p. 151. ‘Die
Frage-Antwort-Struktur aller geschichtlichen Situationen und Ereignisse zum Ausdruck bringen. Jede
geschichtliche Handlung und Tat eines Menschen ist die Antwort auf eine Frage, die von der Geschichte
erhoben wird. Eine geschichtliche Situation ist unverständlich, solange sie nicht als ein von Menschen
vernommener Anruf und zugleich als Antwort der Menschen auf diesen Ruf verstanden wird. Jedes men-
schliche Wort ist eine Antwort. Jede Antwort erhält ihren Sinn durch die Frage, auf die sie antwortet und
bleibt sinnlos für jeden, der die Frage nicht kennt. Der Sinn der Frage wiederum liegt in der konkreten
Situation, in der sie sich erhebt.’
5 While Schmitt’s reflections appear in published form for the first time in 1955, newspaper reports of a series
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an opposition ‘of the highest degree,’ one which, like the rotation of the earth, constantly
repeats itself throughout history.6 This confrontation is, as Jünger describes it, ‘eternally
contemporary’ in new formations, and the East-West structure of the Cold War is merely
the contemporary iteration of the same conflict described Herodotus’ characterization of
the Second Persian Invasion of Greece: a conflict between Western freedom and Eastern
despotism.7 For Jünger, this conflict between two polar forces, representing two competing
ideologies, is encapsulated in the mythic symbol of the Gordian Knot: ‘The Gordian Knot
is to be conceived of as a question of destiny; it always tightens itself anew, just as the
question always poses itself anew. There appears a new light in the sword of Alexander,
Enlightenment in a higher, sunny sense.’8
For Schmitt, however, Jünger’s analysis missed the mark for two reasons. First, Schmitt
believed that ‘the truth of polar oppositions is eternally true, eternally in the sense of an eternal
return. Historical truth, by contrast, is only true once.’ Furthermore, following Heraclitus,
Schmitt held that it was ‘not possible to step into the same river twice.’9 Historical events
were singular occurrences; at best, they form parallels which can ‘serve for the understanding
of this uniqueness,’ but they never form simple repetitions or eternal reoccurrences.10 The
Cold War may express itself in the shorthand of East versus West, but it takes place in a
fundamentally different circumstance than the wars of antiquity. To hold the East-West
division as an eternal characteristic of international politics was to cement the historically
contingent, removing it of its historicity. As Schmitt argues, ‘historical thinking is thinking
about unique situations and, therewith, about unique truths.’11 In addition to critiquing
Jünger’s ‘polarity thinking’ for its insufficient historicity, Schmitt argues that Jünger accepted
‘East’ and ‘West’ as themselves pre-given concepts when, unlike the opposition between
North and South, they lack a polar referent: ‘In relation to Europe, America is to the West;
in relation to America, China and Russia are the West; and in relation to China and Russia,
of Schmitt’s public lectures in 1953 confirm that he was already speaking about Collingwood, Toynbee,
and the philosophy of history in connection with his critique of technology. See NRW 0265-19047: ‘Neue
Deutung moderner Technik,’ Iserlohn Zeitung, 17. October, 1953. See also the reference to Collingwood in
the bottom left hand corner of Schmitt’s handwritten lecture notes for the event, in NRW 0265-18962, p. 4.
6 Ernst Jünger, Der Gordische Knoten (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1953), p. 5.
7 Jünger, Der Gordische Knoten, pp. 13, 17. For Jünger, the opposition East-West is as eternal as ‘Man and
Woman’ and ‘You and I.’ See Jünger, Der Gordische Knoten, p. 150.
8 Jünger, Der Gordische Knoten, p. 147. Quoted in Schmitt, ‘Die geschichtliche Struktur des heutigen
Welt-Gegensatzes.’
9 Schmitt, ‘The Historical Structure of the Contemporary World-Opposition,’ p. 115. Schmitt, ‘Die Lage der
europäischen Rechtswissenschaft,’ p. 415. Emphasis in the original. Schmitt repeats this formulation in
Schmitt, Dialogues, p. 72. Schmitt, Positionen und Begriffe (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2014 [1939]).
10 Schmitt, ‘The Historical Structure,’ p. 114. On the occurrence of historical parallels, see Schmitt, Donoso
Cortés in gesamteuropäischer Interpretation, pp. 87-88. 92-96.
11 Schmitt, ‘The Historical Structure,’ p. 114.
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Europe is to the West.’12 More than making a superficial geographical observation, Schmitt
was instead asserting that the geographic distinction of East and West cannot possibly be the
cause of enmity and conflict.
How then to conceive of the ‘Gordian Knot’ in international politics if not characterized
by the opposition between East and West? As I have argued in chapters five and six of this
dissertation, Schmitt held that Western liberalism and Eastern socialism were closer than
either party of the Cold War cared to admit: both sides were joined in a common philosophy
of history, a grounding in technological rationality, and faith in human progress. If there
were a contemporary sword of Alexander capable of slicing through the Gordian Knot and
rendering the supposed distinction between East and West obsolete, it would thus be the
philosophy of history: as Schmitt recorded in Glossarium, ‘Ernst Jünger thinks . . . that the
philosophers of history are today more important than atomic physicists. I, the diagnostician
of the discriminating concept of war and the transformation of state war into civil war, am
not surprised.’13 For Schmitt, a return to concrete, historical thinking of the type he had
outlined in Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft would expose the true nature of
the contemporary world opposition: ‘not a polar, but rather a historical-dialectical opposition
between land and sea.’14
And so Schmitt turned to R.G. Collingwood to sharpen his sword and slice through the
Gordian Knot. This meant adopting the language of a Question-Answer logic in history,
and locating the historical situation that gave rise to the particular question: ‘every answer
receives its meaning through the question, which it answers, and remains meaningless for
those who do not know the question.’ However, Schmitt also went beyond Collingwood.
Schmitt says, for example, that it is to Collingwood’s credit that he attempted to ‘overcome
his own heritage in the non-historical positivism of the natural sciences,’ and yet, ‘the English
philosopher himself remained stuck in the conception of science of 19th century England.’15
In other words, while Collingwood had attempted to introduce a concept of historicity via
the Question-Answer logic, he ultimately failed to do so, as Collingwood’s own thought was
shaped by a different set of questions arising from positivism. Specifically, Schmitt believes
that Collingwood focuses too much on the individual and his or her individual psychology
12 Schmitt, ‘The Historical Structure,’ p. 104.
13 Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 95. ‘Ernst Jünger meint . . . daß die Geschichtsphilosophen heute wichtiger sind
als die Atom-Physiker. Natürlich. Ich, der Diagnostiker des diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriffs und der
Verwandlung des Staatenkrieges in den Bürgerkrieg, bin davon nicht überrascht.’
14 Schmitt, ‘The Historical Structure,’ p. 133. This is a reference to the opposition first posited in Schmitt,
Land und Meer.
15 Schmitt, ‘Die geschichtliche Struktur des heutigen Welt-Gegensatzes,’ p. 151. ‘um seine eigene Herkunft aus
der Ungeschichtlichkeit des naturwissenschaftlichen Positivismus zu überwinden’; ‘doch blieb der englische
Philosoph selbst viel zu tief in dem Wissenschaftsbegriff des englischen 19. Jahrhunderts stecken.’
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as opposed to the influence of culture and society in shaping questions they seek to answer.
Thus, for Schmitt, ‘it is not a single human or a sum of individual humans who pose some
question and it is even less the case that some historian ex post confronts the past with some
questions’ that he or she formulates from the vantage point of the present.16 Rather, in his
corrective to Collingwood, he argues that ‘history itself consists of concrete questions and
answers,’ meaning that even questions are historical in their origins. As Schmitt states his
interpretation in a more poetic moment, ‘by hearing the question and call of history and
attempting to answer through their behavior and deeds, humans venture into the great test of
historical power and are shaped by a court [of history]. In short: they cross over from the
state of nature into the state of historicity [in den Stand der Geschichtlichkeit].’17
In emphasizing the significance of culture and society for the formation of questions in
history, Schmitt proposes improving the limitations of Collingwood’s method by turning
to the English historian, Arnold Toynbee.18 For Schmitt, Toynbee’s Challenge-Response
structure represents a ‘significant improvement’ over Collingwood’s method: instead of
focusing on the individual and their psychology, Toynbee examines ‘high civilizations,’ ‘with
which the concrete historical challenge, the call to history, and the just-as-concrete historical
answer or response of humans must be asked.’19 Toynbee’s method thus represents an
increase in ‘knowledge production,’ which Schmitt credits for understanding ‘the dialectical
structure of every historical situation.’
However, Schmitt still distinguishes his method from the approach taken by Toynbee.
Toynbee may have refined Collingwood’s approach, but the historical method had not yet
reached its apotheosis, as even Toynbee made a fatal mistake: ‘By allowing for his more than
twenty cultures or high civilizations to be paraded out one after the other, he obscures the
substantive singularity of everything historical and thereby even the structure of the historical
[des Geschichtlichen] itself.’20 There are no eternally true historical laws, just as there is no
inevitable march of progress towards a predetermined endpoint.21 Each moment, culture,
16 Schmitt, ‘Die geschichtliche Struktur des heutigen Welt-Gegensatzes,’ pp. 151-152. ‘Dass nicht ein einzelner
Mensch oder eine Summe von einzelnen Menschen irgendeine Frage stellt und dass noch viel weniger
irgendwelche Geschichtsschreiber ex post mit irgendwelchen Fragen an die Vergangenheit herantreten,
sondern dass die Geschichte selbst in konkreten Fragen und Antworten besteht.’
17 Schmitt, ‘Die geschichtliche Struktur des heutigen Welt-Gegensatzes,’ p. 153. ‘Indem die Menschen die
Frage und den Ruf der Geschichte vernehmen und durch ihr Verhalten und ihre Taten zu beantworten suchen,
wagen sie sich in die große Probe der Geschichtsmächtigkeit hinein und werden sie geprägt durch ein Gericht.
Mit einem Wort: sie treten aus dem Naturzustand in den Stand der Geschichtlichkeit ein.’ Emphasis added.
18 Schmitt heard Toynbee speak at an event at the Akademie des deutschen Rechts in 1939. See Mehring, Carl
Schmitt, p. 369.
19 Schmitt, ‘The Historical Structure,’ p. 120.
20 Schmitt, ‘Die geschichtliche Struktur des heutigen Welt-Gegensatzes,’ p. 154.
21 On this point, Schmitt diverges from his earliest writings under National Socialism, where German history
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and civilization would need to be considered individually, in light of its concrete singularity.
Schmitt thus presents his own approach as standing in the same intellectual tradition
as Collingwood and Toynbee, while at the same time overcoming their methodological
deficiencies. Borrowing from both of these authors, Schmitt articulates a form of dialectics:
‘When we here ask about a dialectical tension, we are not looking for a general law or
a statistical probability, no more than we are looking for a general logic of a conceptual
dialectic in a systematic sense.’ This idea, he is quick to point out, is not Hegelian, though
one is tempted to immediately associate the dialectical method with Hegel. However, here
as well, Schmitt guards himself against too quick of an association. He claims that the
‘singularity can be easily lost within [Hegel’s] great systematic and thus the historical event
is transformed into a mere thought process.’
For scholars such as Reinhard Mehring, Schmitt located and developed his ‘dialectic of
history’ in the work of Hegel, advancing a series of dialectic oppositions such as land and sea,
East and West, state and revolution, and Leviathan and Behemoth. Mehring’s interpretation
follows from Schmitt’s invocation of Hegel’s Rechtsphilosophie, paragraph 247, which
Mehring interprets as ‘authorizing the dialectic of land and sea in Hegel.’22 To this point, I
agree with Mehring that this specific historical dialectic is advanced in Schmitt’s work as a
counter to Jünger’s East-West polarity; however, Mehring goes much further, arguing that
‘Schmitt enthrones himself as the decisive exegete of Hegel of the twentieth century, and takes
the place occupied by Marx.’23 This is the central claim of Mehring’s monograph: that Hegel
is the primary intellectual figure animating Schmitt’s theory of history and law. However,
as quoted above, Schmitt himself says that while he employs the term ‘dialectic,’ that he
does not use the term in a Hegelian sense; he even complains that using the term ‘dialectic’
sets one up to be seen as a Hegelian: ‘the dialectical tension . . . ought to lead us neither into
Hegelian nor into natural scientific nor even into normativistic generalities.’24 Of course,
Schmitt thinks with and mobilizes Hegel, for example during his discussion of natural law
(see chapter 3). But to read Hegel as determinate is to overlook Schmitt’s own rather explicit
formulations of his intellectual influences, namely the influence of the historical school of
law, and of Savigny in particular, as well as philosophers of history such as Collingwood and
Toynbee.
Instead, Schmitt’s method is meant to guard against both a Hegelian ‘misunderstanding
of a conceptual generalization’ as well as the transformation of a single historical event
was retroactively rewritten to lead to the formation of the Third Reich. See Smeltzer, ‘Germany’s Salvation.’
22 Mehring, Pathetisches Denken, p. 220.
23 Mehring, Pathetisches Denken, p. 220.
24 Schmitt, ‘The Historical Structure,’ p. 122.
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into something approaching a general law.25 In Jünger’s case, the East-West division was
reminiscent of the liberal belief in human progress and the centrality of class conflict under
Marxist conceptions of history. In each of these cases, a specific historical moment fell victim
to an errant ‘law ordaining madness [Vergesetzlichungs-Wahn]’.26 Instead, for Schmitt, all
historical events must be captured in their concrete singularity; there may be parallels, but
never the return of the same. In short, for Schmitt, ‘a historical truth can only be true once.’
* * *
At the first symposium dedicated to Carl Schmitt’s work organized after his death,
Helmut Quaritsch proposed a new research direction, according to which Schmitt would
be treated like Jean Bodin or any of the great authors in the history of political thought.27
For Quaritsch, it was time to break with previous scholarship, with its focus, on the one
hand, on Schmitt’s role as a ‘historical actor’ under National Socialism, and on the other,
the ‘selective’ appropriation of his theories for contemporary use. Following Quaritsch, this
dissertation has rejected using Schmitt’s theories to understand contemporary politics or
develop a normative ‘Schmittian’ political theory. Both of these approaches, I have argued,
lack a sufficient recognition of the historicity of Schmitt’s thought, its shifts over time, and
its multiple historical contexts. At the same time, however, this dissertation has insisted on
the impossibility of separating Schmitt the ‘historical actor’ from Schmitt, the newest thinker
in the modern canon of the history of political and legal thought. To do so would violate
Schmitt’s own methodological approach to the study of any ‘great thinker’ from Francisco
de Vitoria to Thomas More and Donoso Cortés, or even Jean Bodin himself.28
In 2017, Reinhard Mehring wrote that ‘Schmitt’s labyrinthine Nachlaß is not inex-
haustible,’ and that the ‘historicization of his work’ is already advanced.29 Mehring is, in
once sense, quite right: although it contains over ten thousand cataloged items, the Schmitt
Nachlaß is finite. However, the process of historicization is only at its beginning phase:
archival documents have primarily been used in countering the dominant ‘vulgar Schmit-
tianism’ that has accompanied his international reception, a seemingly perpetual task given
25 Schmitt, ‘The Historical Structure,’ p. 121.
26 Schmitt, ‘The Historical Structure,’ p. 121.
27 Reinhard Mehring, Carl Schmitt: Denker im Widerstreit (München: Verlag Karl Alber, 2017), pp. 353-354.
28 See Carl Schmitt, ‘Die Formung des französischen Geistes durch den Legisten’; and Samuel Garrett Zeitlin,
‘Politics and the History of Political Thought: Carl Schmitt’s Bodin in Nazi-Occupied Paris,’ conference
paper presented at the University of Cambridge on 12. November, 2019. On the historicity of Cortés, see
Schmitt, Donoso Cortes in gesamteuropäischer Interpretation, p. 101.
29 Quoted in Sebastian Huhnholz, ‘Hochzeit mit Machiavelli,’ Süddeutsche Zeitung, 22.7.2017. Mehring,
Denker im Widerstreit, p. 11.
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Schmitt’s increasing popularity and the flood of secondary literature. However, to accept
Schmitt’s historicity on his own terms, and arising out of his own writings, opens the possibil-
ity of internally reconstructing and reinterpreting Schmitt’s broader body of work according
to the standards he himself set out. This is the way forward.
First and foremost, this dissertation is about Carl Schmitt’s relationship to history: both
his historical and discursive context in the intellectual history of twentieth century Germany,
as well as his formulation and mobilization of historical narratives for political purposes.
This project began with Schmitt’s invocation of an ‘existential question’ facing contemporary
jurisprudence, a discipline he felt was being ‘crushed between theology and technology.’
The answer, Schmitt posited, was to be found in the ‘historicity’ of law – a concept that
remains largely ignored in Schmitt scholarship despite the central role Schmitt himself
ascribed to it. The wager of this dissertation was that this concern of an existential question
facing jurisprudence, one that Schmitt repeated in multiple publications, was of fundamental
importance to Schmitt in this period: such a warning does not come lightly, and as a
result, should occupy a key position in interpreting the aims and intentions of a lifelong
jurist. In so doing, this dissertation has shown how Schmitt used historicity to combat the
incursion of theology in the form of natural law doctrines as a type of eternally true law,
one that threatened in its contemporary manifestations to unleash ‘world civil war.’ In the
following chapter, I then showed that Schmitt’s Vitoria interpretation was directly aimed at
the American Lawyer James Brown Scott and the resurgence of liberal international theory
that asserted its intellectual heritage in Scholastic ideals. The assertion of a set of eternally
valid legal principles stood in direct contrast to Schmitt’s own assertion of the historical and
cultural contingency of law. The following two chapters of this dissertation switched to the
other side of the conceptual triangle, the relationship between technology and historicity.
Chapter five focused on Schmitt’s conception of socialism as the historical continuation of
liberalism through a common faith in human progress and the radical potential of technology
to overcome the necessity of appropriation. In the following chapter, I examined Schmitt’s
critique of political utopianism – primarily contained in his notebook entries with traces in
his Der Nomos der Erde – as an ideology that seeks to cut off the historical roots of law
while reshaping mankind according to a rational plan. Utopianism, therefore, forms the
polar opposite to natural law doctrines in Schmitt’s conceptual framework: while natural
law sought to locate timeless principles through the excavation of past authors, utopianism
asserted its validity in its claim to lie in a future perfect state. For Schmitt, once the utopian
can claim to stand on ‘the side of coming things,’ then even the annihilation of space and
human nature becomes justified. Indeed, for Schmitt, following in his interpretation of
Savigny, history did not unfold according to rational principles or casual laws reminiscent
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of the natural sciences; instead, history and law were organic in their development and
elucidation over time and thus could not be predetermined by human reason.
One important implication of this shift in interpreting Schmitt’s work and the emphasis
on historicity is that it problematizes the assumption of a consistent ‘Schmittian’ theory
across his oeuvre. Instead, each work must first be approached within its historical context;
only then can continuities and divergences be established. As a result, this dissertation has
focused on the period between 1943 and 1956, beginning with a draft manuscript of Die Lage
der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft and drawing a set of continuities and threads linking an
otherwise disparate collection of postwar texts. This shows the extent to which 1945 was not
a complete caesura in Schmitt’s thought; rather, the beginnings of Schmitt’s post-war work
was conceived of prior to the end of the war. These texts would undergo significant revisions
before publication, but their origins – and the historical questions they sought to answer –
were indeed older. At the same time, this dissertation has focused on what would normally
be considered ‘minor texts’ within Schmitt’s oeuvre. In other words, while the reception in
the Anglosphere has focused on a series of his Weimar writings – above all, The Concept of
the Political, Political Theology, and The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy – this focus
has obscured other texts, and has predetermined the reception of Schmitt’s later writings.
Thus, the texts that have traditionally been considered ‘major’ have occupied a secondary
position throughout the dissertation, primarily used to show continuities and divergences
over time rather than the core of an ahistorical ‘Schmittian’ political theory. This shift in
focus has allowed for an emphasis on a specific problem that emerges later in Schmitt’s
work. Indeed, Schmitt’s own writings were the response to specific questions, processes, and
arguments that arose out of concrete moments in history. In focusing on lesser known texts –
letters, diary entries, unpublished manuscripts, and shorter essays – I have sought to highlight
the revisions which Schmitt undertook as a result of changing historical circumstances, his
repeated insistence that his essays be treated as historical documents rather than statements
on the eternal nature of politics and law, and the extent to which even larger manuscripts
were conceived of as responses to contemporary historical problems even if the polemical
target was not explicitly identified in the text itself. At the same time, however, I have shown
that Schmitt was not merely delivering a diagnosis, recording the changing political and legal
structures around him as a passive observer; rather, he conceived of the philosophy of history
itself as a battleground for political contestation, one in which Schmitt actively participated.
‘A la historia apelo.’30
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